The Implications of the New Governance for Corporate Governance

2011 ◽  
pp. 133-146 ◽  
Author(s):  
John R. Boatright
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
New Governance

Strange Bedfellows: Communist Party Institutions and New Governance Mechanisms in Chinese State Holding Corporations

2002 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher A. McNally
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Communist Party ◽  
New Governance ◽  
Monitoring And Control ◽  
Managerial Performance ◽  
State Sector ◽  
Corporate Transparency ◽  
Control Functions ◽  
Corrosive Effect ◽  
And Control

Analyses of corporate governance problems in China's state sector have mainly focused on administrative interference from state agencies. So far the influence of Communist party institutions has received little attention. Although the influence of ideology has diminished greatly, the Chinese Communist party continues to monitor and control economic actors at every level of the state sector. This article shows that the institutional structure through which the party executes its monitoring and control functions has a corrosive effect on the day-to-day governance of the vast majority of state enterprises. The party's management structure aggravates the inadequate monitoring of managerial performance, weakens managerial incentives, and amplifies insufficient corporate transparency, thereby allowing state asset managers to carve out informal spheres of autonomy. These spheres of autonomy create opportunities for insider control, economic corruption, and the illicit privatization of state assets. Effective and sustainable privatization and corporate governance reforms in China's state sector will thus require the party to substantially diminish its authority over state sector executives.

scholarly journals Corporate governance reforms in banks: Lessons from Nigeria?

2011 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 47-50
Author(s):  
Emeka Offor
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Sub Saharan Africa ◽  
New Governance ◽  
Base Reference ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Sub Saharan ◽  
National Governments ◽  
Governance Architecture ◽  
Corporate Governance Reforms ◽  
Governance Reforms

In Sub-Saharan Africa, and indeed in most emerging economies, national governments have in one way or the other (in varying degrees) intervened in the running of corporations. These interventions (usually referred to as reforms) have been eliciting discourses on whether Governments should show interest, be involved in the running of corporations, and also on the effectiveness of those interventions. This paper reviews the subject of this discourse with base reference on banking reforms initiated by various administrations in Nigeria over the decades, articulates lessons from the reforms, raises questions for further research and argues that corporations and markets should be self regulated. National governments should provide operational guidelines, enabling framework and put in place a sustainable mechanism for monitoring, and intervene only when the need arises. The paper also calls for the development of new governance architecture for banks and corporations in order to address emerging corporate governance realities.

Corporate Social Responsibility and Theories of Global Governance

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
David L. Levy ◽  
Rami Kaplan
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Corporate Social Responsibility ◽  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Multinational Corporations ◽  
Global Governance ◽  
Codes Of Conduct ◽  
New Governance ◽  
Contested Terrain ◽  
Corporate Social

This article develops a framework in which corporate social responsibility (CSR) represents the contested terrain of global governance. The rise of CSR is one of the more striking developments of recent decades in the global political economy. Calls for multinational corporations (MNCs) to demonstrate greater responsibility, transparency, and accountability are leading to the establishment of a variety of new governance structures—rules, norms, codes of conduct, and standards—that constrain and shape MNCs' behavior. CSR is thus not just a struggle over practices, but over the locus of governance authority, offering a potential path toward the transformation of stakeholders from external observers and petitioners into legitimate and organized participants in decision-making. This article points to two distinct perspectives on CSR; as a more socially embedded and democratic form of governance that emanates from civil society, or alternatively, as a privatized system of corporate governance that lacks public accountability.

Cultural Entrepreneurship in Corporate Governance Practice Diffusion: Framing of “Independent Directors” by U.S.-Listed Chinese Companies

2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (6) ◽  
pp. 1359-1384
Author(s):  
Sun Hyun Park ◽  
Yanlong Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Host Country ◽  
Institutional Environment ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
New Governance ◽  
Chinese Companies ◽  
Governance Practices ◽  
Governance Practice ◽  
Overseas Education ◽  
Cultural Entrepreneurship

Although the diversity of cultural expectations for different corporate governance practices has been acknowledged, our understanding of how companies use cultural differences to legitimize their governance practice choice and facilitate their resource acquisition remains limited. Building on the literature on cultural entrepreneurship, we theorize how foreign-listed firms engage in global framing in tailoring the description of their new governance practice to the host country investors. Our empirical study examines the relative emphasis of monitoring over resource-providing roles by the U.S.-listed Chinese companies’ independent directors when their roles are understood differently in the home and host countries. Our study finds that exposure to the alternative cultural repertoire of a host country via overseas education of board members and foreign institutional ownership enhance a firm’s organizational resources available to engage in global framing. The likelihood of global framing, however, is constrained by the home country’s institutional environment, which is characterized by local business history and connections to strong local resource providers such as the state. We also find that the effectiveness of global framing to obtain investor recognition in the host country is restricted when the company lacks the capacity to implement the declared role of independent director-as-monitor in its home country.

