Arithmetic as Number Theory, Set Theory and Logic

1993 ◽  
pp. 27-109
Author(s):  
Petr Hájek ◽  
Pavel Pudlák
Keyword(s):  
Number Theory ◽  
Set Theory

scholarly journals A system of axiomatic set theory. Part III. Infinity and enumerability. Analysis

1942 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 65-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Bernays
Keyword(s):  
Number Theory ◽  
Set Theory ◽  
Real Numbers ◽  
Full Generality ◽  
Axiomatic Set Theory

The foundation of analysis does not require the full generality of set theory but can be accomplished within a more restricted frame. Just as for number theory we need not introduce a set of all finite ordinals but only a class of all finite ordinals, all sets which occur being finite, so likewise for analysis we need not have a set of all real numbers but only a class of them, and the sets with which we have to deal are either finite or enumerable.We begin with the definitions of infinity and enumerability and with some consideration of these concepts on the basis of the axioms I—III, IV, V a, V b, which, as we shall see later, are sufficient for general set theory. Let us recall that the axioms I—III and V a suffice for establishing number theory, in particular for the iteration theorem, and for the theorems on finiteness.

Category theory, introduction to

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin McLarty
Keyword(s):  
Number Theory ◽  
Set Theory ◽  
Category Theory ◽  
Standard Set ◽  
Universe Of Sets ◽  
The Universe

A ‘category’, in the mathematical sense, is a universe of structures and transformations. Category theory treats such a universe simply in terms of the network of transformations. For example, categorical set theory deals with the universe of sets and functions without saying what is in any set, or what any function ‘does to’ anything in its domain; it only talks about the patterns of functions that occur between sets. This stress on patterns of functions originally served to clarify certain working techniques in topology. Grothendieck extended those techniques to number theory, in part by defining a kind of category which could itself represent a space. He called such a category a ‘topos’. It turned out that a topos could also be seen as a category rich enough to do all the usual constructions of set-theoretic mathematics, but that may get very different results from standard set theory.

Certain predicates defined by induction schemata

1953 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-59 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hao Wang
Keyword(s):  
Number Theory ◽  
Set Theory ◽  
Formal System ◽  
General Notion ◽  
Constant Number ◽  
Natural Numbers ◽  
System L ◽  
Truth Definition ◽  
Consistency Proofs ◽  
Special Case

It is known that we can introduce in number theory (for example, the system Z of Hilbert-Bernays) by induction schemata certain predicates of natural numbers which cannot be expressed explicitly within the framework of number theory. The question arises how we can define these predicates in some richer system, without employing induction schemata. In this paper a general notion of definability by induction (relative to number theory), which seems to apply to all the known predicates of this kind, is introduced; and it is proved that in a system L1 which forms an extension of number theory all predicates which are definable by induction (hereafter to be abbreviated d.i.) according to the definition are explicitly expressible.In order to define such predicates and prove theorems answering to their induction schemata, we have to allow certain impredicative classes in L1. However, if we want merely to prove that for each constant number the special case of the induction schema for a predicate d.i. is provable, we do not have to assume the existence of impredicative classes. A certain weaker system L2, in which only predicative classes of natural numbers are allowed, is sufficient for the purpose. It is noted that a truth definition for number theory can be obtained in L2. Consistency proofs for number theory do not seem to be formalizable in L2, although they can, it is observed, be formalized in L1.In general, given any ordinary formal system (say Zermelo set theory), it is possible to define by induction schemata, in the same manner as in number theory, certain predicates which are not explicitly definable in the system. Here again, by extending the system in an analogous fashion, these predicates become expressible in the resulting system. The crucial predicate instrumental to obtaining a truth definition for a given system is taken as an example.

Towards a consistent set-theory

1951 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 130-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Myhill
Keyword(s):  
Number Theory ◽  
Real Number ◽  
Set Theory ◽  
Mathematical Practice ◽  
Axiom Of Choice ◽  
Small Fragment ◽  
Real Numbers ◽  
The Real ◽  
Classical Construction

In a previous paper, I proved the consistency of a non-finitary system of logic based on the theory of types, which was shown to contain the axiom of reducibility in a form which seemed not to interfere with the classical construction of real numbers. A form of the system containing a strong axiom of choice was also proved consistent.It seems to me now that the real-number approach used in that paper, though valid, was not the most fruitful one. We can, on the lines therein suggested, prove the consistency of axioms closely resembling Tarski's twenty axioms for the real numbers; but this, from the standpoint of mathematical practice, is a pitifully small fragment of analysis. The consistency of a fairly strong set-theory can be proved, using the results of my previous paper, with little more difficulty than that of the Tarski axioms; this being the case, it would seem a saving in effort to derive the consistency of such a theory first, then to strengthen that theory (if possible) in such ways as can be shown to preserve consistency; and finally to derive from the system thus strengthened, if need be, a more usable real-number theory. The present paper is meant to achieve the first part of this program. The paragraphs of this paper are numbered consecutively with those of my previous paper, of which it is to be regarded as a continuation.

