La decisión de desmovilizarse de las FARC-EP antes del Acuerdo Final para la Paz. Una aproximación desde la teoría de la acción colectiva (Deciding to Demobilize From the FARC-EP Before the Final Agreement for Peace a Collective Action Theory Approach)

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lizeth Melissa Molina Alvarez
Author(s):  
Irene Moreno Bibiloni

El siguiente trabajo tiene como objetivo fundamental realizar un acercamiento a las campañas del lazo azul que se dieron en los años noventa en el País Vasco propiciadas por la Coordinadora Gesto por la Paz de Euskal Herria, en tanto que iniciativa social novedosa ante la violencia terrorista en el País Vasco. Partimos de la hipótesis de la importancia de los movimientos sociales, en este caso el pacifista, para comprender la historia reciente del País Vasco y la evolución de la actitud frente a ETA. La clave para este acercamiento ha sido el estudio de los sentimientos y las emociones como elemento a tener en cuenta en el comportamiento colectivo, más allá de los aspectos racionales que han venido destacando las teorías clásicas de la movilización social. Propongo para este análisis una metodología basada en la historia oral, para tratar de centrar la atención en lo que la emoción genera en relación a la acción colectiva y la movilización ciudadana. Así pues, a las fuenteshemerográficas y documentales se han sumado las orales, a través del análisis de entrevistas semiestructuradas a integrantes de Gesto por la Paz, para reconstruir y comprender qué suponía significarse públicamente contra la violencia política.PALABRAS CLAVE: País Vasco, movilizaciones pacifistas, Gesto por la Paz, historia oral, lazo azul.ABSTRACTThe following study seeks to carry out an examination of the so-called lazo azul (blue ribbon) campaigns during the 1990s in the Basque Country, promoted by the Coordinadora Gesto por la Paz de Euskal Herria. The key to this approach is the study of the feelings and emotions as the primary element to consider in collective behaviour, going beyond the rational aspects which have been highlighted by the classical theories concerning social mobilizations. In order to develop the analysisI use a methodology based on oral history to try to focus on what emotion generates in relation to collective action and citizen mobilizations. Apart from documentary and newspapers sources, oral ones have been added through the analysis of semi-structured interviews of members of Gesto por la Paz, so that what it meant to declare oneself in public against political violence and what was felt when participating in these mobilizations can be rebuilt and understood.KEY WORDS: Basque Country, peace demonstrations, Gesto por la Paz, oral history, blue ribbon.


2021 ◽  
pp. 109-129
Author(s):  
Calla Hummel

Chapter 5 develops an ethnography of street vendors, their organizations, and the city officials who they interact with in the city of La Paz, Bolivia. The chapter is based on 14 months of ethnographic fieldwork in the city over four research trips in 2012, 2014 to 2015, 2018, and 2019 as well as administrative data on 31,906 street vending licenses in the city. Fieldwork included interviews, participant observation at dozens of meetings between bureaucrats and organized vendors, ride-alongs with the Municipal Guard, a street vendor survey, working as a street vendor in a clothing market, and selling wedding services with a street vendor cooperative. The theory’s observable implications are illustrated with ethnographic evidence, survey results, and license data from La Paz. I discuss how street vending has changed in the city and how officials have intervened in collective action decisions as the informal sector grew. The chapter demonstrates that officials increased benefits to organized vendors as the costs of regulating markets increased. Additionally, the leaders that take advantage of these offers tend to have more resources than their colleagues, and as the offers increased, so did the level of organization among the city’s street vendors. The chapter also discusses the many trade-offs that officials make in implementing different policies, and how officials manage the often combative organizations that they encourage.


2018 ◽  
Vol 73 (1) ◽  
pp. 90-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lu Gram ◽  
Nayreen Daruwalla ◽  
David Osrin

Community mobilisation interventions have been used to promote health in many low-income and middle-income settings. They frequently involve collective action to address shared determinants of ill-health, which often requires high levels of participation to be effective. However, the non-excludable nature of benefits produced often generates participation dilemmas: community members have an individual interest in abstaining from collective action and free riding on others’ contributions, but no benefit is produced if nobody participates. For example, marches, rallies or other awareness-raising activities to change entrenched social norms affect the social environment shared by community members whether they participate or not. This creates a temptation to let other community members invest time and effort. Collective action theory provides a rich, principled framework for analysing such participation dilemmas. Over the past 50 years, political scientists, economists, sociologists and psychologists have proposed a plethora of incentive mechanisms to solve participation dilemmas: selective incentives, intrinsic benefits, social incentives, outsize stakes, intermediate goals, interdependency and critical mass theory. We discuss how such incentive mechanisms might be used by global health researchers to produce new questions about how community mobilisation works and conclude with theoretical predictions to be explored in future quantitative or qualitative research.


