Death as a Hermeneutic

Horizons ◽  
1993 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 115-117
Author(s):  
John Carmody
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Good Life ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Global Ethics ◽  
Recent Meeting ◽  
John's Gospel ◽  
The Way

During a recent meeting of Jewish, Christian, and Muslim theologians in Graz, Austria, as various speakers discussed the concept of the good life, on the way to preparing a statement on global ethics, I found thoughts of death shifting the horizon within which I was considering the different arguments. Similarly, during recent work on a Jectio divina of John's Gospel, I felt myself drawn to images magnifying the theme, “in him was life,” because I wanted help contending with death. The following brief elaboration of these two experiences may illustrate concretely Nietzsche's dictum that all who philosophize defend themselves. As well, it may expose the roots of a thesis that deeper interpretation is usually religious, because usually we forge it at the crossroads of our contingency and the necessity that there be more. Following the exposition of these two possibilities, I shall suggest a few implications for pedagogy.

Virtue Epistemology and the Democratic Life

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin Farrelly
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Good Life ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Human Flourishing ◽  
Intellectual Humility ◽  
Social Existence ◽  
Original Meaning ◽  
The Social ◽  
Democratic Life

Integrating insights from the Ancient Greeks (e.g. concerning virtue, eudaimonia, and the original meaning of “democracy”), John Dewey, and recent work in virtue epistemology, this chapter develops a virtue-based defense of democracy, one that conceives of democracy as an inquiry-based mode of social existence. This account of democracy is developed by responding to three common concerns raised against democracy, which the author calls the Irrationality Problem, the Problem of Autonomy, and the Epistocracy Objection. Virtue epistemology can help elucidate the link between democracy and human flourishing by drawing attention to democracy’s potential for cultivating and refining the “intellectual virtues” (e.g. intellectual humility, fairness in evaluating the arguments of others, the social virtue of being communicative, etc.) constitutive of the good life.

The Good Life and the Good Lives of Others

1992 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 133-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julia Annas
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Good Life ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Anglo Saxon ◽  
Ethical Theories ◽  
Good Lives ◽  
The Way

It is well-known that in recent years, alongside the familiar forms of modern ethical theory, such as consequentialism, deontology, and rights theory, there has been a resurgence of interest in what goes by the name of “virtue ethics” — forms of ethical theory which give a prominent status to the virtues, and to the idea that an agent has a “final end” which the virtues enable her to achieve. With this has come an increase of theoretical (as opposed to antiquarian) interest in ancient ethical theories, particularly Aristotle's, an interest which has made a marked difference in the way ethics is pursued in the Anglo-Saxon and European intellectual worlds.In this essay, I shall not be discussing modern virtue ethics, which is notably protean in form and difficult to pin down. I shall be focusing on ancient eudaimonistic ethical theories, for in their case we can achieve a clearer discussion of the problem I wish to discuss (a problem which arises also for modern versions of virtue ethics which hark back to the ancient theories in their form).

scholarly journals Paradox in Plato's ‘Phaedrus’

1982 ◽  
Vol 28 ◽  
pp. 64-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mary Margaret Mackenzie
Keyword(s):  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Good Life ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
The World ◽  
Verbal Content ◽  
The Way

A paradox is like a pun. It is also like a Delphic oracle. For in all three cases, we escape puzzlement, or spoil the joke, when we interpret, when we follow the tracks of the words and disentangle their meaning. So paradoxes are about words - either about the relation between one word and another, or about the relation between words and the world; and the punch of the paradox is delivered by its verbal content. Thus it is characteristic of a good paradox that its verbal content is vicious: paradoxes are very often self-referential, such as ‘Please ignore this notice’.Paradoxes may be classified according to two main types. Firstly, there are the innocuous paradoxes which tell - or point the way to - a surprising truth. The Socratic Paradoxes, for example, are paradoxical because to say ‘No-one does wrong willingly’ is to contradict the phenomena. But deeper reflection upon Socrates' moral psychology and his account of the good life, might make us concede the truth of his dictum. Certainly it is Socrates' view that we all hold beliefs that entail his thesis. Similarly Heracleitus tells the truth that we cannot step into the same (in all respects) river twice; although if we concede that the waters may flow without damaging the identity of the river, what he says is false. Thus ordinary paradoxes tend to have two faces - their initial, paradoxical one, where they appear false, and their truth, apparent upon reflection.

scholarly journals Philosophy and the good life

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Angela Hobbs
Keyword(s):  
Young People ◽  
Recent Work ◽  
Good Life ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
Ethical Framework ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Greek Philosophy ◽  
Ancient Greek ◽  
Children And Young People ◽  
Ancient Greek Philosophy

