The Exclusionary Rule and Trial Procedure Reform

Author(s):  
Jingkun Liu
Author(s):  
Sof'ya Shestakova ◽  
Uulzhan Imanalieva

The article iis devoted to the research of the institution of investigative judge introduced into the criminal procedure of the Kyrgyz Republic in 2019. The authors analyze the conceptual foundations of this institution, its procedural significance, as well as the legal model under Kyrgyz legislation in its comparative perspective with the legislation of Germany and some former Soviet republics. Two main achievements: the organizational and functional isolation of an investigating judge during the criminal procedure and granting them the power of deposition are seen by the authors as advantages of the Kyrgyz model of the institution of an investigative judge. The former is aimed at guaranteeing the objectivity, impartiality and neutrality of the judge considering the case on the merits, who is discharged judicial control in pre-trial procedure nowadays. The latter is aimed at implementing for the prosecution and defense the right to be equal parties of procedural opportunities to participate in evidence as an integral element of the adversarial principle.


Legal Studies ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Claire Hamilton

Abstract The changes to the Irish exclusionary rule introduced by the judgment in People (DPP) v JC mark an important watershed in the Irish law of evidence and Irish legal culture more generally. The case relaxed the exclusionary rule established in People (DPP) v Kenny, one of the strictest in the common law world, by creating an exception based on ‘inadvertence’. This paper examines the decision through the lens of legal culture, drawing in particular on Lawrence Friedman's distinction between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ legal culture to help understand the factors contributing to the decision. The paper argues that Friedman's concept and, in particular, the dialectic between internal and external legal culture, holds much utility at a micro as well as macro level, in interrogating the cultural logics at work in judicial decision-making.


1991 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 221-267 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. M. Beattie

My subject is the story of the entry of lawyers into the English criminal courts and their impact on trial procedure. Until the eighteenth century lawyers played little part in the trial of felonies in England—in the trial, that is, of those accused of the most serious offenses, including murder, rape, arson, robbery, and virtually all forms of theft. Indeed, the defendants in such cases were prohibited at common law from engaging lawyers to act for them in court. In the case of less-serious crimes—misdemeanors—defendants were allowed counsel; and those accused of high treason, the most serious offense of all, were granted the right to make their defense by counsel in 1696. But not in felony. Accused felons might seek a lawyer's advice on points of law, but if they wanted to question the prosecution evidence or to put forward a defense, they had to do that on their own behalf. The victim of a felony (who most often acted as the prosecutor in a system that depended fundamentally on private prosecution) was free to hire a lawyer to manage the presentation of his or her case. But in fact few did so. The judges were generally the only participants in felony trials with professional training. They dominated the courtroom and orchestrated the brief confrontation between the victim and the accused that was at the heart of the trial.


1983 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 585-609 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter F. Nardulli

A key criticism that has emerged in the debate over the search and seizure exclusionary rule is that it exacts heavy societal costs in the form of lost prosecutions and that such costs outweigh any demonstrated social benefits. This article examines the costs of three exclusionary rules using data collected for 7,500 cases in a nine-county study of criminal courts in three states. It emphasizes motions to suppress physical evidence but for comparative purposes also includes motions to suppress confessions and identifications. The results show that the various exclusionary rules exact only marginal social costs. Motions to suppress physical evidence are filed in fewer than 5% of the cases, largely drug and weapons cases, while serious motions to suppress identifications and confessions are filed in 2% and 4% of the cases. The success rate of motions to suppress is equally marginal. Successful motions to suppress physical evidence occur in only 0.69% of the cases, while successful motions to suppress identifications or confessions occur much less often. Moreover, not all who successfully suppressed evidence escaped conviction, especially when only an identification or a confession was suppressed. In all, only 46 cases—less than 0.6% of the cases studied—were lost because of the three exclusionary rules combined, most of them involving offenses that would have incurred less than six months’ imprisonment or first offenders. Finally, the impact of unsuccessful motions on subsequent plea bargaining was found to be marginal; only unsuccessful motions to exclude confessions resulted in any real sentencing concessions.


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