A Cyber Security Digital Twin for Critical Infrastructure Protection: The Intelligent Transport System Use Case

2021 ◽  
pp. 230-244
Author(s):  
Giovanni Paolo Sellitto ◽  
Massimiliano Masi ◽  
Tanja Pavleska ◽  
Helder Aranha
Keyword(s):  
Transport System ◽  
Cyber Security ◽  
Critical Infrastructure ◽  
Intelligent Transport System ◽  
Use Case ◽  
Critical Infrastructure Protection ◽  
Infrastructure Protection ◽  
Intelligent Transport ◽  
Digital Twin ◽  
System Use

Maturity and Process Capability Models and Their Use in Measuring Resilience in Critical Infrastructure Protection Sectors

2015 ◽  
pp. 506-526
Author(s):  
Clemith J. Houston Jr. ◽  
Douglas C. Sicker
Keyword(s):  
Risk Management ◽  
Cyber Security ◽  
Critical Infrastructure ◽  
Process Capability ◽  
Critical Infrastructure Protection ◽  
Maturity Models ◽  
Infrastructure Protection ◽  
Management Capabilities ◽  
Use Of Models ◽  
Measurement Capabilities

This paper provides a literature review and survey of maturity and process capability models, Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) tools and frameworks to identify strategies for assessing and measuring resilience and risk management capabilities, with a specific focus on the electricity generating sector. The focus is on the use of models such as CERT-RMM, and others, as a means of addressing challenges associated with cyber security and risk management. Foundational concepts, terminology and definitions are provided; examples of maturity and process capability models are presented and discussed, tools that enable process capability and resilience are identified, including those specific to the electricity generating sector. The evolution of models and how they have addressed challenges is presented, in addition to the characteristics and differences of models and the growth in domains where they can be used. The benefits of the application of process capability and maturity models in maintaining and enhancing resilience and cyber security protection is supported in this paper and recommendations for research opportunities that may yield further insight and measurement capabilities are offered.

Maturity and Process Capability Models and Their Use in Measuring Resilience in Critical Infrastructure Protection Sectors

2014 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 44-63
Author(s):  
Clemith J. Houston Jr. ◽  
Douglas C. Sicker
Keyword(s):  
Risk Management ◽  
Cyber Security ◽  
Critical Infrastructure ◽  
Process Capability ◽  
Critical Infrastructure Protection ◽  
Infrastructure Protection ◽  
Management Capabilities ◽  
Use Of Models ◽  
Measurement Capabilities ◽  
Provided Examples

This paper provides a literature review and survey of maturity and process capability models, Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) tools and frameworks to identify strategies for assessing and measuring resilience and risk management capabilities, with a specific focus on the electricity generating sector. The focus is on the use of models such as CERT-RMM, and others, as a means of addressing challenges associated with cyber security and risk management. Foundational concepts, terminology and definitions are provided; examples of maturity and process capability models are presented and discussed, tools that enable process capability and resilience are identified, including those specific to the electricity generating sector. The evolution of models and how they have addressed challenges is presented, in addition to the characteristics and differences of models and the growth in domains where they can be used. The benefits of the application of process capability and maturity models in maintaining and enhancing resilience and cyber security protection is supported in this paper and recommendations for research opportunities that may yield further insight and measurement capabilities are offered.

Critical Infrastructure Protection

2013 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 80-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
L. Tabansky
Keyword(s):  
Cyber Security ◽  
Critical Infrastructure ◽  
Public Security ◽  
Cyber Warfare ◽  
Critical Infrastructure Protection ◽  
Policy Changes ◽  
Infrastructure Protection ◽  
Defense Systems ◽  
Regulatory Model ◽  
National Infrastructure

Cyber Warfare holds a grave hazard of striking national infrastructure while circumventing traditional defense systems. This article examines the evolution of Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) policy in Israel and analyses its performance. Israel has developed a unique legal and regulatory model for critical infrastructure protection, which was implemented in late 2002. Recently, a comprehensive review of cyber security posture has been conducted, and significant policy changes are in progress. The Israeli approach to CIP and beyond, fostering cooperation between public, security, academic and private sectors, appears to be successful. This study of the evolution of Israeli Critical Infrastructure Protection policy may assist policy-making in other countries.

scholarly journals Russia’s Critical Infrastructure Policy: What do we Know About it?

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christer Pursiainen
Keyword(s):  
Cyber Security ◽  
Critical Infrastructure ◽  
State Of The Art ◽  
Current Situation ◽  
Security Threats ◽  
Critical Infrastructure Protection ◽  
Private Companies ◽  
Infrastructure Protection ◽  
Infrastructure Policy

Abstract The article is an analytical state-of-the-art review of the Russian Federation’s critical infrastructure policy, starting from the 1990s but zooming in on the current situation. The article discusses what does critical infrastructure mean in the Russian context. It explores the country’s threat scenarios in this field, and asks what part is played by cyber security threats in this context. Further, the article elaborates the issue whether Russia’s policy is focused on critical infrastructure protection, or has the country adopted the more recent concept of resilience that puts emphasis on adaptive measures and recovery. Finally, it is considered who are the actors in Russian critical infrastructure policy and, in particular, how does Russia deal with the fact that the respective infrastructure operators even in Russia usually are not directly state-owned entities, but private companies.

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