Analyzing Huawei as a Chinese Multinational Operating in Three Worlds: Domestic Policy Instrument, Global Economic Agent, and Foreign Policy Target

Author(s):  
Duane Windsor
Author(s):  
David M. Webber

Having mapped out in the previous chapter, New Labour’s often contradictory and even ‘politically-convenient’ understanding of globalisation, chapter 3 offers analysis of three key areas of domestic policy that Gordon Brown would later transpose to the realm of international development: (i) macroeconomic policy, (ii) business, and (iii) welfare. Since, according to Brown at least, globalisation had resulted in a blurring of the previously distinct spheres of domestic and foreign policy, it made sense for those strategies and policy decisions designed for consumption at home to be transposed abroad. The focus of this chapter is the design of these three areas of domestic policy; the unmistakeable imprint of Brown in these areas and their place in building of New Labour’s political economy. Strikingly, Brown’s hand in these policies and the themes that underpinned them would again reappear in the international development policies explored in much greater detail later in the book.


An enduring concern about armed humanitarian intervention, and the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ doctrine that advocates its use under certain circumstances, is that such interventions are liable to be employed as a foreign policy instrument by powerful states pursuing geopolitical interests. This collection of essays critically investigates the causes and consequences, as well as the uses and abuses, of armed humanitarian intervention. Some of the chapters interrogate how the presence of ulterior motives impact on the moral credentials of armed humanitarian intervention. Others shine a light on the potential adverse effects of such interventions, even where they are motivated primarily by humanitarian concern. While some of these unwanted consequences will be familiar to readers, others have been largely neglected in the scholarship. The volume also tracks the evolution of the R2P norm, and draws attention to how it has evolved, for better or for worse, since UN member states unanimously accepted it over a decade ago. In some respects, the norm has been distorted to yield prescriptions, and to impose constraint, fundamentally at odds with the spirit of the R2P idea. This gives us all the more reason to be cautious of unwarranted optimism about humanitarian intervention and the Responsibility to Protect.


Author(s):  
Aleksey Vladimirovich Borisov

The article contains the critical analysis of the understanding of “soft power” in Russia as a state’s foreign policy instrument. The author notes that the strategic planning guidelines defining the fundamental principles, priorities, goals and tasks in the field of foreign policy and national security contain numerous references to the importance of “soft power” and emphasize the necessity of increasing Russia’s role in the global humanitarian space. However, the instrumental understanding contradicts the initial understanding of “soft power” as a way to legitimize a state’s foreign policy efforts and leads to refocusing from the evaluation of the effect of using humanitarian technologies to the evaluation of the humanitarian activity itself. In the author’s opinion, such approach hampers the appropriate usage of Russia’s resources of “soft power” for the purposes of its foreign policy, and sidetracks from the understanding that the efforts aimed at the cultivation of soft power are directed towards a state’s internal policy, whereas being only projected outwardly.   


Author(s):  
Douglas Foyle

Dramatic changes in the way the public acquires information and formulates its attitudes have potentially altered the opinion and foreign policy relationship. While traditional approaches have treated public opinion on domestic and foreign matters as largely distinct, the culmination of a series of changes may eliminate the effective distinction between foreign and domestic policy, at least in terms of how the American political system operates. All the factors central to the opinion and foreign policy process, such as information acquisition, attitude formation, media effects, the effect of opinion on policy, and presidential leadership now appear to mirror the processes observed at the domestic level. This analysis reviews historical trends in the literature on public opinion and foreign policy that has focused on the rationality of the public’s opinions, the structure of its attitudes, and its influence on foreign policymaking. The traditional Almond-Lippmann consensus portrayed an emotional public with unstructured attitudes and little influence on foreign policy; however, revisionist views have described a reasonable public with largely structured views on foreign policy that can, at times, constrain and even drive those policies. More recently, the rise of “intermestic” issues, contain both domestic and international elements, such as globalization, inequality, terrorism, immigration, and climate change, have interacted to transform the domestic and international context. The bulk of this analysis highlights emerging new research directions that should be pursued in light of the changes. First, scholars should continue to evaluate the “who thinks what and why” questions with particular attention to differences between high- and low-information individuals, the effect of misinformation, and information sources. In doing so, research should build on research from non-American contexts that points to the important influences of societal and institutional factors. In addition to continued examination of traditional demographic factors such as partisanship and ideology, additional attention should turn to consider potential genetic and biological foundations of attitudes. Finally, researchers should continue to evaluate how the new media environment, including social media, affects how the public accesses information, how the media provides information, and how political elites attempt to shape both. Given these changes, scholars should consider whether it continues to make sense to treat public opinion dynamics regarding foreign policy as distinct from domestic policy and its implications.


