The ECU and its role on the European monetary scene

Author(s):  
André Louw
Keyword(s):  
2002 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 73-81
Author(s):  
Karen Donfried

Wolf-Dieter Eberwein and Karl Kaiser, Germany’s New Foreign Policy: Decision-Making in an Independent World (Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001)Adrian Hyde-Price, Germany & European Order: Enlarging NATO and the EU (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000)Matthias Kaelberer, Money and Power in Europe: The Political Economy of European Monetary Cooperation (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001)


Author(s):  
Ihor Soroka

The question of whether or not to adopt the euro is a very important one, not only for the 13 European Union members that do not share the same currency, but also for future EU candidates. Current literature on the effect of the euro on trade is scarce since the European Monetary Union (EMU) was officially created in 1999, and up until recently there has not been enough data to analyze this issue. This paper aims to estimate the effect of the euro on trade between member countries using the standard gravity model of trade. Using data from current 25 EU members over the period from 1997 to 2004, I show that higher trade volumes between EMU members cannot be attributed to the adoption of the euro. I find evidence that the euro adoption has had a short-run effect on bilateral trade and that this effect is eliminated over a short period of time. My findings suggest that members of the EMU trade on average from 8.8% to 47% more compared to non-members depending on the type of regression used, while members of the Free Trade Agreement trade 61.3% more. The effect of the euro on trade is eliminated as soon as I control for country-pair specific effects that include the FTA effect as well as history of trade relations between two countries. I conclude that the adoption of the euro should be seen as a final step in the European economic and monetary integration for countries that already benefit from relatively high volumes of bilateral trade. Full text availale at: https://doi.org/10.22215/rera.v2i1.166


Author(s):  
C. Randall Henning

As the crisis evolved, euro-area governments first constructed two transitional financial facilities and then created a permanent fund. This chapter reviews the creation of the financial facilities of the euro area culminating in the establishment of the European Stability Mechanism. The ESM treaty contains a strong presumption, but not a strict legal requirement, that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) will also be involved in assistance to a member state. As a political matter, the Fund’s involvement is strongly favored in creditor countries of the euro area. The emergence of the ESM, a new institutional player in crisis finance, prompted a reconsideration of the institutional arrangements under which crisis programs are designed. The chapter reviews proposals from research institutes and the European Parliament to combine resources of the European Commission and the ESM into a European Monetary Fund.


Author(s):  
C. Randall Henning

European governments, against their initial instincts, invited the International Monetary Fund to design financial rescue programs during the euro crisis in cooperation with the European Commission and European Central Bank. These institutions, known as the “troika,” constitute a regime complex in the parlance of international political economy. This book poses four questions about the regime complex for crisis finance in the euro area: Why did European governments choose this particular mix of institutions? What was the strategy of key member states in directing several institutions to collaborate on lending programs? Why did this arrangement endure despite severe conflicts among the institutions? Should the member states of the euro area “go it alone” by creating a European Monetary Fund? This chapter elaborates on these questions and provides an overview of the book.


2021 ◽  
pp. 097215092110161
Author(s):  
Papageorgiou Christos ◽  
Anastasiou Athanasios ◽  
Liargovas Panagiotis

Four indicators corresponding to the four targets of the European Monetary Union were calculated. The study showed that: (a) concerning the deviation of state’s general government deficit/surplus from 3% of gross domestic product (GDP), all member states had reached their target, with the exception of Cyprus, which was slightly under the target, (b) concerning the deviation of state’s general government debt from 60% of GDP, half of all European Union (EU) member states did not reach their targets, and there was a lot to be done, especially from the EU15 member states, (c) concerning the deviation of state’s inflation rate from the mean of the three states with best results of +1.5%, it was observed that the average value of EU28 member states had reached the final target, mainly due to the performances of the EU15 member states, (d) and concerning the deviation of state’s interest rate from the mean of the three states with the best results of +2%, it was observed that the average value of EU28 member states had reached the final target.


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