Nash Game-Theoretic Model for Optimizing Pricing and Inventory Policies in a Three-Level Supply Chain

2011 ◽  
pp. 555-566 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yun Huang ◽  
George Q. Huang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Inventory Policies ◽  
Nash Game ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model

scholarly journals Motivating Supplier Social Responsibility Under Incomplete Visibility

2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (6) ◽  
pp. 1268-1286 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tim Kraft ◽  
León Valdés ◽  
Yanchong Zheng
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Investment Decision ◽  
Problem Definition ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Practical Relevance ◽  
Managerial Implications ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model

Problem definition: We examine how a profit-driven firm (she) can motivate better social responsibility (SR) practices by a supplier (he) when these practices cannot be perfectly observed by the firm. We focus on the firm’s investment in the supplier’s SR capabilities. To capture the influence of consumer demands, we incorporate the potential for SR information to be disclosed by the firm or revealed by a third party. Academic/practical relevance: Most firms have limited visibility into the SR practices of their suppliers. However, there is little research on how a firm under incomplete visibility should (i) invest to improve a supplier’s SR practices and (ii) disclose SR information to consumers. We address this gap. Methodology: We develop a game-theoretic model with asymmetric information to study a supply chain with one supplier and one firm. The firm makes her investment decision given incomplete information about the supplier’s current SR practices. We analyze and compare two settings: the firm does not disclose versus she discloses SR information to the consumers. Results: The firm should invest a high (low) amount in the supplier’s capabilities if the information she observes suggests the supplier’s current SR practices are poor (good). She should always be more aggressive with her investment when disclosing (versus not disclosing). This more aggressive strategy ensures better supplier SR practices under disclosure. When choosing between disclosing and not disclosing, the firm most likely prefers not to disclose when the supplier’s current SR practices seem to be average. Managerial implications: (i) Greater visibility helps the firm to better tailor her investment to the level of support needed. (ii) Better visibility also makes the firm more “truthful” in her disclosure, whereas increased third-party scrutiny makes her more “cautious.” (iii) Mandating disclosure is most beneficial for SR when the suppliers’ current practices seem to be average.

Supply Chain Risk Management

2007 ◽  
pp. 355-387
Author(s):  
Thorsten Blecker ◽  
Wolfgang Kersten ◽  
Hagen Spath ◽  
Birit Koeppen
Keyword(s):  
Risk Management ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Supply Chain Risk Management ◽  
Supply Chain Risk ◽  
Supply Chain Efficiency ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Supply Chain Risks

This chapter introduces a game-theoretic approach to supply chain risk management. The focus of this study lies on the risk of a single supply chain member defecting from common supply chain agreements, thereby jeopardizing the overall supply chain performance. The chapter goes on to introduce a manual supply chain game, by which dynamic supply chain mechanisms can be simulated and further analyzed using a game-theoretic model. With the help of the game-theoretic model, externalities are identified that negatively impact supply chain efficiency. The conclusion drawn from this chapter is that incentives are necessary to overcome these externalities in order to align supply chain objectives. The authors show that the game-theoretic model, in connection with the supply chain game presented, provides an informative basis for the future development of incentives by which supply chains can be aligned in order to reduce supply chain risks.

scholarly journals Strategy Analysis of Selling Model Selection in Vertical Competition Supply Chains: A Game Theoretic Model

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Qian Chen ◽  
Sen Liu ◽  
Lijun Wang ◽  
Zhe Zhang ◽  
Xiaojun He
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Price Elasticity ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Strategy Analysis ◽  
Cross Price Elasticity ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
The Cross ◽  
Pareto Improving ◽  
Improve Supply Chain

This paper takes the supply chain perspective to study the choice of selling model for manufacturers and e-tailers. To accomplish our objective, we consider three selling models, including reselling, agency selling, and mixed selling. By comparing and analyzing the equilibrium outcomes of the three selling models, we obtain some beneficial results. These results show that manufacturers and e-tailers cannot manage to make a profit at the same time whether they choose the reselling model or agency selling model. Our results also show that the mixed selling model may improve supply chain performance, as long as the cross-price elasticity is not low. Especially when the cross-price elasticity is comparatively high, a manufacturer and an e-tailer in vertical competition can achieve a profit-Pareto-improving situation, regardless of the market share of the e-tailer.

Supply Chain Risk Management

2009 ◽  
pp. 318-343
Author(s):  
Thorsten Blecker ◽  
Wolfgang Kersten ◽  
Hagen Späth ◽  
Birgit Koeppen
Keyword(s):  
Risk Management ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Supply Chain Risk Management ◽  
Supply Chain Risk ◽  
Supply Chain Efficiency ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Supply Chain Risks

This chapter introduces a game-theoretic approach to supply chain risk management. The focus of this study lies on the risk of a single supply chain member defecting from common supply chain agreements, thereby jeopardizing the overall supply chain performance. The chapter goes on to introduce a manual supply chain game, by which dynamic supply chain mechanisms can be simulated and further analyzed using a game-theoretic model. With the help of the game-theoretic model, externalities are identified that negatively impact supply chain efficiency. The conclusion drawn from this chapter is that incentives are necessary to overcome these externalities in order to align supply chain objectives. The authors show that the game-theoretic model, in connection with the supply chain game presented, provides an informative basis for the future development of incentives by which supply chains can be aligned in order to reduce supply chain risks.

Contract design for a multi-channel hotel service supply chain

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 371-392
Author(s):  
Xiaoyan Zeng ◽  
Pengcheng Shi ◽  
Wei Xie
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Cost Information ◽  
Moderate Amount ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Coordination Strategy ◽  
Hotel Service ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Practical Implications

Purpose This paper aims to reduce the confliction between different retail channels. Design/methodology/approach By investigating a game-theoretic model consisting of a dominant hotel, a promoter and an OTA, the authors analyze the optimal amount of reserved rooms on the hotel's official website and realize the coordination between the hotel and the promoter with an appropriate contact. Findings When the gap between promoter’s reservation profits under different promotion cost coefficients is reasonable, complete coordination can be achieved in the supply chain. In addition, numerical examples are conducted to show that the profit of hotel and supply chain can be maximized with a moderate amount of reserved rooms on OTA. Research limitations/implications The authors only focus on one OTA scenarios, which overlooks the competition between OTAs. Practical implications Coordination strategy can fierce the increase on profit when the customer conversion rate increases. Originality/value The authors propose a contract menu to help the hotel avoid the profit loss under asymmetric promotion cost information.

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