2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 449-476
Author(s):  
Niels Selling

AbstractWhat determines whether or not firms lobby on the same policy issues? Scholars offer two broad answers to this question. Firms that are (1) similar or (2) connected through interorganizational ties target the same policy issues. In this article, I argue that the co-occurrence of these two conditions produces the opposite outcome, namely a tendency to lobby on different issues. This expectation draws on ideas from collective action theory and the literature on issue niches. From these, I derive the following assumptions: similar firms share political objectives and they should, when possible, act collectively by jointly delegating their lobbying activities. The reason for doing this is that it allows them to focus on their issue niches. However, the ability to delegate hinges on coordination and monitoring, which is facilitated by interorganizational relations. To test this proposition, I study the largest American corporations. The dependent variable is activity overlap, a measure of the extent to which firms lobby on the same issues. According to expectations, activity overlap is reduced when firms operate in the same industry and, simultaneously, enjoy favorable conditions for social interactions, such as a concentrated market structure. These results lend support to collective action theory.


2018 ◽  
Vol 56 (11) ◽  
pp. 2357-2372
Author(s):  
Richard S. Brown

Purpose Previous research combining corporate political activity and collective action theory has focused solely on industry structure and its role in predicting group lobbying or PAC participation. The purpose of this paper is to use a different context—franchise systems—to apply Olsonian collective action theory to political activities. Design/methodology/approach Using a random-effects technique in STATA on an unbalanced panel data set, this paper empirically models the effects of franchise system size and degree of franchising on the level of lobbying intensity. Findings Since franchise systems are made up of differing unit ownership structure, the author first model if those systems that are fully franchised lobby less than those with franchisor unit ownership (supported). Next, since collective action theory predicts that more participants in a space will lead to less collective action, the author predict that franchise systems with larger unit counts will lobby less than those with smaller counts (not supported). Finally, the author test the interaction of these two effects as systems that are fully franchised and of higher unit totals should have an even greater negative relationship with political activity (supported). Originality/value This paper uses both a novel data set and a novel context to study collective action. Previous research has utilized an industry structure context to model the level of lobbying and collective action, while the current research uses an analogous logic, but in the context of franchise systems.


2004 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 289-302 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susan H. Foster-Cohen

The discussion in this article offers a comparison between Relevance Theory as an account of human communication and Herbert Clark’s (1996)sociocognitive Action Theory approach. It is argued that the differences are fundamental and impact analysis of all kinds of naturally occurring communicative data, including that produced by non-native speakers. The differences are discussed and illustrated with data from second language communication strategies. It is suggested that the often fraught interactions between native and non-native speakers are better captured through a Relevance Theory approach than through the alternatives.


2009 ◽  
Vol 59 (2) ◽  
pp. 279-287 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Bowen ◽  
G. Acciaioli

This paper presents a model of development action synthesising the development arena framework with collective action theory. It shows how application of this model in the Engineers Without Borders Australia (EWB) water supply improvement and capacity building project in Tenganan, Indonesia has helped to maximise the extent to which the project practice can reflect the project rhetoric as “bottom-up” or community-inspired. The model posits a broad range of stakeholders actively engaged in development action: each stakeholder is different, with its own interests, missions, procedures, and ways of deploying power in development action. Recognising the multiplicity of subjects of development is especially crucial for improving bottom-up practice. Connections and interactions among stakeholders are inherently problematic, and must be negotiated to accomplish development work, as tensions in the dynamic among stakeholders may operate to restrict the success of these “bottom-up” development projects.


ILR Review ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 73 (4) ◽  
pp. 995-1020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah Ashwin ◽  
Chikako Oka ◽  
Elke Schuessler ◽  
Rachel Alexander ◽  
Nora Lohmeyer

Using qualitative data from interviews with multiple respondents in 45 garment brands and retailers, as well as respondents from unions and other stakeholders, the authors analyze the emergence of the Action Collaboration Transformation (ACT) living wages initiative. They ask how the inter-firm coordination and firm–union cooperation demanded by a multi-firm transnational industrial relations agreement (TIRA) developed. Synthesizing insights from the industrial relations and private governance literatures along with recent collective action theory, they identify a new pathway for the emergence of multi-firm TIRAs based on common group understandings, positive experiences of interaction, and trust. The central finding is that existing union-inclusive governance initiatives provided a platform from which spillover effects developed, facilitating the formation of new TIRAs. The authors contribute a new mapping of labor governance approaches on the dimensions of inter-firm coordination and labor inclusiveness, foregrounding socialization dynamics as a basis for collective action and problematizing the limited scalability of this mode of institutional emergence.


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