The Pre-Kernel as a Fair Division Rule for Some Cooperative Game Models

Author(s):  
Holger I. Meinhardt
Author(s):  
GERHARD J. WOEGINGER

In a recent paper [International Journal of Uncertainty, Fuzziness, and Knowledge-Based Systems 8:611–618], Yager & Kreinovich characterize a certain proportional division rule in terms of the three axioms (1) symmetry, (2) participant mergability, and (3) continuity. This technical note tightens their characterization: The proportional division rule is already fully characterized by the first two axioms (1) symmetry and (2) participant mergability.


2013 ◽  
Vol 15 (02) ◽  
pp. 1340001 ◽  
Author(s):  
HERVÉ MOULIN

The fertile application of cooperative game techniques to cost sharing problems on networks has so far concentrated on the Stand Alone core test of fairness and/or stability, and ignored many combinatorial optimization problems where this core can be empty. I submit there is much room for an axiomatic discussion of fair division in the latter problems, where Stand Alone objections are not implementable. But the computational complexity of optimal solutions is still a very severe obstacle to this approach.


Author(s):  
Julius B. Barbanel ◽  
Alan D. Taylor
Keyword(s):  

2009 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 54-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yang WANG ◽  
Chuang LIN ◽  
Quan-Lin LI ◽  
Jing-Qi WANG ◽  
Xin JIANG

2000 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael J. Meurer
Keyword(s):  

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document