Children, the Feminist Ethic of Care and Childhood Studies: Is This the Way to the Good Life?

Author(s):  
Tom Cockburn
1997 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
David M Smith

Social justice has returned to the geographical agenda, but in an intellectual environment different from that in which ‘radical geography’ emerged more than two decades ago. The author attempts to (re)integrate the notion of social justice with some broader conception of the good life. An egalitarian formulation of distributive justice is posited, to set the scene for an argument that its application requires reference to the way of life in which it is embedded. Postapartheid South Africa is used for illustrative purposes. It is argued that the interdependence of distributional and relational aspects of justice might find fruitful expression in a universal ethic of care, as a central feature of a good way of life.


1992 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 133-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julia Annas

It is well-known that in recent years, alongside the familiar forms of modern ethical theory, such as consequentialism, deontology, and rights theory, there has been a resurgence of interest in what goes by the name of “virtue ethics” — forms of ethical theory which give a prominent status to the virtues, and to the idea that an agent has a “final end” which the virtues enable her to achieve. With this has come an increase of theoretical (as opposed to antiquarian) interest in ancient ethical theories, particularly Aristotle's, an interest which has made a marked difference in the way ethics is pursued in the Anglo-Saxon and European intellectual worlds.In this essay, I shall not be discussing modern virtue ethics, which is notably protean in form and difficult to pin down. I shall be focusing on ancient eudaimonistic ethical theories, for in their case we can achieve a clearer discussion of the problem I wish to discuss (a problem which arises also for modern versions of virtue ethics which hark back to the ancient theories in their form).


Horizons ◽  
1993 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 115-117
Author(s):  
John Carmody

During a recent meeting of Jewish, Christian, and Muslim theologians in Graz, Austria, as various speakers discussed the concept of the good life, on the way to preparing a statement on global ethics, I found thoughts of death shifting the horizon within which I was considering the different arguments. Similarly, during recent work on a Jectio divina of John's Gospel, I felt myself drawn to images magnifying the theme, “in him was life,” because I wanted help contending with death. The following brief elaboration of these two experiences may illustrate concretely Nietzsche's dictum that all who philosophize defend themselves. As well, it may expose the roots of a thesis that deeper interpretation is usually religious, because usually we forge it at the crossroads of our contingency and the necessity that there be more. Following the exposition of these two possibilities, I shall suggest a few implications for pedagogy.


1982 ◽  
Vol 28 ◽  
pp. 64-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mary Margaret Mackenzie

A paradox is like a pun. It is also like a Delphic oracle. For in all three cases, we escape puzzlement, or spoil the joke, when we interpret, when we follow the tracks of the words and disentangle their meaning. So paradoxes are about words - either about the relation between one word and another, or about the relation between words and the world; and the punch of the paradox is delivered by its verbal content. Thus it is characteristic of a good paradox that its verbal content is vicious: paradoxes are very often self-referential, such as ‘Please ignore this notice’.Paradoxes may be classified according to two main types. Firstly, there are the innocuous paradoxes which tell - or point the way to - a surprising truth. The Socratic Paradoxes, for example, are paradoxical because to say ‘No-one does wrong willingly’ is to contradict the phenomena. But deeper reflection upon Socrates' moral psychology and his account of the good life, might make us concede the truth of his dictum. Certainly it is Socrates' view that we all hold beliefs that entail his thesis. Similarly Heracleitus tells the truth that we cannot step into the same (in all respects) river twice; although if we concede that the waters may flow without damaging the identity of the river, what he says is false. Thus ordinary paradoxes tend to have two faces - their initial, paradoxical one, where they appear false, and their truth, apparent upon reflection.


Hypatia ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 6-19
Author(s):  
Kathryn J. Norlock

What if it doesn't get better? Against more hopeful and optimistic views that it is not just ideal but possible to put an end to what John Rawls calls “the great evils of human history,” I aver that when it comes to evils caused by human beings, the situation is hopeless. We are better off with the heavy knowledge that evils recur than we are with idealizations of progress, perfection, and completeness; an appropriate ethic for living with such heavy knowledge could include resisting evils, improving the lives of victims, and even enjoying ourselves. Better conceptions of the objects of hope, and the good life, inform a praxis‐centered, nonideal, feminist ethic, supportive of sustained moral motivation, resilience, and even cheer. I connect elements of stoic and pessimistic philosophy in order to outline some normative recommendations for living with evils. A praxis‐centered ethic would helpfully adjust our expectations from changing an uncontrollable future to developing better skills for living in a world that exceeds our control. As Aldo Leopold once said, “That the situation is hopeless should not prevent us from doing our best.”


2009 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel A. Butler

This paper argues that, Marx’s insistences notwithstanding, there is an ethical core to Marx’s critique of capitalism. I attempt to establish this claim through presenting salient points of Marx’s critique. From this basis, I move on to discuss Marx’s conception of human nature and the way in which it is typically frustrated under pre-communist societies. This frustration is the basis for a moral preference for communism. After pausing briefly to consider the possible criticism that this moral preference is mere ideology, I conclude with the normative heart of the matter. This is addressed by underscoring principal similarities between Marx’s work and Aristotle’s ethical project, insofar as each comprehends an intuitive description of the good life and an analysis of the prerequisites for obtaining it. A grasp of this similarity opens the door to understanding the normative flip side of Marx’s intellectual project.


Pneuma ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 279-290
Author(s):  
Steven Félix-Jäger

Abstract Methods within visual culture studies can reveal the aesthetic stimuli that shape the way a religious group pictures or visualizes existence. Studying the visual culture of a religious movement allows one to see what formational mechanisms already exist and how the stimuli implicitly or explicitly support the movement’s theological commitments. This article suggests an approach for understanding Pentecostalism anew in its own distinct theological and sociological terms by categorizing the contours of the religious visual cultures of global Pentecostalism. This article argues that theologies of abundance are largely at play in the visual cultures of global Pentecostalism, and this can be demonstrated by identifying the visual stimuli that form religious experience and shape the way Pentecostals around the world imagine, understand, and project reality.


2019 ◽  
pp. 235-252
Author(s):  
Russell E. Jones

At Philebus 59d10–64c4, Socrates offers a recipe for the good life. His recipe reveals pure knowledge as the most important ingredient. Not only is pure knowledge valuable on its own, but it must be present for the other ingredients to make their own distinctive contributions to the good life. It determines which other ingredients are to be included, and in what manner and what amounts. The passage thus prepares the way for knowledge, and particularly pure knowledge, to be ranked ahead of pleasure as most responsible for the good life.


2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 215-237
Author(s):  
Philip J. Ivanhoe

This essay offers an introduction to Jeong Yakyong’s (Dasan’s) ethical philosophy as revealed by his commentary on the Mengzi. Following Mengzi, Dasan insisted that the Confucian Way was grounded in the will of Heaven but looked back to early views about the Lord on High and described ethical life in terms of an everyday, natural order decreed by the Lord on High. Not only did he see a wide range of human emotions as indispensable and central to the good life, he also insisted that Heaven and the Way must be understood in terms of their manifestations in this world.


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