Insurance Markets and Asymmetric Information

2021 ◽  
pp. 315-381
Author(s):  
Peter Zweifel ◽  
Roland Eisen ◽  
David L. Eckles
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Insurance Markets

Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets: Predictions and Tests

2013 ◽  
pp. 397-422 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pierre-André Chiappori ◽  
Bernard Salanié
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Insurance Markets

scholarly journals Testing for asymmetric information in insurance markets: A test for ex ante moral hazard revisited

2017 ◽  
Vol 150 ◽  
pp. 4-5
Author(s):  
David Rowell ◽  
Son Hong Nghiem ◽  
Luke B. Connelly
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Insurance Markets ◽  
Ex Ante Moral Hazard ◽  
Ex Ante

scholarly journals Reducing asymmetric information in insurance markets: Cars with black boxes

2010 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 394-403 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lilia Filipova-Neumann ◽  
Peter Welzel
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Insurance Markets ◽  
Black Boxes

Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets: A Multivariate Ordered Regression Approach

2016 ◽  
Vol 85 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-125 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valentino Dardanoni ◽  
Antonio Forcina ◽  
Paolo Li Donni
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Insurance Markets ◽  
Regression Approach

scholarly journals Asymmetric information in secondary insurance markets: Evidence from the life settlements market

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 1143-1175
Author(s):  
Daniel Bauer ◽  
Jochen Russ ◽  
Nan Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Life Expectancy ◽  
Life Insurance ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Economic Consequences ◽  
Insurance Markets ◽  
Term Survival ◽  
Informational Asymmetry ◽  
Life Settlements ◽  
Near Term

We use data from a large US life expectancy provider to test for asymmetric information in the secondary life insurance—or life settlements—market. We compare realized lifetimes for a subsample of settled policies relative to all (settled and nonsettled) policies, and find a positive settlement‐survival correlation indicating the existence of informational asymmetry between policyholders and investors. Estimates of the “excess hazard” associated with settling show the effect is temporary and wears off over approximately 8 years. This indicates individuals in our sample possess private information with regards to their near‐term survival prospects and make use of it, which has economic consequences for this market and beyond.

scholarly journals Trade Credit Insurance and Asymmetric Information Problem

2017 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 123-137
Author(s):  
Olena Sokolovska
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Trade Credit ◽  
Graphical Analysis ◽  
The Political ◽  
Insurance Markets ◽  
Credit Insurance ◽  
The World ◽  
Conceptual Background ◽  
Trade Credits ◽  
Information Problem

Abstract The presence of different risk factors in international trade gives evidence of the necessity of support in gaps that may affect exporters’ activity. To maximize the trade volumes and in the same time to minimize the exporters’ risks the stakeholders use trade credit insurance. The paper provides analysis of conceptual background of the trade credit insurance in the world. We analyzed briefly the problems, arising in insurance markets due to asymmetric information, such as adverse selection and moral hazard. Also we discuss the main stages of development of trade credit insurance in countries worldwide. Using comparative and graphical analysis we provide a brief evaluation of the dynamics of claims and recoveries for different forms of trade credit insurance. We found that the claims related to the commercial risk for medium and long trade credits in recent years exceed the recoveries, while with the political risk the reverse trend holds. And we originally consider these findings in terms of information asymmetry in the trade credit insurance differentiated by type of risk.

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