Total brain failure: a new contribution by the President’s Council on Bioethics to the definition of death according to the neurological standard

2009 ◽  
Vol 35 (7) ◽  
pp. 1305-1307 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nereo Zamperetti ◽  
Rinaldo Bellomo
2018 ◽  
Vol 44 (12) ◽  
pp. 868-871 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xavier Symons ◽  
Reginald Mary Chua

Several bioethicists have recently discussed the complexity of defining human death, and considered in particular how our definition of death affects our understanding of the ethics of vital organ procurement. In this brief paper, we challenge the mainstream medical definition of human death—namely, that death is equivalent to total brain failure—and argue with Nair-Collins and Miller that integrated biological functions can continue even after total brain failure has occurred. We discuss the implications of Nair-Collins and Miller’s argument and suggest that it may be necessary to look for alternative biological markers that reliably indicate the death of a human being. We reject the suggestion that we should abandon the dead-donor criteria for organ donation. Rather than weaken the ethical standards for vital organ procurement, it may be necessary to make them more demanding. The aim of this paper is not to justify the dead donor rule. Rather, we aim to explore the perspective of those who agree with critiques of the whole brain and cardiopulmonary definitions of death but yet disagree with the proposal that we should abandon the dead-donor rule. We will consider what those who want to retain the dead-donor rule must argue in light of Nair-Collins and Miller’s critique.


We have new answers to how the brain works and tools which can now monitor and manipulate brain function. Rapid advances in neuroscience raise critical questions with which society must grapple. What new balances must be struck between diagnosis and prediction, and invasive and noninvasive interventions? Are new criteria needed for the clinical definition of death in cases where individuals are eligible for organ donation? How will new mobile and wearable technologies affect the future of growing children and aging adults? To what extent is society responsible for protecting populations at risk from environmental neurotoxins? As data from emerging technologies converge and are made available on public databases, what frameworks and policies will maximize benefits while ensuring privacy of health information? And how can people and communities with different values and perspectives be maximally engaged in these important questions? Neuroethics: Anticipating the Future is written by scholars from diverse disciplines—neurology and neuroscience, ethics and law, public health, sociology, and philosophy. With its forward-looking insights and considerations for the future, the book examines the most pressing current ethical issues.


1987 ◽  
Vol 13 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 233-248 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald E. Cranford ◽  
David Randolph Smith

For the past two decades, the medical profession and society have debated the definition of death. Some reasonable consensus has been reached on this issue, in theory and in practice. In the last few years, however, a far more important debate has been evolving — the definition of human personhood. Human personhood has been discussed extensively in the past with respect to the abortion question and other issues concerning the beginning of life. More recently, however, the definition of personhood has been raised with respect to termination of treatment decisions at the end of life and, in particular, on the appropriate care of patients in a persistent vegetative state.Our major premise is that consciousness is the most critical moral, legal, and constitutional standard, not for human life itself, but for human personhood. There is nothing highly original in our approach to this particular issue; others have advanced similar arguments in recent years.


2018 ◽  
Vol 36 (5) ◽  
pp. 436-446 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pamela Durepos ◽  
Tamara Sussman ◽  
Jenny Ploeg ◽  
Noori Akhtar-Danesh ◽  
Harveer Punia ◽  
...  

Purpose: The purpose of this study was to clarify the concept of death preparedness for family caregivers in dementia. Conceptualization was required to support the assessment, promotion, and operationalization (ie, measurement) of death preparedness through palliative care interventions such as advance care planning. Methods: Rodgers evolutionary method of concept analysis was selected to guide this study because of the dynamic nature of death preparedness influenced by context, setting, and time. A comprehensive literature search was conducted. Authors performed constant comparative analysis to identify and interpret surrogate/related concepts, attributes, antecedents, and consequences of death preparedness. Results: Most importantly attributes included (1) knowing and recognizing the symptoms of decline in dementia and what dying looks like; (2) understanding emotions and grief responses; (3) accessing and appraising supports needed to manage and care for dying; (4) organizing affairs and completing tasks in advance; (5) accepting that losses are inevitable and imminent; (6) reflecting on caregiving and finding meaning, “a silver-lining”; and (7) closing, reconciling, and renewing relationship bonds and completing the family member’s life. Discussion: This study contributed a full definition of death preparedness in dementia. Findings aligned with/expanded upon Hebert et al Theoretical Framework of Preparedness for End-of-Life. The use of problem- and emotion-based coping strategies by caregivers with support from health-care providers to promote feelings of death preparedness (including self-efficacy and control) and minimize uncertainty was the implication of this study. Development of a holistic preparedness instrument is underway.


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