Autonomy as a Normative Criterion: Imagination and Reflection as Its Indicators

Author(s):  
Gustavo Pereira
Keyword(s):  
2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (5) ◽  
pp. 861-879
Author(s):  
Francesco Bogliacino ◽  
Cristiano Codagnone ◽  
Giuseppe Alessandro Veltri

AbstractIn this paper, we develop a framework to analyze the relationship between evidence and policy. Postulating a normative criterion based on cost–benefit analysis and the value of a piece of information, as well as a topology of the policy space defined by three characteristics (epistemic uncertainty, interests, and the degree of value conflicts), we identify the (Nash) equilibria of an interaction between experts and citizens in providing information to a decision maker. In this setup, we study three institutional arrangements (evidence-based policy, deliberative governance, and negotiated conflict) that differ in terms of reliance on experts and citizens for providing information. We show that different degrees of uncertainty, interests, and value-relevance surrounding the issue at stake result in vastly different arrangement performances; hence, to foster efficiency, rules should be contingent.


2018 ◽  
Vol 18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Татяна [Tatiana] Александрова [Aleksandrova] ◽  
Руска [Ruska] Станчева [Stancheva]

Inflectional types within first conjugation in standard Bulgarian The article presents the modulation models in some first conjugation verbs in the Bulgarian language based on a certain set of classification characteristics and diagnostic forms. The inflection types within one of the nine classes in which the Bulgarian verbal vocabulary are distinguished according to a procedure which comprises three levels of categorization: 1) by a morphological criterion; 2) by types of morphological (regressive) changes encoded in word-forming or grammatical forms, and 3) by a normative criterion (presence of doublets). Also considered is the combinatorics of the grammatical morphs in the set of verb forms. The presentation of formal types is done in terms of normative grammar, taking into account the dynamism of the norm. The model aims to cover the entire verbal vocabulary by uniting different lexical-grammatical classifications of the Bulgarian verbs. Typy fleksyjne w ramach pierwszej koniugacji w literackim języku bułgarskim W artykule przedstawiono propozycję zmodyfikowania klasyfikacji niektórych czasowników pierwszej koniugacji w języku bułgarskim w oparciu o pewien zestaw cech klasyfikacyjnych i form diagnostycznych. Procedura, według której bułgarskie czasowniki jednej z dziewięciu klas formalnych podzielone zostają na typy fleksyjne, składa się z trzech poziomów kategoryzacji: 1) według kryterium morfologicznego, 2) według rodzajów zmian morfologicznych (regresywnych) zakodowanych w formach słowotwórczych lub gramatycznych, 3) według kryterium normatywnego (obecność dubletów). Uwzględniana jest również kombinatoryka morfów w zbiorze form czasownika. Prezentacja cech formalnych odbywa się w gramatyce normatywnej przy uwzględnieniu dynamiki normy. Model ma na celu opracowanie wszystkich czasowników bułgarskich poprzez kombinację różnych kryteriów leksykalno-gramatycznych klasyfikacji.


Author(s):  
Robert Sugden

Chapter 5 proposes using opportunity rather than preference-satisfaction as a normative criterion. I present an ‘Individual Opportunity Criterion’, which essentially states that expansions in any individual’s opportunity set should be treated as having value to that individual. I give a contractarian justification for this criterion under the assumption that individuals’ preferences are neoclassical, arguing against philosophers who claim that preference-satisfaction is not an acceptable normative criterion, even when preferences satisfy neoclassical assumptions. I then show that the contractarian justification of the Individual Opportunity Criterion extends to cases in which those assumptions do not hold, including cases in which an individual’s decisions are dynamically inconsistent.


