Was There any Coherent European China Policy in the Case of the EU Arms Embargo on China?

AbstractThis article investigates the sudden rise and subsequent slow decline of the European Union (EU) in Chinese diplomacy between 2002 and 2007. China’s decision in 2003 to consider relations with the EU as ‘strategic’ in nature does not reflect a fundamental change of mind but rather a perception of favourable circumstances. China has a long track record of high expectations towards a united Europe. After the World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations had created a positive image of a united and independent EU, the transatlantic rift over the Iraq War in 2002 and 2003 seemed to present an international environment that was conducive to stronger China‐EU ties. Subsequently, however, the difficulties of engaging with a complex entity like the EU have contributed to souring diplomatic relations. This development is traced for two major cases of Chinese foreign policy towards the EU: the quest for recognition as a market economy; and the push to have the EU’s arms embargo lifted. Over time, Chinese engagement with the EU on these issues has gone through different phases, reflecting repeated attempts to improve the diplomatic approach, to eliminate unsuccessful strategies and to react to EU feedback. China has not yet reached its goal on either issue. The article concludes by pointing to the specific difficulties that have emerged from the evolution of Chinese diplomacy towards the EU on these two cases.

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The EU and China, 2006 to 2016: A Clash Between Interests and Values

British Journal of Chinese Studies ◽

10.51661/bjocs.v8i2.10 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 8 (2) ◽

pp. 120-129

Author(s):

Kerry Brown

Keyword(s):

European Union ◽

Market Economy ◽

External Action ◽

Foreign Affairs ◽

The European Union ◽

Republic Of China ◽

Chinese Studies ◽

Arms Embargo ◽

The Relationship ◽

The Eu

In the last decade, while undergoing its own reform through the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 which created a designated foreign affairs body across the 28 member states, the European External Action Service (EEAS), the European Commission has also produced two major communications on relations with the People’s Republic of China. The first, in 2006, was issued at a time when the European Union (EU) was just recovering from its failure to lift the arms embargo on China, and was being criticised by Beijing because it had not accorded market economy status to a country that had become its largest trading partner. The second came out in 2016, at a time when the relationship had settled into a more pragmatic mould, though the continuing refusal to grant market economy status still rankled with the Chinese partners. At time of publication of this article, the journal operated under the old name. When quoting please refer to the citation on the left using British Journal of Chinese Studies. The pdf of the article still reflects the old journal name; issue number and page range are consistent.

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Rethinking non-recognition: The EU’s Investment Agreement with Taiwan under the One-China Policy

Leiden Journal of International Law ◽

10.1017/s0922156520000291 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 33 (3) ◽

pp. 689-712

Author(s):

Pasha L. Hsieh

Keyword(s):

International Relations ◽

Asia Pacific ◽

The European Union ◽

China Policy ◽

Investment Protection ◽

Investment Agreement ◽

The One ◽

Interdisciplinary Study ◽

Trade And Investment ◽

The Eu

AbstractThis article re-examines the theories of recognition and non-recognition in the context of the evolving framework of the European Union (EU)’s trade and investment relations with Taiwan from legal and international relations perspectives. Notwithstanding its one-China policy, the EU has developed a pragmatic approach to engaging Taiwan under bilateral consultations and World Trade Organization negotiations that have built the foundation for the bilateral investment agreement (BIA). The article argues that since the 1980s, the EU has accorded diverse forms of recognition to Taiwan and the BIA will buttress the process. To substantiate the contention, the article systemically explores the political and trade policies of European states and EU institutions in line with their strategies toward cross-strait relations.By deciphering the new momentum that has galvanized the European Commission’s strategy towards the EU-Taiwan BIA, the research sheds light on the implications of European Parliament resolutions and the EU’s investment talks with China. The structure and impact of the BIA are also analysed in light of EU investment protection agreements with Singapore and Vietnam. Hence, the findings contribute to the interdisciplinary study of international law and international relations and enhance the understanding of the EU’s Asia-Pacific trade and investment agreements.

