Emotional Agents Make a (Bank) Run

Author(s):  
Konstantinos Grevenitis ◽  
Ilias Sakellariou ◽  
Petros Kefalas
Keyword(s):  
Bank Run ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 195-204
Author(s):  
Štefan Korečko ◽  
Branislav Sobota ◽  
Peter Zemianek
Keyword(s):  

2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 873-894
Author(s):  
Markus Kinateder ◽  
Hubert János Kiss ◽  
Ágnes Pintér

Abstract In a Diamond–Dybvig type model of financial intermediation, we allow depositors to announce at a positive cost to subsequent depositors that they keep their funds deposited in the bank. Theoretically, the mere availability of public announcements (and not its use) ensures that no bank run is the unique equilibrium outcome. Multiple equilibria—including bank run—exist without such public announcements. We test the theoretical results in the lab and find a widespread use of announcements, which we interpret as an attempt to coordinate on the no bank run outcome. Withdrawal rates in general are lower in information sets that contain announcements.


2021 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 4-21
Author(s):  
Yuliya S. EVLAKHOVA

Subject. The article focuses on the dynamics of individual deposits in the Russian systemically important banks as a factor of the stability of available resources. Objectives. I assess the threat of individual deposits outflowing from the Russian too-big-to-fail banks within 2015–2019. I correspondingly outline recommendations for mitigating the threat in the future. Methods. The study is based on methods of logic, comparative and statistical analysis. I devised and applied our own algorithm for classifying too-big-to-fail banks by threat of individual deposit outflow and its level. Results. Systemically important banks were found to have not been exposed to the high threat of bank run within 2015–2019. Three fundamental credit institutions were constantly exposed to the threat of individual deposit outflow. One of eleven systemic banks continuously demonstrated the low threat of individual deposit outflow. The rest of the banks were migrating among the low-threat and high-threat classes. Conclusions and Relevance. The Russian systemically important banks can refer to our findings to articulate their deposit policy, set and use digital accounts of retail customers. The Bank of Russian can rely on the analysis of the threat of individual deposit outflow and other data on financial and business operations of the banks and its sustainability as part of bank oversight procedures.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 72-89
Author(s):  
Mirela Gutica ◽  
Stephen Petrina

Evaluating the subjective playing experience and engagement in learning is important in the design of advanced learning technologies (ALTs) that respond to the learners' cognitive and emotional states. This article addresses students' attitudes toward an educational game, Heroes of Math Island, and their responses to the emotional agent, an animated monkey. Fifteen students (seven boys and eight girls) from grades six and seven participated in this quasi-experimental study (pretest, intervention, post-test, followed by post-questionnaire and interview). This research presents a detailed analysis of students' subjective reactions with respect to Heroes of Math Island and to the underlying mathematics content, their learning gains and emotions triggered during gameplay, and design issues resulting from the evaluation of the game and of its emotional agent. The findings from this study inform how ALTs and educational games can be designed in order to be effective and provide emotional engagement, enjoyment, and learning.


2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 84
Author(s):  
Mingyuan Sun

Few derived versions based on the classic bank run model have taken into account the framing effect of general lenders. The purpose of this study is to revisit the issue and discuss a model of bank run equilibrium combined with biased risk preference, which is applied to analyze how portfolio allocation and liquidity buffer in commercial banks are affected by liquidation cost and the reference point. The results suggest the condition on which the liquidity buffer of a particular bank should provide. Liquidation cost is positively correlated with the lower bound of liquidity buffer. The effect of the reference point on liquidity buffer partially depends on the slope of yield curve term structure. Higher reference point could typically cause a lower portion of long-term investment.


Author(s):  
Gechun Liang ◽  
Eva Lütkebohmert ◽  
Yajun Xiao
Keyword(s):  

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Brown ◽  
Stefan T. Trautmann ◽  
Razvan Vlahu
Keyword(s):  

2010 ◽  
Vol 117 (4) ◽  
pp. 688-694 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Czaplicka ◽  
A. Chmiel ◽  
J.A. Hołyst

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