What Is Unique in Infant Thinking About Others? Infant Social Cognition from an Evolutionary Perspective

Author(s):  
David Buttelmann
Author(s):  
Lasana T. Harris

The second chapter introduces the evolutionary perspective on social cognition, emphasizing the prioritorizing of survival and reproduction as basic human motives. It then describes an example of the interaction between genes and environment that directs evolution, before considering the universality of emotions as an example of the product of evolutionary pressures shaped by social motives that stem from the basic human motives. It then addresses the how and why questions surrounding humans’ advanced social and intellectual abilities, pinpointing spontaneous social cognition and gesture and language respectively. It then explores modern environmental pressures that continue to guide human beings’ social and intellectual evolution.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nichola Raihani ◽  
Vaughan Bell

Although paranoia is the most commonly presenting symptom of psychosis, paranoid thoughts occur frequently in the general population and range widely in severity, from mild socio-evaluative concerns to frank delusions about the harmful intentions of others. Furthermore, paranoia commonly appears after a surprisingly diverse range of difficulties including trauma, brain injury, sleep deprivation, drug use, and psychiatric and neurological disorder. Evolutionary accounts of paranoia have been proposed before but have largely focused on paranoia as a misplaced threat response. Although social threat is clearly a key component, the experience of paranoia is markedly more complex than these accounts would lead us to believe: paranoia can involve multiple alterations in the perception of the social environment, the identification of specific but seemingly arbitrary groups as the source of persecution, and extended beliefs about conspiracy and complex coordination between the perceived persecutors. Here, we argue for an evolutionary approach to paranoia that more fully accounts for its complex social phenomenology and considers how it can be understood in light of our evolved social cognition. More specifically, in terms of the ability to form coalitions and coordinate between groups in situations of cooperation and competition.


2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Whiten

Abstract The authors do the field of cultural evolution a service by exploring the role of non-social cognition in human cumulative technological culture, truly neglected in comparison with socio-cognitive abilities frequently assumed to be the primary drivers. Some specifics of their delineation of the critical factors are problematic, however. I highlight recent chimpanzee–human comparative findings that should help refine such analyses.


2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian Robertson

Abstract Osiurak and Reynaud (O&R) claim that research into the origin of cumulative technological culture has been too focused on social cognition and has consequently neglected the importance of uniquely human reasoning capacities. This commentary raises two interrelated theoretical concerns about O&R's notion of technical-reasoning capacities, and suggests how these concerns might be met.


2016 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 257-264 ◽  
Author(s):  
Johannes H. Scheidemann ◽  
Franz Petermann ◽  
Marc Schipper

Abstract. We investigated theory of mind (ToM) deficits in Alzheimer‘s disease (AD) and its possible connection to autobiographical memory (ABM). Patients and matched controls were evaluated and compared using a video-based ToM test, an autobiographical fluency task, and a neuropsychological test battery. We found that ToM deficits were positively associated with semantic ABM in the clinical group, whereas a positive relationship appeared between ToM and episodic ABM in controls. We hypothesize that this reflects the course of the disease as well as that semantic ABM is used for ToM processing, being still accessible in AD. Furthermore, we assume that it is also less efficient, which in turn leads to a specific deficit profile of social cognition.


2014 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 187-193 ◽  
Author(s):  
Florian Müller ◽  
Klaus Rothermund

According to social cognition textbooks, stereotypes are activated automatically if appropriate categorical cues are processed. Although many studies have tested effects of activated stereotypes on behavior, few have tested the process of stereotype activation. Blair and Banaji (1996) demonstrated that subjects were faster to categorize first names as male or female if those were preceded by gender congruent attribute primes. The same, albeit smaller, effects emerged in a semantic priming design ruling out response priming by Banaji and Hardin (1996) . We sought to replicate these important effects. Mirroring Blair and Banaji (1996) we found strong priming effects as long as response priming was possible. However, unlike Banaji and Hardin (1996) , we did not find any evidence for automatic stereotype activation, when response priming was ruled out. Our findings suggest that automatic stereotype activation is not a reliable and global phenomenon but is restricted to more specific conditions.


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