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EU Common Security and Defence Policy and China: a case study of coopetition

10.31338/1641-2478pe.3.20.7 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. 107-123

Author(s):

Boris Litwin

Keyword(s):

Foreign Policy ◽

China Policy ◽

Eu Member States ◽

Defence Policy ◽

Dual Perspective ◽

China’S Foreign Policy ◽

Cooperation Partner ◽

The Eu ◽

Common Security

With the 2019 EU–China Strategic Outlook, the EU has revalidated its dual perspective on China as cooperation partner and strategic competitor at the same time. So far, considerations of China in EU and EU Member States have primarily focused on economic questions. However, as China‘s foreign policy becomes more assertive and visible via military deployments in the EU‘s geopolitical neighbourhood, the EU needs to confront this challenge by giving appropriate and concrete political responses in a geostrategic context as well. Based on the concept of „coopetition“, this article provides an analysis and subsequent recommendations on how the EU can integrate the “China factor” in its Common Security and Defence Policy, while ensuring that a balance of cooperation and competition in EU’s China policy is retained

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Italy’s China policy is becoming more hard-line

Emerald Expert Briefings ◽

10.1108/oxan-db266350 ◽

2021 ◽

Keyword(s):

Prime Minister ◽

Economic Sanctions ◽

Economic Downturn ◽

China Policy ◽

Content Type ◽

The Eu

Significance However, since then, Rome has become increasingly hawkish over China, a shift which has intensified under Prime Minister Mario Draghi’s period in office. Draghi has already blocked three Chinese acquisitions of Italian firms this year, and stated he will assess Italy’s future participation in the BRI. Impacts Beijing’s decision to impose economic sanctions on Lithuania will put pressure on the EU to adopt a tougher China policy. EU fiscal and monetary support should reduce the appeal of hard-line Eurosceptism in Italy. Italy will be slow to advance projects envisaged under the 2019 MoU, although a future economic downturn could alter the dynamics.

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The EU-China’s Strategic Partnership: A Case Study of the EU’s Arms Embargo against China

The Agora Political Science Undergraduate Journal ◽

10.29173/agora12406 ◽

2011 ◽

Vol 2 (1) ◽

pp. 52-60

Author(s):

Yixiong Huang

Keyword(s):

The United States ◽

Strategic Partnership ◽

Reform Process ◽

Decision Making Process ◽

Strategic Issues ◽

Strategic Cooperation ◽

Arms Embargo ◽

The Relationship ◽

The Eu

In 2003, the EU and China established a strategic partnership intended to deepen their bilateral relationship not only economically, but also strategically. However, the EU-China relations are still challenged by several ideological and strategic issues. This paper will evaluate the EU-China’s strategic partnership by presenting a case study of the EU’s arms embargo against China since the 1989 Tiananmen Incident. This paper will argue that although the EU-China’s strategic partnership has a strong foundation of bilateral economic and strategic cooperation, the relationship between the EU and China is still very weak: (1) ideologically, the EU is still unsatisfied with China’s human rights record and political reform process; and (2) strategically, the United States (U.S.) still plays an influential role the EU’s external decision-making process.

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Europe will find ways to work more closely with Taiwan

Emerald Expert Briefings ◽

10.1108/oxan-db266115 ◽

2021 ◽

Keyword(s):

Member State ◽

China Policy ◽

Member States ◽

Content Type ◽

The One ◽

The Eu

Significance Taipei has seized the opportunity, increasing its lobbying of both EU institutions and member states. China has threatened that those supporting closer ties with Taiwan will "pay a heavy price”. Impacts The Czech Republic’s new government will promote ties with Taiwan as during its presidency of the EU Council in the second half of 2022. No member state or EU institution is ready to abandon the 'One China' policy, but they will find ways to increase interaction with Taipei. There will be further rhetorical skirmishes and credible Chinese threats of sanctions on European individuals promoting ties with Taiwan.

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Beyond the Arms Embargo: EU Transfers of Defense and Dual-Use Technologies to China

Journal of East Asian Studies ◽

10.1017/s1598240800008304 ◽

2013 ◽

Vol 13 (3) ◽

pp. 457-482 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Oliver Bräuner

Keyword(s):

Asia Pacific ◽

Individual Member ◽

Security Threat ◽

Scientific Cooperation ◽

Economic Interests ◽

Member States ◽

Strategic Approach ◽

Military Systems ◽

Arms Embargo ◽

The Eu

China has largely been cut off from direct transfers of military systems and technologies since the announcement of the EU arms embargo in 1989. Nevertheless, the EU and its member states remain a major source of high technologies for China, namely, by means of trade, investment, and scientific cooperation. This is mainly because the EU-China relationship continues to be dominated by the economic interests of individual member states, both in trade and increasingly in investments. Furthermore, due to a lack of direct security interests in the Asia-Pacific, Europeans do not generally see China as a security threat or a strategic competitor. Therefore, the EU has so far failed to develop a strategic approach toward the potential security implications of transfers of European militarily sensitive technologies that goes beyond the existing arms embargo and currently lacks effective mechanisms to control the flow of such technologies to China.

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