Author(s):  
Clair Apodaca

The majority of countries around the world are engaged in the foreign aid process, as donors, recipients, or, oftentimes, both. States use foreign aid as a means of pursuing foreign policy objectives. Aid can be withdrawn to create economic hardship or to destabilize an unfriendly or ideologically antagonistic regime. Or, conversely, aid can be provided to bolster and reward a friendly or compliant regime. Although foreign aid serves several purposes, and not least among them the wish to increase human welfare, the primary reason for aid allocations or aid restrictions is to pursue foreign policy goals. Strategic and commercial interests of donor countries are the driving force behind many aid programs. Not only do target countries respond to the granting of bilateral and multilateral aid as an incentive, but also the threat of aid termination serves as an effective deterrent. Both the granting and the denial of foreign assistance can be a valuable mechanism designed to modify a recipient state’s behavior. Donors decide which countries will receive aid, the amount of aid provided, the time frame in which aid is given, and the channel of aid delivery. The donor’s intentions and the recipient’s level of governance determine the type or sector of foreign aid. States can choose between bilateral or multilateral methods of disbursing foreign assistance in order to pursue their interests. Although bilateral disbursements allow the donor state to have complete control over the aid donation, the use of multilateral forums has its advantages. Multilateral aid is cheaper, it disperses accountability, and it is often viewed as less politically biased. Foreign aid, once the exclusive foreign policy instrument of rich powerful states, is now being provided by middle-income countries, too. The motivation for foreign aid allocations by nontraditional donors parallels the motives of traditional Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors. A main difference between traditional and nontraditional aid donors is that nontraditional aid donors generally do not place conditionalities on their loans. The issue of fungibility can obstruct the donor government’s purpose behind the allocation of foreign aid. If the preferences of the recipient government are different from those of the donor, the recipient can often divert the aid and use it for other purposes. A recipient government may reallocate its budget after it determines how much aid it is slated to receive. The recipient government will redirect its resources to areas it deems a priority that cannot be funded externally, for example the military or prestige projects.


2012 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 145-165
Author(s):  
Hugh D. Hudson

The Soviet War Scare of 1927 is usually treated solely within the bounds of Soviet political machinations. This study explores the connection between Bolshevik domestic and foreign policy in the War Scare of 1927 with a focus on the peasants. The peasants in the early years of the NEP were seeking a compromise with the regime, seeing the relations of power following the war, the civil war, and horrendous famine of 1921-1922, not in their favor. The War Scare of 1927 altered how both the peasants and the regime saw one another and the possibility of compromise. The rumors of war were soon coupled with threats of peasants uprising against the communists. By fall 1927, both the local police in their svodki and the central OGPU in its summary reports to the political leadership were describing a mounting confrontational atmosphere among the peasants. Given the heightened anxieties within the leadership regarding the Soviet Union’s ability to defend itself, concern over the reliability of the peasantry and a demand to know more fully about the “political situation in the countryside” had reached a fever pitch. Surveiling the countryside, both the central OGPU and the party leadership concluded, not without some evidence, that a growing number of peasants desired a showdown. The War Scare of 1927 added significantly to the factors that helped set the process of collectivization in motion.


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