Normativity, Equal Opportunity, and the Adjustment Problem in The Just State

2012 ◽  
Vol 33 (01) ◽  
pp. 45-56
Author(s):  
Robert Berman
Keyword(s):  
Equal Opportunity ◽  
Normative Theory ◽  
Self Determination ◽  
Substantial Contribution ◽  
Adjustment Problem ◽  
Specific Topic ◽  
Political Justice ◽  
Systematic Philosophy ◽  
Normative Criterion ◽  
Philosophy Of Right

The Just State, as Richard Winfield notes at the outset, is the culmination of an ambitious project devoted to limning the contours and content of a systematic philosophy of right. Apart from its value as a substantial contribution to the understanding of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, The Just State offers its own self-standing, content-rich account of political justice. Winfield's book is overflowing with argument and analysis, which calls for careful, detailed consideration, and the brief set of comments that follow cannot possibly do it full justice. It is useful, however, to focus on a specific topic concerning normativity discussed in the ‘Introduction’. In particular, I would like to raise some questions about the principle of equal opportunity and the adjustment problem that arises from it.Before turning to those questions, it might be helpful to offer an overview of the overarching structure of The Just State. The ‘Introduction’ and eight chapters can be clustered thematically into three parts. The ‘Introduction’ has the important task of clearing away the obstacles thrown up by sceptical arguments against the very possibility of a normative theory of political justice. Chapters 1-3 set the stage for the account of political justice proper, which then takes up the remainder of the book, chapters 4-8. So the argument starts, in the ‘Introduction’, with a refutation of the sceptical denial of the project of political philosophy understood as the normative theory of political justice. This is important because the positive upshot of this anti-sceptical argument is the identification of a singular normative criterion: self-determination.

Hegel's System of Needs: The Elementary Relations of Economic Justice

1998 ◽  
Vol 19 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 51-72
Author(s):  
David Merrill
Keyword(s):  
Civil Society ◽  
Economic Justice ◽  
The Self ◽  
Self Determination ◽  
Social Character ◽  
Natural Necessity ◽  
Philosophy Of Right ◽  
Characteristic Features ◽  
Rule Out

The Philosophy of Right is not usually taken to contain a prescriptive ethics. Yet to establish as much regarding the elementary relations of the economy is the task of this essay. The project is cast into three parts. It begins with Hegel's account in the ‘Introduction’ of the free self prior to the exposition of the modes of just conduct or philosophy of right proper. It is an account of freedom not yet realized — without any particular content. Yet, the point is established that the philosophy of justice will be based on a twofold notion of self-determination. Most of the ‘Introduction’ concerns the argument that freedom or valid conduct has to do with pure self-determination, the self determining itself. The claim is also made that philosophy establishes its own legitimacy through its conceptual self-determination. Part two deals with the question of how freedom can be realized in civil society where the individual's governing orientation is particularity. The characteristic features of civil society do not encourage the expectation that freedom can be realized there. One, particularity itself appears to be rooted in a natural necessity which seems to preclude any possibility of freedom. Two, the inherently social character of civil society seems to rule out the exercise of a freedom that is about the self's relation to itself in self-determination. Three, the pursuit of particularity characteristic of civil society seems inherently antisocial and thus not a suitable mode of conduct for ethics. However, the argument will be made that the theory can conceive of the relations of particularity in a way that makes the free self inherently social and particularity both social and free from natural determinations.

scholarly journals Self-determination and “the Right to Specificity”. Concerning Hegel’s Theory of Modern Freedom

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 78-88
Author(s):  
Erzsébet Rózsa
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Cultural Transformation ◽  
Self Determination ◽  
Norms And Values ◽  
Normative Basis ◽  
Moral Normativity ◽  
Forms Of Life ◽  
Philosophy Of Right ◽  
The Right