This paper considers the implications for education of a reworked ancient Greek ethics and politics of flourishing (particularly as found in Plato), where ‘flourishing’ comprises the objective actualisation of our intellectual, imaginative and affective potential. A brief outline of the main features of an ethics of flourishing and its potential attractions as an ethical framework is followed by a consideration of the ethical, aesthetic and political requirements of such a framework for the theory and practice of education, indicating the ways in which my approach differs from other recent work in the field. I argue that the teaching of philosophy in schools and philosophical approaches to the teaching of other subjects are ideally suited to meet the pedagogic requirements of individual and communal flourishing so understood, contributing greatly both to the understanding of what a well-lived life might be, and to the actual living of it. I further argue that these requirements are not only derived from ancient Greek philosophy but are in turn especially well-served by the teaching and deployment of Greek philosophy itself. My claim is not that Greek philosophy has all the answers, or that other philosophers and philosophical approaches should be excluded; it is simply that Greek philosophy offers rich resources for those seeking to introduce children and young people to philosophy and to foster thereby their flourishing in both childhood and as adults.

scholarly journals Seeing the Other Side of the Coin: (Re)Constructing the Normative Flipside to Marx’s Sociology.

2009 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel A. Butler
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Good Life ◽  
The Other ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Salient Points ◽  
Ethical Project ◽  
The Way

This paper argues that, Marx’s insistences notwithstanding, there is an ethical core to Marx’s critique of capitalism. I attempt to establish this claim through presenting salient points of Marx’s critique. From this basis, I move on to discuss Marx’s conception of human nature and the way in which it is typically frustrated under pre-communist societies. This frustration is the basis for a moral preference for communism. After pausing briefly to consider the possible criticism that this moral preference is mere ideology, I conclude with the normative heart of the matter. This is addressed by underscoring principal similarities between Marx’s work and Aristotle’s ethical project, insofar as each comprehends an intuitive description of the good life and an analysis of the prerequisites for obtaining it. A grasp of this similarity opens the door to understanding the normative flip side of Marx’s intellectual project.

Material Visions of the Good Life

Pneuma ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 279-290
Author(s):  
Steven Félix-Jäger
Keyword(s):  
Visual Culture ◽  
Good Life ◽  
Religious Movement ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Culture Studies ◽  
Visual Culture Studies ◽  
The World ◽  
The Aesthetic ◽  
Visual Cultures ◽  
The Way

Abstract Methods within visual culture studies can reveal the aesthetic stimuli that shape the way a religious group pictures or visualizes existence. Studying the visual culture of a religious movement allows one to see what formational mechanisms already exist and how the stimuli implicitly or explicitly support the movement’s theological commitments. This article suggests an approach for understanding Pentecostalism anew in its own distinct theological and sociological terms by categorizing the contours of the religious visual cultures of global Pentecostalism. This article argues that theologies of abundance are largely at play in the visual cultures of global Pentecostalism, and this can be demonstrated by identifying the visual stimuli that form religious experience and shape the way Pentecostals around the world imagine, understand, and project reality.

Cooking Up the Good Life with Socrates

2019 ◽  
pp. 235-252
Author(s):  
Russell E. Jones
Keyword(s):  
Good Life ◽  
The Other ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Important Ingredient ◽  
Pure Knowledge ◽  
The Way

At Philebus 59d10–64c4, Socrates offers a recipe for the good life. His recipe reveals pure knowledge as the most important ingredient. Not only is pure knowledge valuable on its own, but it must be present for the other ingredients to make their own distinctive contributions to the good life. It determines which other ingredients are to be included, and in what manner and what amounts. The passage thus prepares the way for knowledge, and particularly pure knowledge, to be ranked ahead of pleasure as most responsible for the good life.

What Makes the Good Life Good? An Investigation into the Nature of Happiness

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elyse Platt
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Good Life ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Valuable Contribution ◽  
Suitable Alternative ◽  
Happy Life ◽  
Contemporary Philosopher ◽  
Fred Feldman

My research focuses on the nature of happiness as presented by contemporary philosopher Fred Feldman in his recent work, What is This Thing Called Happiness?(2010). Feldman offers an innovative theory of happiness that suggests happiness is contingent on a subject’s capacity to acquire more pleasure than displeasure in his or her surroundings. Feldman’s model is a valuable contribution to the study of happiness because it calls attention to the power a subject has in determining her own happiness. Like many of his predecessors including Aristotle, Feldman describes the happy life as the Good Life. However, where Aristotle measures the Good Life in terms of virtue, Feldman uses welfare as his metric. A problem with Feldman’s approach is that he rejects Aristotle’s arguments for why happiness is the Good without providing a suitable alternative. In this paper, I address the limitations of Feldman’s model by examining the implications of this omission. I will argue that Feldman lacks a conclusive argument for why the Good Life consists of welfare. Most significantly, Feldman’s account is problematic because it leads to the unusual conclusion that many of us are not in fact pursuing the Good Life for fear of becoming moral monsters. By reintroducing virtue into our description of happiness, and arguments for why happiness is our greatest good, I think that we can rescue contemporary theories of happiness from the repugnant moral conclusions that I have suggested are present in Feldman’s work.

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