scholarly journals Portugal

2020 ◽  
pp. 105-117
Author(s):  
Nina Amelung ◽  
Rafaela Granja ◽  
Helena Machado

Abstract The Portuguese DNA database was established in 2008 and is one of the smallest DNA databases in the EU. Portugal has one of the most restrictive regulatory frameworks in the EU in relation to the criteria for the entry and deletion of DNA profiles. The country started connecting with the Prüm system’s genetic data exchange in 2015. In terms of bordering practices, Portugal serves as an example of latent rebordering dynamics. This is because the requirements of the EU regulations regarding Prüm have been fully implemented in Portugal in terms of techno-scientific and operational infrastructures, yet Portugal simultaneously severely restricts access to biometric data. This situation derives from particularities of Portugal’s national policy regulations on data protection and its judicial traditions as well as regulations on ethical oversight.

Author(s):  
Ludmila Georgieva ◽  
Christopher Kuner

Article 4(1) (Definition of personal data); Article 4(2) (Definition of processing); Article 4(11) (Definition of consent); Article 4(13) (Definition of genetic data, see also recital 34); Article 4(14) (Definition of biometric data); Article 4(15) (Definition of data concerning health, see also recital 35); Article 6(4)(c) (Lawfulness of processing, compatibility test) (see too recital 46 on vital interest); Article 13(2)(c) (Information to be provided where personal data are collected from the data subject); Article 17(1)(b), (3)(c) (Right to erasure (‘right to be forgotten’)); Article 20(1)(a) (Right to data portability); Article 22(4) (Automated individual decision-making, including profiling); Article 27(2)(a) (Representatives of controllers or processors not established in the Union); Article 30(5) (Records of processing activities); Article 35(3)(b) (Data protection impact assessment) (see too recital 91); Article 37(1)(c) (Designation of the data protection officer) (see too recital 97); Article 83(5)(a) (General conditions for imposing administrative fines).


2016 ◽  
Vol 80 (5) ◽  
pp. 303-326 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tim J Wilson

This article places sharing forensic biometric data for international criminal justice cooperation purposes within the domain of global public goods. Such cooperation is a rational response to globalisation, but faces several obstacles. These range from sociocultural and political concerns about national legal and criminal justice autonomy to the potential impact of market fundamentalism on scientific standardisation and cooperation mechanism delivery. The significance of such inhibitors will vary as societal and personal perceptions of stability change. These issues are examined by analysing the progress achieved with the EU Prüm forensic biometric data exchange model. Shocks to European stability, such as the increased scale of terrorist crimes and the UK EU referendum result will inevitably test the resilience of Prüm. Combining insights from global public goods and criminal law scholarship, however, may help to identify how reactions to such shocks, including questions about future UK participation in Prüm, might be managed.


Author(s):  
Lee A. Bygrave ◽  
Luca Tosoni

Article 4(1) (Definition of ‘personal data’) (see too recital 26); Article 4(15) (Definition of ‘data concerning health’) (see also recital 35); Article 4(16) (Definition of ‘biometric data’) (see too recital 51); Article 9(1) (Processing of special categories of personal data) (see also recital 53); Article 22(4) (Automated individual decision-making, including profiling) (see also recital 71); Article 35(3)(b) (Data protection impact assessment) (see too recital 91).


Author(s):  
Lee A. Bygrave ◽  
Luca Tosoni

Article 4(1) (Definition of ‘personal data’) (see too recital 26); Article 4(13) (Definition of ‘genetic data’) (see also recital 34); Article 4(16) (Definition of ‘biometric data’) (see too recital 51); Article 9(1) (Processing of special categories of personal data) (see also recital 53); Article 22(4) (Automated individual decision-making, including profiling) (see also recital 71); Article 35(3)(b) (Data protection impact assessment) (see too recital 91).


Author(s):  
Simone Casiraghi ◽  
Alessandra Calvi

Biometrics technologies have been spreading cross-sector in the public and private domains. Their potential intrusiveness, in particular regarding privacy and data protection, has called the European legislators, in the recent EU data protection reform, to introduce a definition of “biometric data,” and to grant biometric data specific protection, as a “special category of data.” Despite the reformed framework, in the field of border management, the use of biometric data is expected to increase steadily because it is seen as a more efficient and reliable solution. This chapter will look into the reformed data protection and border management legal frameworks to highlight discrepancies between the two, and ultimately assess to what extent the new data protection reformed regime for biometric data is satisfactory.


2020 ◽  
pp. 55-71
Author(s):  
Nina Amelung ◽  
Rafaela Granja ◽  
Helena Machado

Abstract Germany’s DNA database was established in 1998 and grew into one of the mid-sized databases in the EU. Under the leadership of its Minister of the Interior, Germany was among the countries that drove the creation of the Prüm system and was among the first signatories of the Prüm Treaty in 2005. The 2007 German Presidency of the EU, along with the European Commission, also pushed for the integration of the Convention of Prüm into an EU legal framework. In terms of bordering practices, the German situation serves to illustrate an expansive and diffusive mode of debordering. This expansiveness is documented by the country’s early involvement and comprehensive establishment of data exchange with most of the countries in the system; this diffusive character is illustrated by the string-pulling practices employed by Germany, and some other Member States’ governments, to influence transnational police collaboration in the EU.


2020 ◽  
pp. 35-54
Author(s):  
Nina Amelung ◽  
Rafaela Granja ◽  
Helena Machado

Abstract This chapter introduces the concept of ‘biobordering’. Taking the nationally grown crime control regimes into account, we argue that the proposed concept of bioborders is useful in capturing how the territorial foundations of national state autonomy are partially reclaimed (what we call rebordering) and at the same time partially purposefully suspended (what we call debordering). The concept of biobordering is particularly fruitful for understanding how modes of bordering entangle with large-scale IT database infrastructures for the exchange of biometric data in the context of crime control. It highlights in particular the legal, scientific, technical, political and ethical dimensions of data exchange across borders across the EU. The chapter reviews recent insights from border studies and continues by outlining components and dynamics of biobordering that make bioborders more or less permeable for expansive biometric data exchange.


Author(s):  
Simone Casiraghi ◽  
Alessandra Calvi

Biometrics technologies have been spreading cross-sector in the public and private domains. Their potential intrusiveness, in particular regarding privacy and data protection, has called the European legislators, in the recent EU data protection reform, to introduce a definition of “biometric data,” and to grant biometric data specific protection, as a “special category of data.” Despite the reformed framework, in the field of border management, the use of biometric data is expected to increase steadily because it is seen as a more efficient and reliable solution. This chapter will look into the reformed data protection and border management legal frameworks to highlight discrepancies between the two, and ultimately assess to what extent the new data protection reformed regime for biometric data is satisfactory.


Author(s):  
Lee A. Bygrave ◽  
Luca Tosoni

Article 4(1) (Definition of ‘personal data’) (see too recital 26); Article 4(13) (Definition of ‘genetic data’) (see too recital 34); Article 4(15) (Definition of ‘data concerning health’) (see also recital 35); Article 9(1) (Special categories of personal data); Article 22(4) (Automated individual decision-making, including profiling) (see also recital 71); Article 35(3)(b) (Data protection impact assessment) (see too recital 91).


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