In this paper, it will be shown that Hegel’s philosophical thematisation of subjective freedom has given a fundamental contribution to the historical innovation of modernity, which regards not only human rights, but also norms and values. Besides, it played an important role concerning the cultural transformation, i.e., the process of the realization of the historical innovation oriented towards the ideals of modern freedom. To show this, the author will focus on some passages from Hegel’s Philosophy of Right of 1820, in which Hegel regarded subjective freedom as universally-normative and, at the same time, as socially and historically contextualized (situated, respectively). Hegel, namely, explicates modern freedom in its ideality and moral normativity, addressing its realization in particular forms of life. Marriage, for instance, as it will be shown towards the end of this contribution, exemplified as the right to particularity, is the normative basis of modern subjective freedom. Tensions and collisions will permanently challenge this type of freedom and also require permanent (and self-defeating) efforts invested in striving for a (too contextualized and situated) „reconciliation“ (in Hegel´s terms Versöhnung).

The Ethics of Nationalism By Margaret Moore. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. 272p. $45.00.

2002 ◽  
Vol 96 (3) ◽  
pp. 618-619
Author(s):  
Chandran Kukathas
Keyword(s):  
Normative Theory ◽  
Self Determination ◽  
Moral Value ◽  
Oxford University ◽  
National Unit ◽  
Political Principle ◽  
Mistaken Assumption ◽  
Normative Problem ◽  
Normative Argument ◽  
National Membership

This fine study purports to offer “a normative theory of nationalism.” Such a theory is needed, the author claims, because most of the literature on the ethics of secession proceeds on the mistaken assumption that the normative problem of state breakup is best addressed by applying established liberal arguments or values to the issue at hand. In fact, however, it makes little sense to derive a theory of secession in this way, rather than by considering directly the kinds of normative claims secessionists make. These are nationalist claims. We need, moreover, to recognize that well-known accounts of nationalism, such as those offered by Ernest Gellner, for whom nationalism is a political principle that holds that the political and national unit should be congruent, are inadequate—either because they include too much, or because, as in the case of Gellner (Nations and Nationalism, 1983), they associate it with a particular set of demands or principles. Nationalism, according to Margaret Moore, should be understood as “a normative argument that confers moral value on national membership, and on the past and future existence of the nation, and identifies the nation with a particular homeland or part of the globe” (p. 5). Once we have understood this, we will be in a better position to understand the key policies and demands of nationalists, including their occasional (and only occasional) demands for national self-determination, and to understand the normative limits of nationalism. And we will then be in a better position to understand the nature, and defensibility, of national self-determination, and of secession in particular.

Equality of Opportunity Globalized?

2006 ◽  
Vol 19 (02) ◽  
pp. 301-318 ◽  
Author(s):  
Darrel Moellendorf
Keyword(s):  
Equal Opportunity ◽  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Self Determination ◽  
Value Pluralism ◽  
Moral View ◽  
Opportunity Sets ◽  
Positive Account ◽  
Equal Respect

The principle of global equality of opportunity is an important part of the commitment to global egalitarianism. In this paper I discuss how a principle of global equality of opportunity follows from a commitment to equal respect for the autonomy of all persons, and defend the principle against some of the criticism that it has received. The particular criticisms that I address contend that a moral view based upon dignity and respect cannot take properties of persons-such as their citizenship-as morally arbitrary, that any justification of what counts as equal opportunity sets must be based upon national cultural understandings, that a positive account of equality of opportunity cannot adequately handle the fact of value pluralism across the globe, and that the principle of equality of opportunity is incompatible with national self-determination. In the course of defending the principle of equality of opportunity from these criticisms, I make revisions to my previously published defense of the principle.

Kant's View of Reason in Politics

Philosophy ◽  
1979 ◽  
Vol 54 (207) ◽  
pp. 19-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. B. Gallie
Keyword(s):  
The State ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
General Will ◽  
Political Issue ◽  
Political Justice ◽  
Head Of State ◽  
Philosophy Of Right ◽  
Tone Of Voice