Finite set theory, number theory and axioms of limitation

1966 ◽  
Vol 164 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth R. Brown ◽  
Hao Wang
Keyword(s):  
Number Theory ◽  
Set Theory ◽  
Finite Set ◽  
Finite Set Theory

Set theoretic properties of Loeb measure

1990 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 1022-1036 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arnold W. Miller
Keyword(s):  
Number Theory ◽  
Set Theory ◽  
Measure Zero ◽  
Continuum Hypothesis ◽  
Zero Set ◽  
Zero Sets ◽  
Martin’S Axiom ◽  
Basic Set ◽  
Nonstandard Models ◽  
The Continuum

AbstractIn this paper we ask the question: to what extent do basic set theoretic properties of Loeb measure depend on the nonstandard universe and on properties of the model of set theory in which it lies? We show that, assuming Martin's axiom and κ-saturation, the smallest cover by Loeb measure zero sets must have cardinality less than κ. In contrast to this we show that the additivity of Loeb measure cannot be greater than ω1. Define cof(H) as the smallest cardinality of a family of Loeb measure zero sets which cover every other Loeb measure zero set. We show that card(⌊log2(H)⌋) ≤ cof (H) ≤ card(2H), where card is the external cardinality. We answer a question of Paris and Mills concerning cuts in nonstandard models of number theory. We also present a pair of nonstandard universes M ≼ N and hyperfinite integer H ∈ M such that H is not enlarged by N, 2H contains new elements, but every new subset of H has Loeb measure zero. We show that it is consistent that there exists a Sierpiński set in the reals but no Loeb-Sierpiński set in any nonstandard universe. We also show that it is consistent with the failure of the continuum hypothesis that Loeb-Sierpiński sets can exist in some nonstandard universes and even in an ultrapower of a standard universe.

scholarly journals A system of axiomatic set theory. Part V. General set theory (continued)

1943 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 89-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Bernays
Keyword(s):  
Number Theory ◽  
Set Theory ◽  
Transfinite Induction ◽  
Recursive Definition ◽  
Axiomatic Set Theory

We have still to consider the extension of the methods of number theory to infinite ordinals—or to transfinite numbers as they may also, as usual, be called.The means for establishing number theory are, as we know, recursive definition, complete induction, and the “principle of the least number.” The last of these applies to arbitrary ordinals as well as to finite ordinals, since every nonempty class of ordinals has a lowest element. Hence immediately results also the following generalization of complete induction, called transfinite induction: If A is a class of ordinals such that (1) ΟηA, and (2) αηA → α′ηA, and (3) for every limiting number l, (x)(xεl → xηA) → lηA, then every ordinal belongs to A.

scholarly journals Set Theory INC# ∞# Based on Innitary Intuitionistic Logic with Restricted Modus Ponens Rule. Hyper Inductive Denitions. Application in Transcendental Number Theory. Generalized Lindemann-Weierstrass Theorem

2021 ◽  
pp. 70-119
Author(s):  
Jaykov Foukzon
Keyword(s):  
Number Theory ◽  
Set Theory ◽  
Intuitionistic Logic ◽  
Theoretical Language ◽  
Modus Ponens ◽  
Transcendental Number ◽  
Weierstrass Theorem ◽  
Induction Principle ◽  
Intuitionistic Set Theory ◽  
Intuitionistic Arithmetic

In this paper intuitionistic set theory INC#∞# in infinitary set theoretical language is considered. External induction principle in nonstandard intuitionistic arithmetic were derived. Non trivial application in number theory is considered.The Goldbach-Euler theorem is obtained without any references to Catalan conjecture. Main results are: (i) number ee is transcendental; (ii) the both numbers e + π and e − π are irrational.

Between number theory and set theory

1953 ◽  
Vol 126 (1) ◽  
pp. 385-409 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hao Wang
Keyword(s):  
Number Theory ◽  
Set Theory
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