Author(s):  
Robert Sugden

Normative analysis in economics has usually aimed at satisfying individuals’ preferences. Its conclusions have supported a long-standing liberal tradition of economics that values economic freedom and views markets favourably. However, behavioural research shows that individuals’ preferences, as revealed in choices, are often unstable, and vary according to contextual factors that seem irrelevant for welfare. The Community of Advantage proposes a reformulation of normative economics that is compatible with what is now known about the psychology of choice. Other such reformulations have assumed that people have well-defined ‘latent’ preferences which, because of psychologically-induced errors, are not always revealed in actual choices. According to these reformulations, the economist’s job is to reconstruct latent preferences and to design policies to satisfy them. The argument of this book is that latent preference and error are psychologically ungrounded concepts, and that economics needs to be more radical in giving up rationality assumptions. The book advocates a kind of normative economics that does not use the concept of preference. Its recommendations are addressed, not to an imagined ‘social planner’, but to citizens, viewed as potential parties to mutually beneficial agreements. Its normative criterion is the provision of opportunities for individuals to participate in voluntary transactions. Using this approach, many of the normative conclusions of the liberal tradition are reconstructed. It is argued that a well-functioning market economy is an institution that individuals have reason to value, whether or not their preferences satisfy conventional axioms of rationality, and that individuals’ motivations in such an economy can be cooperative rather than self-interested.


2015 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 297-303 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Sugden

Abstract:This paper replies to Christian Schubert's critical review of my work on opportunity as a normative criterion. Schubert argues that the criterion I have proposed would not command general assent because it does not recognize the legitimacy of individuals’ preferences for achieving self-development by constraining their future opportunities. I argue that my account of the ‘responsible agent’ is compatible with self-development, and that preferences for self-constraint are less common than Schubert suggests. For the purposes of normative economics, my opportunity criterion is much more generally applicable than Schubert's criterion of ‘opportunity to learn’.


2016 ◽  
Vol 64 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Konrad Utz

AbstractKant did not explain the method of his foundation of ethics expressly. However, we can comprehend it as the demonstration of the originality of morality. For morality cannot be derived from anything non-moral – such a relation of derivation would destroy it. Therefore, there cannot be a justification or proof of morality in the strong sense, there can only be a “groundwork”, as the term “Grundlegung” is normally translated in English. This groundwork or grounding consists in disclosing the place or topos and the turn or trope of its originating. According to Kant, the first is the will as practical reason; the latter is the turn of the will towards itself as autonomy. The result of such groundwork is, first, the evidence of the authenticity of morality and, hence, its unconditional validity – since such original validity is not conditioned on anything extra-moral. Second, we get a normative criterion for the contents of morality, which in Kant takes the form of the Categorical Imperative. The article seeks to defend the view that there is no alternative to Kant’s method of the foundation of ethics. However, by describing this method in a purely formal way, the author aims to open up the possibility to implement it in another way and with other results than Kant does.


2012 ◽  
Vol 33 (01) ◽  
pp. 45-56
Author(s):  
Robert Berman

The Just State, as Richard Winfield notes at the outset, is the culmination of an ambitious project devoted to limning the contours and content of a systematic philosophy of right. Apart from its value as a substantial contribution to the understanding of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, The Just State offers its own self-standing, content-rich account of political justice. Winfield's book is overflowing with argument and analysis, which calls for careful, detailed consideration, and the brief set of comments that follow cannot possibly do it full justice. It is useful, however, to focus on a specific topic concerning normativity discussed in the ‘Introduction’. In particular, I would like to raise some questions about the principle of equal opportunity and the adjustment problem that arises from it.Before turning to those questions, it might be helpful to offer an overview of the overarching structure of The Just State. The ‘Introduction’ and eight chapters can be clustered thematically into three parts. The ‘Introduction’ has the important task of clearing away the obstacles thrown up by sceptical arguments against the very possibility of a normative theory of political justice. Chapters 1-3 set the stage for the account of political justice proper, which then takes up the remainder of the book, chapters 4-8. So the argument starts, in the ‘Introduction’, with a refutation of the sceptical denial of the project of political philosophy understood as the normative theory of political justice. This is important because the positive upshot of this anti-sceptical argument is the identification of a singular normative criterion: self-determination.


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