A Provably Secure Offline RFID Yoking-Proof Protocol with Anonymity

AbstractDue to its provable security and remarkable device-independence, masking has been widely accepted as a noteworthy algorithmic-level countermeasure against side-channel attacks. However, relatively high cost of masking severely limits its applicability. Considering the high tackling complexity of non-linear operations, most masked AES implementations focus on the security and cost reduction of masked S-boxes. In this paper, we focus on linear operations, which seems to be underestimated, on the contrary. Specifically, we discover some security flaws and redundant processes in popular first-order masked AES linear operations, and pinpoint the underlying root causes. Then we propose a provably secure and highly efficient masking scheme for AES linear operations. In order to show its practical implications, we replace the linear operations of state-of-the-art first-order AES masking schemes with our proposal, while keeping their original non-linear operations unchanged. We implement four newly combined masking schemes on an Intel Core i7-4790 CPU, and the results show they are roughly 20% faster than those original ones. Then we select one masked implementation named RSMv2 due to its popularity, and investigate its security and efficiency on an AVR ATMega163 processor and four different FPGA devices. The results show that no exploitable first-order side-channel leakages are detected. Moreover, compared with original masked AES implementations, our combined approach is nearly 25% faster on the AVR processor, and at least 70% more efficient on four FPGA devices.

Download Full-text

Breaking and (Partially) Fixing Provably Secure Onion Routing

2020 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) ◽

10.1109/sp40000.2020.00039 ◽

2020 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Christiane Kuhn ◽

Martin Beck ◽

Thorsten Strufe

Keyword(s):

Onion Routing ◽

Provably Secure

Download Full-text

Leakage-Free and Provably Secure Certificateless Signcryption Scheme Using Bilinear Pairings

The Computer Journal ◽

10.1093/comjnl/bxv002 ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 58 (10) ◽

pp. 2636-2648 ◽

Cited By ~ 7

Author(s):

SK Hafizul Islam ◽

Fagen Li

Keyword(s):

Bilinear Pairings ◽

Signcryption Scheme ◽

Provably Secure

Download Full-text

Provably secure server-aided verification signatures

Computers & Mathematics with Applications ◽

10.1016/j.camwa.2011.01.036 ◽

2011 ◽

Vol 61 (7) ◽

pp. 1705-1723 ◽

Cited By ~ 17

Author(s):

Wei Wu ◽

Yi Mu ◽

Willy Susilo ◽

Xinyi Huang

Keyword(s):

Secure Server ◽

Provably Secure

Download Full-text

A Mathematical Problem for Security Analysis of Hash Functions and Pseudorandom Generators

International Journal of Foundations of Computer Science ◽

10.1142/s0129054115500100 ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 26 (02) ◽

pp. 169-194 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Koji Nuida ◽

Takuro Abe ◽

Shizuo Kaji ◽

Toshiaki Maeno ◽

Yasuhide Numata

Keyword(s):

Mathematical Problem ◽

Security Analysis ◽

Hash Functions ◽

Future Research ◽

Theoretical Frameworks ◽

Pseudorandom Generators ◽

Mathematical Problems ◽

Security Evaluations ◽

Security Property ◽

Provably Secure

In this paper, we specify a class of mathematical problems, which we refer to as “Function Density Problems” (FDPs, in short), and point out novel connections of FDPs to the following two cryptographic topics; theoretical security evaluations of keyless hash functions (such as SHA-1), and constructions of provably secure pseudorandom generators (PRGs) with some enhanced security property introduced by Dubrov and Ishai (STOC 2006). Our argument aims at proposing new theoretical frameworks for these topics (especially for the former) based on FDPs, rather than providing some concrete and practical results on the topics. We also give some examples of mathematical discussions on FDPs, which would be of independent interest from mathematical viewpoints. Finally, we discuss possible directions of future research on other crypto-graphic applications of FDPs and on mathematical studies on FDPs themselves.

Download Full-text