The New Governance: Governing without Government

1996 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 652-667 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. A. W. Rhodes
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Service Delivery ◽  
Public Management ◽  
New Public Management ◽  
Good Governance ◽  
Interorganizational Networks ◽  
British Government ◽  
New Governance ◽  
New Public ◽  
Self Organizing

The term ‘governance’ is popular but imprecise. It has at least six uses, referring to: the minimal state; corporate governance: the new public management; ‘good governance’; socio-cybernetic systems: and self-organizing networks. I stipulate that governance refers to ‘self-organizing, interorganizational networks' and argue these networks complement markets and hierarchies as governing structures for authoritatively allocating resources and exercising control and co-ordination. I defend this definition, arguing that it throws new light on recent changes in British government, most notably: hollowing out the state, the new public management, and intergovernmental management. 1 conclude that networks are now a pervasive feature of service delivery in Britain; that such networks are characterized by trust and mutual adjustment and undermine management reforms rooted in competition; and that they are a challenge to governability because they become autonomous and resist central guidance.

scholarly journals Corporate governance quality and premature revenue recognition: evidence from the UK

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-99 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jihad Al Okaily ◽  
Rob Dixon ◽  
Aly Salama
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Least Squares Regression ◽  
New Governance ◽  
Governance Reform ◽  
Revenue Recognition ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Uk ◽  
The Relationship

Purpose Since 2005, wide-ranging concerns have been raised about misleading revenue recognition practices, especially during and after the 2008–2009 global financial crisis. There is a lack of research into the relationship between corporate governance (CG) mechanisms and premature revenue recognition (PRR). The paper aims to discuss these issues. Design/methodology/approach This paper uses a generalised least squares regression analysis of a sample of 854 FTSE 350 firm–year observations. Stubben (2010) discretionary revenue (DR) model is used to measure PRR as it is considered less biased, better specified and more likely to reduce measurement error than accrual models. Findings The results suggest that the size of audit committees plays an effective role in constraining PRR. Moreover, PRR is more likely to be curbed in the presence of small boards comprising a higher proportion of non-executive directors. Additional tests reveal that the relationship between board size and PRR is non-linear. Research limitations/implications The findings address the concerns of corporate firms, capital providers, UK regulators and standard-setters regarding misleading revenue recognition practices and should be considered while setting new governance reform recommendations in response to changing economic conditions. Originality/value This is the first study that adopts the DR model of Stubben (2010) to capture PRR and examines its association with CG internal mechanisms. Moreover, the paper considers an important time period – from 2005 to 2013 – in which many significant developments took place.

scholarly journals The Impact of Whistleblowing Awards Programs on Corporate Governance

2019 ◽  
Vol 36 ◽  
pp. 63-83 ◽  
Author(s):  
Janet Austin ◽  
Sulette Lombard
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Securities And Exchange Commission ◽  
New Governance ◽  
Whistle Blowing ◽  
Award Program ◽  
System A ◽  
The Us ◽  
Award Programs ◽  
And Control ◽  
The Impact

Since the introduction of a whistle-blower awards program by the US Securities and Exchange Commission in 2010, securities regulators in other countries, including Canada, have adopted, or are considering adopting, similar programs. For example, in 2016, the Ontario Securities Commission adopted its own whistle-blower award program. Although the primary main reason for these programs is to encourage the reporting of securities violations to the regulator, they could also have an impact on corporate governance. This is because the implementation of such a program may prod companies to design, and then instigate, a more effective internal whistle-blowing system. A truly successful internal whistle-blowing system can enable a company to detect and correct potential wrongdoing before it causes significant harm. This article closely examines this connection between whistle-blowing award programs, companies’ compliance and risk management systems, and how a whistle-blowing award program might well result in more effective internal whistle-blowing systems without the need for a regulator to resort to the imposition of prescriptive rules. As such, this article reflects upon how whistle-blower award programs fit within new governance regulatory theory that challenges traditional “command-and-control-type”regulation in favour of an outcome-driven approach.

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