Interest Groups in the Policy-Making Process in Croatia

Neo-functionalism ascribes a dynamic role to interest groups in the process of integrating pluralist communities. By participating in the policymaking process, interest groups are expected to develop a stake in promoting further integration in order to acquire economic payoffs and additional benefits from maintaining and stimulating the organization through which certain demands can be articulated and goals attained. This implies that in the integration process interest groups have an instrumental role to play in the maintenance of the system; and that by virtue of their participation in the policy-making process of an integrating community they will “learn” about the rewards of such involvement and undergo attitudinal changes inclining them favorably towards the system. Thus, they acquire an interest in seeing the system's perpetuation, and the policy and decision makers acquire an interest in being responsive to interest groups' demands. What is implied overall is that actors' loyalties will shift towards those decision makers in the systems best able to reward them.

Download Full-text

9. The European Commission

European Union Politics ◽

10.1093/hepl/9780198708933.003.0009 ◽

2016 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Morten Egeberg

Keyword(s):

Policy Implementation ◽

Interest Groups ◽

European Commission ◽

Agenda Setting ◽

Policy Making ◽

International Organization ◽

External Relations ◽

Policy Making Process ◽

Defence Policy ◽

Implementation Programme

This chapter focuses on the European Commission, arguing that it is more productive to compare it to national executives or to a government than to a secretariat of a traditional international organization. It first provides an overview of the Commission's functions within the European Union's policy-making process, including agenda-setting, policy implementation, programme management, and external relations, and notes that the Commission plays a more limited role in foreign, security, and defence policy. The chapter proceeds by discussing the question of Commission influence and autonomy, along with the structure, demography, and decision behaviour within the Commission. It also describes committees and administrative networks that link the Commission to national administrations and interest groups, as well as the recent growth of EU agencies.

Download Full-text

Political Agency and Legislative Subsidies with Imperfect Monitoring

10.31235/osf.io/ydfbs ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Benjamin Blumenthal

Keyword(s):

Moral Hazard ◽

Interest Groups ◽

Adverse Selection ◽

Policy Making ◽

Political Agency ◽

Imperfect Monitoring ◽

Agency Model ◽

Policy Making Process

Politicians are expected to implement projects that benefit their constituents. These projects’ benefits sometimes partially accrue to interest groups and not entirely to voters. Since these projects are costly to implement, this provides an incentive for interest groups to intervene in the policy-making process by offering legislative subsidies to politicians. In addition, voters are frequently ill-equipped to scrutinise politicians’ actions and can often only imperfectly monitor them. This paper shows how these considerations interact in a stylised two-periods political agency model with moral hazard and adverse selection. I show how and when voters benefit from the existence of self-interested interest groups and of their involvement in the policy-making process. I also consider how voters monitor politicians in the presence of interest groups that might capture projects’ benefits.

Download Full-text

Interest groups in the policy-making process

Politics in the Republic of Ireland ◽

10.4324/9780203982563-13 ◽

2012 ◽

pp. 352-383

Author(s):

Gary Murphy

Keyword(s):

Interest Groups ◽

Policy Making ◽

Policy Making Process

Download Full-text

The Political Economy of National Climate Policy: Cases of U.S.A., Germany and Japan

International Area Review ◽

10.1177/223386590500800110 ◽

2005 ◽

Vol 8 (1) ◽

pp. 183-203

Author(s):

Soonjae Shin

Keyword(s):

Political Economy ◽

Environmental Policy ◽

Interest Groups ◽

Climate Policy ◽

Policy Making ◽

Policy Instruments ◽

The Political ◽

Design And Implementation ◽

Political Dominance ◽

Policy Making Process

A growing amount of literature in the political economy suggests that the implementation of an environmental policy is limited due to the complexity of the interests of different interest groups and the political dominance of the polluting industries. This paper examines this insufficient implementation of an environmental concept in the case of the climate policy in the U.S.A., Germany and Japan. The focuses of this analysis are the choice, design and implementation of climate policy instruments in these countries. Starting from the fact that interest groups in the policy-making process prefer different policy instruments, the analysis shows which interests are enforced via which political instrument.

Download Full-text

Business Coordination and Tax Politics

Political Studies ◽

10.1177/0032321715616287 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 65 (1) ◽

pp. 122-143 ◽

Cited By ~ 8

Author(s):

Néstor Castañeda

Keyword(s):

Interest Groups ◽

Tax Policy ◽

Policy Making ◽

Developed Countries ◽

Policy Integration ◽

Tax Reforms ◽

Original Dataset ◽

Business Politics ◽

Policy Making Process ◽

Business Interest

Business interest groups are crucial actors for tax policy-making, but it is still unclear under which conditions they are more successful than politicians in shaping taxation. This article argues that centralised coordination and high levels of policy integration make business interest groups more influential in the tax policy-making process. If there is no ideological convergence between agenda setters and business, highly centralised and well-integrated business interest groups are more successful in blocking or softening revenue-raising tax reforms or simply transferring tax burdens to consumers or non-organised citizens. To evaluate this theoretical framework, I have compiled an original dataset on business groups and associations for 18 countries in Latin America between 1990 and 2010. This theory uncovers a strong link between the patterns of business coordination and the feasibility of implementing distributive tax policies. This article also contributes to the study of business politics beyond the limited sample of developed countries.

Download Full-text

The Origins and Maintenance of Interest Groups in America

American Political Science Review ◽

10.2307/1958924 ◽

1983 ◽

Vol 77 (2) ◽

pp. 390-406 ◽

Cited By ~ 305

Author(s):

Jack L. Walker

Keyword(s):

Public Policy ◽

Interest Groups ◽

Policy Making ◽

Response Rate ◽

Voluntary Associations ◽

National Level ◽

Group Leaders ◽

Policy Goals ◽

Policy Making Process ◽

Different Sources

Rather than striving to measure the influence of groups in the policy-making process this article concentrates instead on the ways in which interest groups are created and the means by which they remain in existence. A survey by mail was conducted during 1980-1981 of all voluntary associations that are open to membership and concerned with some aspects of public policy at the national level. The sample of groups was chosen from the Congressional Quarterly's Washington Information Directory. Questionnaires were delivered to 913 interest groups, and usable responses were received from 564, yielding a response rate of 64.8%.Most studies of groups have concerned the tactics employed by group leaders in attracting and holding their members. This study demonstrates that the origins and maintenance of groups depends even more upon the success of group leaders in securing funds from outside their membership which are needed to keep their groups in operation. Estimates of patronage from different sources are provided as well as data on the congruence between the policy goals of groups and their patrons.

Download Full-text