The political writings of Kant and of Hegel present two contrasts, whose connection and explanation have (so far as I know) never been adequately explored. The first contrast is in respect of the quality of their discussions of ‘home’ politics—in Kant's language, the ‘problem of establishing a perfect civic constitution’. Here Hegel shines. However much one may dislike the tone of voice, the vocabulary, the style and the arrangement of its arguments, his Philosophy of Right, especially when supplemented by his more topical political writings, presents an array of dicta, judgments and arguments of notable penetration, balance and prescience. Consider for instance his account of the very different political functions of free associations and of representative bodies, and his perception of the symbolic—but crucially symbolic—role of head of state. On these, as on many other issues, Hegel's views deserve the credit that has of late begun to be restored to them. Whatever his philosophical failings, he had a remarkable sense of the key junctures of different strands in the life of politics; so that, although the kind of state he describes and admires retains little practical relevance today, his exposition of it remains a valuable training-ground in political appreciation. By contrast Kant's philosophy of the state, as we find it in Part II of his Philosophy of Right (itself being Part I of his Metaphysics of Morals), in Part II of Theory and Practice and in Appendices I and II of Perpetual Peace, is at first sight little more than an academic exercise. It amounts to a restatement, in dehistoricized terms and in accordance with Kant's rationalist theory of morals, of Rousseau's central political teachings, viz. that an original, unanimous, unrescindable contract explains political allegiance, and that the idea of a General Will is a sufficient criterion of political justice within the state. From these two basic positions Kant develops a theory of civic obedience far more restrictive than that of Rousseau or indeed than that of Hobbes. Throughout, Kant accepts—in the spirit which one might accord to revelation—Rousseau's assumptions that government can be confined to issues that fall under a General Will, and that such a Will can be ‘found’ for the resolution of every political issue, so that honest men need never disagree about what the General Will is. But to say this is to say that Kant's concern with home politics is little more than academic.

Hegel's Critique of Liberal Theories of Rights

1974 ◽  
Vol 68 (3) ◽  
pp. 1086-1092 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter G. Stillman
Keyword(s):  
Civil Society ◽  
Political Theory ◽  
The State ◽  
Self Determination ◽  
Political Freedom ◽  
Human Being ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Philosophy Of Right

In “Abstract Right,” the first part of the Philosophy of Right, Hegel criticizes the usual content and formulations of liberal theories of rights. In terms of content, Hegel argues that the subject of rights is only a narrow abstraction from the full human being; that he has limited self-determination and limited political freedom; and that, when he acts on his rights, he produces terror and destruction. In terms of formulations, Hegel argues that the pervasiveness of contract relations is inaccurate and undesirable; that the state cannot be derived from the natural man's alienating his right to punish; and that it is inaccurate to conceptualize civil society as only limiting natural man's freedoms. By transforming natural to abstract rights, Hegel retains much of the substance of rights, while concurrently preparing for the later sections of his text which try to overcome the inadequacies of a political theory based only on rights.

The Ethics of Secession and a Normative Theory of Nationalism

2000 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 225-250 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margaret Moore
Keyword(s):  
Normative Theory ◽  
Self Determination ◽  
National Politics ◽  
Just Cause ◽  
Theories Of Justice ◽  
Collective Self ◽  
The Relationship

The three major normative theories of secession are just-cause theories, choice theories, and national self-determination theories. Just-cause and choice theories are problematic because they view secession in terms of the application of liberal theories of justice or a liberal principle of autonomy, without regard for the dynamics of nationalist mobilitization and national politics. National self-determination theories can be supported by a collective autonomy argument. This is related to a particular view of the relationship between collective self-government and territory.

National Autonomy

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wayne Norman
Keyword(s):  
Normative Theory ◽  
Self Determination ◽  
Political Leaders ◽  
Central Concept ◽  
The People ◽  
National Autonomy

What rights do nations have to govern themselves and to control specific territories and the people living on these territories? What limits are there on these rights and on the activities of national communities and their political leaders? What projects can be justified primarily by appeals to the interests and identities of nations? A well-reasoned answer to these questions could be called a normative theory of national autonomy or national self-determination, which in turn is a central part of a normative theory of nationalism. It would be an understatement to note that political philosophers are far from any consensus about the broad content of a theory of national autonomy. Almost every central concept in, and assumption underlying, the above questions is contested. There are disputes about what nations are, or even if there are such things as nations.

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