Incentive Contracts

2018 ◽  
pp. 405-434
Author(s):  
Susheng Wang
Keyword(s):  
Incentive Contracts

School Consolidations and Teacher Incentive Contracts

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aaron Lowen ◽  
M. Ryan Haley ◽  
Nancy J. Burnett
Keyword(s):  
Incentive Contracts

Incentive Contracts and Institutional Labor Market Design

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martina Nikolaeva Gogova ◽  
Jens Uhlenbrock
Keyword(s):  
Labor Market ◽  
Market Design ◽  
Incentive Contracts

Incentive Contracts and Institutional Labor Market Design

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martina Nikolaeva Gogova ◽  
Jens Uhlenbrock
Keyword(s):  
Labor Market ◽  
Market Design ◽  
Incentive Contracts

scholarly journals Spending Political Capital*

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arthur Campbell
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Incentive Contracts ◽  
Important Task ◽  
Political Capital ◽  
Alternative Mechanism ◽  
Team Size ◽  
Current Period ◽  
Multi Agent ◽  
Participation In Decision Making ◽  
Number Of Individuals

Abstract An important task for organizations is establishing truthful communication between parties with differing interests. This task is made particularly challenging when the accuracy of the information is poorly observed or not at all. In these settings, incentive contracts based on the accuracy of information will not be very effective. This paper considers an alternative mechanism that does not require any signal of the accuracy of any information communicated to provide incentives for truthful communication. Rather, an expert sacrifices future participation in decision-making to influence the current period’s decision in favour of their preferred project. This mechanism captures a notion often described as ‘political capital’ whereby an individual is able to achieve their own preferred decision in the current period at the expense of being able to exert influence in future decisions (‘spending political capital’). When the first-best is not possible in this setting, I show that experts hold more influence than under the first-best and that, in a multi-agent extension, a finite team size is optimal. Together these results suggest that a small number of individuals hold excessive influence in organizations.

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