Collective Action Theory Meets the Blogosphere: A New Methodology

Author(s):  
Nitin Agarwal ◽  
Merlyna Lim ◽  
Rolf T. Wigand
2018 ◽  
Vol 73 (1) ◽  
pp. 90-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lu Gram ◽  
Nayreen Daruwalla ◽  
David Osrin

Community mobilisation interventions have been used to promote health in many low-income and middle-income settings. They frequently involve collective action to address shared determinants of ill-health, which often requires high levels of participation to be effective. However, the non-excludable nature of benefits produced often generates participation dilemmas: community members have an individual interest in abstaining from collective action and free riding on others’ contributions, but no benefit is produced if nobody participates. For example, marches, rallies or other awareness-raising activities to change entrenched social norms affect the social environment shared by community members whether they participate or not. This creates a temptation to let other community members invest time and effort. Collective action theory provides a rich, principled framework for analysing such participation dilemmas. Over the past 50 years, political scientists, economists, sociologists and psychologists have proposed a plethora of incentive mechanisms to solve participation dilemmas: selective incentives, intrinsic benefits, social incentives, outsize stakes, intermediate goals, interdependency and critical mass theory. We discuss how such incentive mechanisms might be used by global health researchers to produce new questions about how community mobilisation works and conclude with theoretical predictions to be explored in future quantitative or qualitative research.


2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 449-476
Author(s):  
Niels Selling

AbstractWhat determines whether or not firms lobby on the same policy issues? Scholars offer two broad answers to this question. Firms that are (1) similar or (2) connected through interorganizational ties target the same policy issues. In this article, I argue that the co-occurrence of these two conditions produces the opposite outcome, namely a tendency to lobby on different issues. This expectation draws on ideas from collective action theory and the literature on issue niches. From these, I derive the following assumptions: similar firms share political objectives and they should, when possible, act collectively by jointly delegating their lobbying activities. The reason for doing this is that it allows them to focus on their issue niches. However, the ability to delegate hinges on coordination and monitoring, which is facilitated by interorganizational relations. To test this proposition, I study the largest American corporations. The dependent variable is activity overlap, a measure of the extent to which firms lobby on the same issues. According to expectations, activity overlap is reduced when firms operate in the same industry and, simultaneously, enjoy favorable conditions for social interactions, such as a concentrated market structure. These results lend support to collective action theory.


2018 ◽  
Vol 56 (11) ◽  
pp. 2357-2372
Author(s):  
Richard S. Brown

Purpose Previous research combining corporate political activity and collective action theory has focused solely on industry structure and its role in predicting group lobbying or PAC participation. The purpose of this paper is to use a different context—franchise systems—to apply Olsonian collective action theory to political activities. Design/methodology/approach Using a random-effects technique in STATA on an unbalanced panel data set, this paper empirically models the effects of franchise system size and degree of franchising on the level of lobbying intensity. Findings Since franchise systems are made up of differing unit ownership structure, the author first model if those systems that are fully franchised lobby less than those with franchisor unit ownership (supported). Next, since collective action theory predicts that more participants in a space will lead to less collective action, the author predict that franchise systems with larger unit counts will lobby less than those with smaller counts (not supported). Finally, the author test the interaction of these two effects as systems that are fully franchised and of higher unit totals should have an even greater negative relationship with political activity (supported). Originality/value This paper uses both a novel data set and a novel context to study collective action. Previous research has utilized an industry structure context to model the level of lobbying and collective action, while the current research uses an analogous logic, but in the context of franchise systems.


2009 ◽  
Vol 59 (2) ◽  
pp. 279-287 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Bowen ◽  
G. Acciaioli

This paper presents a model of development action synthesising the development arena framework with collective action theory. It shows how application of this model in the Engineers Without Borders Australia (EWB) water supply improvement and capacity building project in Tenganan, Indonesia has helped to maximise the extent to which the project practice can reflect the project rhetoric as “bottom-up” or community-inspired. The model posits a broad range of stakeholders actively engaged in development action: each stakeholder is different, with its own interests, missions, procedures, and ways of deploying power in development action. Recognising the multiplicity of subjects of development is especially crucial for improving bottom-up practice. Connections and interactions among stakeholders are inherently problematic, and must be negotiated to accomplish development work, as tensions in the dynamic among stakeholders may operate to restrict the success of these “bottom-up” development projects.


ILR Review ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 73 (4) ◽  
pp. 995-1020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah Ashwin ◽  
Chikako Oka ◽  
Elke Schuessler ◽  
Rachel Alexander ◽  
Nora Lohmeyer

Using qualitative data from interviews with multiple respondents in 45 garment brands and retailers, as well as respondents from unions and other stakeholders, the authors analyze the emergence of the Action Collaboration Transformation (ACT) living wages initiative. They ask how the inter-firm coordination and firm–union cooperation demanded by a multi-firm transnational industrial relations agreement (TIRA) developed. Synthesizing insights from the industrial relations and private governance literatures along with recent collective action theory, they identify a new pathway for the emergence of multi-firm TIRAs based on common group understandings, positive experiences of interaction, and trust. The central finding is that existing union-inclusive governance initiatives provided a platform from which spillover effects developed, facilitating the formation of new TIRAs. The authors contribute a new mapping of labor governance approaches on the dimensions of inter-firm coordination and labor inclusiveness, foregrounding socialization dynamics as a basis for collective action and problematizing the limited scalability of this mode of institutional emergence.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Verenice Y. Heredia Espinoza

Intermediate socio-spatial units (ISUs), materialized as neighborhoods and districts, were important elements in the ordering of the built environment in large ancient settlements. They are indicative of an increasing vertical and horizontal complexity because they lie between households and the governing authority. Collective action theory holds that ISUs can take many forms and can be created through bottom-up, top-down, or top-down/bottom-up processes. The distribution of ISUs in the context of other architectural elements illuminates the degree to which collective policies shaped urban landscapes. This article identifies districts and neighborhoods, two types of ISUs, at the site of Los Guachimontones (Jalisco, Mexico) through a study of its internal spatial organization. Intensive survey and mapping have identified thousands of architectural elements, including the circular complexes known as guachimontones. Thiessen polygon analysis reveals that guachimontones are an important feature of the site's spatial organization, as well as to the materialization of ISUs and other socio-spatial units. Broadly speaking, the organization of these built spaces reveals that their growth can be attributed to collectively oriented political strategies.


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