Curriculum Reform in Transitional Justice Environments: The South African Human Rights Commission, Human Rights Education and the Schooling Sector

Author(s):  
Felisa Tibbitts ◽  
André Keet
2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Theo De Wit

What can political philosophy, interested in the field of ‘transitional justice’ learn from dissident voices in states who try to define their future while dealing with a past where human rights were severely violated? In this article I discuss Jean Améry’s reflections on Germany’s handling of their national socialistic past and compare that with texts of the South African philosopher Johan Degenaar. My premise will be that with regard to a central point, Améry and Degenaar’s reflections on their nations’ respective political choices display a strong resemblance: both resisted the notion of the priority of the (quasi-) natural survival of the nation over the sake of justice. But I will indicate also that the resistance of Améry and Degenaar was partly in vain: mainly, survival triumphed over justice in both cases. This indicates the lasting meaning of ‘anamnestic reason’, a conscious, critical remembrance of the past.


2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Andre Mangu

After several decades of apartheid rule, which denied human rights to the majority of the population on the ground of race and came to be regarded as a crime against humanity, South Africa adopted its first democratic Constitution in the early 1990s. The 1996 Constitution, which succeeded the 1993 interim Constitution, is considered one of the most progressive in the world. In its founding provisions, it states that South Africa is a democratic state founded on human dignity, the achievement of equality, the advancement of human rights and freedoms. The Constitution enshrines fundamental human rights in a justiciable Bill of Rights as a cornerstone of democracy. Unfortunately, in the eyes of a number of politicians, officials and lay-persons, the rights in the Bill of Rights accrue to South African citizens only. Xenophobia, which has been rampant since the end of apartheid, seems to support the idea that foreigners should not enjoy these rights. Foreign nationals have often been accused of posing a threat to South African citizens with regard to employment opportunities. In light of the South African legislation and jurisprudence, this article affirms the position of the South African labour law that foreign nationals are indeed protected by the Constitution and entitled to rights in the Bill of Rights, including the rights to work and fair labour practices.


2014 ◽  
Vol 39 (04) ◽  
pp. 902-937 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernadette Atuahene

One of the most replicated findings of the procedural justice literature is that people who receive unfavorable outcomes are more likely to believe that the process was nonetheless legitimate if they thought that it was fair. Using interviews of 150 people compensated through the South African land restitution program, this article examines whether these findings apply in the transitional justice context where it is often unclear who the winners and losers are. The question explored is: When all outcomes are unfavorable or incomplete, how do people make fairness assessments? The central observation was that the ability of respondents and land restitution commission officials to sustain a conversation with each other had the greatest effect on whether respondents believed that the land restitution process was fair. The study also contributes to the existing literature by exploring the institutional arrangements and resources necessary to facilitate communication and to overcome any communication breakdowns encountered.


2013 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Auwais Rafudeen

This paper examines a South African debate on legislating Muslim marriages in the light of anthropologist Talal Asad’s critique developed in his Formations of the Secular (2003). It probes aspects of the debate under four Asadian themes: (1) the historicity of the secular, secularism, and secularization; (2) the place of power and the new articulations of discourses it creates; (3) the state as the arm of that power; and (4) the interconnections (or dislocations) among law, ethics, and the organic environment (habitus). I argue that Asad illumines the debate in the following ways: (1) by providing a deeper historical and philosophical appreciation of its terms of reference, given that the proposed legislation will be subject to South Africa’s secular Bill of Rights and constitution; (2) by requiring us to examine and interrogate the genealogies of such particular hegemonic discourses as human rights, which some participants appear to present as ahistorical and privileged; and (3) by showing, through the concept of habitus, why this debate needs to go beyond its present piecemeal legal nature and develop an appreciation of the organic linkages among the Shari‘ah, morality, community, and self. Yet inevitable nuances are produced when applying Asad’s ideas to the South African context.


Author(s):  
N Gabru

Human life, as with all animal and plant life on the planet, is dependant upon fresh water. Water is not only needed to grow food, generate power and run industries, but it is also needed as a basic part of human life. Human dependency upon water is evident through history, which illustrates that human settlements have been closely linked to the availability and supply of fresh water. Access to the limited water resources in South Africa has been historically dominated by those with access to land and economic power, as a result of which the majority of South Africans have struggled to secure the right to water. Apartheid era legislation governing water did not discriminate directly on the grounds of race, but the racial imbalance in ownership of land resulted in the disproportionate denial to black people of the right to water. Beyond racial categorisations, the rural and poor urban populations were traditionally especially vulnerable in terms of the access to the right.  The enactment of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, brought the South African legal system into a new era, by including a bill of fundamental human rights (Bill of Rights). The Bill of Rights makes provision for limited socio-economic rights. Besides making provision for these human rights, the Constitution also makes provision for the establishment of state institutions supporting constitutional democracy.  The Constitution has been in operation since May 1996. At this stage, it is important to take stock and measure the success of the implementation of these socio-economic rights. This assessment is important in more ways than one, especially in the light of the fact that many lawyers argued strongly against 1/2the inclusion of the second and third generation of human rights in a Bill of Rights. The argument was that these rights are not enforceable in a court of law and that they would create unnecessary expectations of food, shelter, health, water and the like; and that a clear distinction should be made between first generation and other rights, as well as the relationship of these rights to one another. It should be noted that there are many lawyers and non-lawyers who maintained that in order to confront poverty, brought about by the legacy of apartheid, the socio-economic rights should be included in a Bill of Rights. The inclusion of section 27 of the 1996 Constitution has granted each South African the right to have access to sufficient food and water and has resulted in the rare opportunity for South Africa to reform its water laws completely. It has resulted in the enactment of the Water Services Act 108 of 1997 and the National Water Act 36 of 1998.In this paper the difference between first and second generation rights will be discussed. The justiciability of socio-economic rights also warrants an explanation before the constitutional implications related to water are briefly examined. Then the right to water in international and comparative law will be discussed, followed by a consideration of the South African approach to water and finally, a few concluding remarks will be made.


Author(s):  
Vinesh Basdeo

The deprivation of the proceeds of crime has been a feature of criminal law for many years. The original rationale for the confiscation of criminal assets at international level was the fight against organised crime, a feature of society described by the European Court of Human Rights as a "scourge" so that the draconian powers which are a feature of confiscation regimes around the world have been approved in circumstances which otherwise might have caused governments considerable difficulties before the international human rights tribunals.[1] The primary objective of this article is to determine if the asset forfeiture measures employed in the South African criminal justice system are in need of any reform and/or augmentation in accordance with the "spirit, purport and object" of the South African Constitution.[2] This article attempts to answer three questions. Firstly, why is criminal asset forfeiture important to law enforcement? Secondly, in which circumstances can property be forfeited and what types of property are subject to forfeiture? Thirdly, how is forfeiture accomplished, and what are its constitutional ramifications? 


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