Revisiting the Incentive Contracts of Hedge Funds: A Game Theoretic Perspective with Managerial Ownership, Effort and Ability

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard J. Fairchild ◽  
Karan Puri
Keyword(s):  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Incentive Contracts ◽  
Managerial Ownership ◽  
Game Theoretic

scholarly journals Theoretical Foundations of Relational Incentive Contracts

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Joel Watson
Keyword(s):  
Online Publication ◽  
Repeated Games ◽  
Incentive Contracts ◽  
Annual Review ◽  
Publication Date ◽  
Contractual Relationships ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Self Enforcement ◽  
Theoretical Foundations

This article describes the emerging game-theoretic framework for modeling long-term contractual relationships with moral hazard. The framework combines self-enforcement and external enforcement, accommodating alternative assumptions regarding how actively the parties initially set and renegotiate the terms of their contract. A progression of theoretical components is reviewed, building from the recursive formulation of equilibrium continuation values in repeated games. A principal-agent setting serves as a running example. Expected final online publication date for the Annual Review of Economics, Volume 13 is August 2021. Please see http://www.annualreviews.org/page/journal/pubdates for revised estimates.

scholarly journals Incentive Contracts for Sustainable Growth of Small or Medium-Sized Enterprise

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (9) ◽  
pp. 4964
Author(s):  
Daehyeon Park ◽  
Jinhyeong Jo ◽  
Doojin Ryu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Public Procurement ◽  
Incentive Contracts ◽  
Sustainable Growth ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Large Enterprise ◽  
Improvement Effect ◽  
Game Theoretic

This study analyzes incentive contracts in public procurement supply chains using a game-theoretic approach. Specifically, we compare a structure in which the host company is a large enterprise and the partner company is a small or medium-sized enterprise (SME) to a structure in which the host is an SME and the partner is a large enterprise. For each structure, we examine whether an incentive contract improves supply chain performance and confirm that the performance improvement effect is greater when the host company is an SME. Our analysis has several policy implications. SMEs are less likely to be selected as host companies for large-scale procurement projects, limiting their growth opportunities. Thus, to enable SMEs’ sustainable growth through large-scale procurement projects, the governments can allocate a portion of public procurement to SMEs. The introduction of incentive contracts elicits sustainable cooperation from large companies when an SME is the host company in a public procurement supply chain.

Institutional Investors on the Securities Market

2003 ◽  
pp. 95-101
Author(s):  
O. Khmyz
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Capital Market ◽  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Securities Market ◽  
Main Role ◽  
Investment Funds ◽  
Investment Process ◽  
The Capital Market

Acording to the author's opinion, institutional investors (from many participants of the capital market) play the main role, especially investment funds. They supply to small-sized investors special investment services, which allow them to participate in the investment process. However excessive institutialization and increasing number of hedge-funds may lead to financial crisis.

Stability in the informal value transfer systems: norms of trust or institutions of control?

2017 ◽  
pp. 120-130
Author(s):  
A. Lyasko
Keyword(s):  
Social Control ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Transfer System ◽  
Value Transfer ◽  
Partner Interaction ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Informal Value Transfer System

Informal financial operations exist in the shadow of official regulation and cannot be protected by the formal legal instruments, therefore raising concerns about the enforcement of obligations taken by their participants. This paper analyzes two alternative types of auxiliary institutions, which can coordinate expectations of the members of informal value transfer systems, namely attitudes of trust and norms of social control. It offers some preliminary approaches to creating a game-theoretic model of partner interaction in the informal value transfer system. It also sheds light on the perspectives of further studies in this area of institutional economics.

Influential individuals: Approach to modeling

2018 ◽  
pp. 114-131
Author(s):  
O. Yu. Bondarenko
Keyword(s):  
Social Interactions ◽  
Social Status ◽  
Experimental Approach ◽  
Expert Knowledge ◽  
Formal Models ◽  
Leader Influence ◽  
Learning Game ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Asymmetric Interactions ◽  
Influential Individuals

his article explores theoretical and experimental approach to modeling social interactions. Communication and exchange of information with other people affect individual’s behavior in numerous areas. Generally, such influence is exerted by leaders, outstanding individuals who have a higher social status or expert knowledge. Social interactions are analyzed in the models of social learning, game theoretic models, conformity models, etc. However, there is a lack of formal models of asymmetric interactions. Such models could help elicit certain qualities characterizing higher social status and perception of status by other individuals, find the presence of leader influence and analyze its mechanism.

Optimal Distributed Beamforming for Two-User MISO Interference Channel Based on a Game-Theoretic Viewpoint

2012 ◽  
Vol E95.B (10) ◽  
pp. 3345-3348
Author(s):  
Jiamin LI ◽  
Dongming WANG ◽  
Pengcheng ZHU ◽  
Lan TANG ◽  
Xiaohu YOU
Keyword(s):  
Interference Channel ◽  
Distributed Beamforming ◽  
Game Theoretic
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