CONTINUING THE DEFINITION OF DEATH DEBATE: THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS ON CONTROVERSIES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH

Bioethics ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 101-107 ◽  
Author(s):  
ALBERT GARTH THOMAS
2019 ◽  
Vol 86 (4) ◽  
pp. 366-380
Author(s):  
Frederick J. White

This essay reviews recent controversy in the determination of death, with particular attention to the definition and moment of death. Definitions of death have evolved from the intuitive to the pathophysiologic and the medicolegal. Many United States jurisdictions have codified the definition of death relying on guidance from the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA). Flaws in the structure of the UDDA have led to misunderstanding of the physiologic nature of death and methods for the determination of death, resulting in a bifurcated concept of death as either circulatory/respiratory or neurologic. The practice of organ donation after circulatory determination of death (DCDD) raises a number of ethical questions, most prominently revolving around the moment of death and manifested as an expedited time to determination of death, a departure from the unitary concept of death, a violation of the dead donor rule, and a challenge to the standard of irreversibility. Attempts to redefine the determination of death from an irreversibility standard to a permanence standard have significant impact on the social contract upon which deceased donor organ transplantation rests, and must entail broad societal examination. The determination of death is best reached by a clear, strict, and uniform irreversibility standard. In deceased donor organ transplantation, the interests of the donor as a person are paramount, and no interest of organ recipients or of the greater society can justify negation of the rights and bodily integrity of the person who is a donor, nor conversion of the altruism of giving into the calculus of taking.


2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Taufik Suryadi ◽  
Kulsum Kulsum

Abstrak. Isu-isu tentang akhir kehidupan (end of life) selalu menarik untuk dibicarakan. Penentuan akhir kehidupan ini sering menjadi dilema bagi para dokter karena apabila dokter tidak memahami tentang pengambilan keputusan akhir hidup pasien ia akan menghadapi konsekuensi bioetika dan medikolegal. Terdapat beberapa istilah yang berkaitan dengan isu akhir kehidupan yaitu euthanasia, withholding and withdrawal life support, physician assisted suicide, dan  palliative care. Dengan berkembangnya ilmu kedokteran dan teknologi, definisi kematian menjadi sulit ditentukan karena dengan bantuan alat canggih kedokteran kehidupan ‘dapat diperpanjang’. Dari kenyataan inilah maka timbul pertanyaan serius: “Sampai kapan dokter harus mempertahankan kehidupan?. Apakah semua jenis pengobatan dan perawatan yang dapat  memperpanjang hidup manusia itu harus selalu diberikan?”.Dari permasalahan ini dapat didiskusikan tentang euthanasia ditinjau dari sudut bioetika dan medikolegal. Kata kunci: euthanasia, aspek bioetika, aspek medikolegal  Abstract .The issues of end of life are always interesting to discussed. This final determination of life is often a dilemma for doctors because if the doctor does not understand the final decision of the patient's life he will face the consequences of bioethics and medicolegal. There are several terms related to the issues of end of life that is euthanasia, withholding and withdrawal life support, physician assisted suicide, and palliative care. With the development of medical science and technology, the definition of death becomes difficult to determine because with the help of advanced medical devices 'life can be extended'. It is from this fact that a serious question arises: "How long should doctors maintain life? Are all types of cure and care that can extend the life of a human should always be given? "From this issues can be discussed about euthanasia in terms of bioethics and medicolegal. Keywords: euthanasia, bioethics aspect, medicolegal aspect


1983 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-14
Author(s):  
John J. Paris ◽  
Ronald E. Cranford

“It is important to be clear on what determination of death statutes involve…. It is equally important to understand the objections to such legislation, analyze and evaluate them, and devise a coherent public policy position on the issue. That policy must be medically sound, ethically appropriate, and theologically acceptable.”


2020 ◽  
Vol 87 (3) ◽  
pp. 317-333 ◽  
Author(s):  
Doyen Nguyen

Prompted by concerns raised by the rise in litigations, which challenge the legal status of brain death (BD), Lewis and colleagues recently proposed a revision of the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA). The revision consists of (i) narrowing down the definition of BD to the loss of specific brain functions, namely those functions that can be assessed on bedside neurological examination; (ii) requiring that the determination of BD must be in accordance with the specific guidelines designated in the revision; and (iii) eliminating the necessity for obtaining consent prior to performing the tests for BD determination. By analyzing Lewis and colleagues’ revision, this article shows that this revision is fraught with difficulties. Therefore, this article also proposes two approaches for an ethical revision of the UDDA; the first is in accordance with scientific realism and Christian anthropology, while the second is grounded in trust and respect for persons. If the UDDA is to be revised, then it should be based on sound ethical principles in order to resolve the ongoing BD controversies and rebuild public trust. Summary: This article critically examines the recent revision of the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA) advanced by Lewis and colleagues. The revision only further reinforces the status quo of brain death without taking into account the root cause of the litigations and controversies about the declaration of death by neurological criteria. In view of this deficiency, this article offers two approaches to revising the UDDA, both of which are founded on sound moral principles.


2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 179-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vilius Dranseika ◽  
Ivars Neiders

Abstract In his paper “The challenge of brain death for the sanctity of life ethic”, Peter Singer advocates two options for dealing with death criteria in a way that is compatible with efficient organ transplantation policy. He suggests that we should either (a) redefine death as cortical death or (b) go back to the old cardiopulmonary criterion and scrap the Dead Donor Rule. We welcome Singer’s line of argument but raise some concerns about the practicability of the two alternatives advocated by him. We propose adding a third alternative that also – as the two previous alternatives – preserves and extends the possibility of organ transplantation without using anyone without their consent. Namely, we would like to draw readers’ attention to a proposal by Robert Veatch, formulated 42 years ago in his 1976 book “Death, dying, and the biological revolution” and developed further in his later publications. Veatch argues for a conscience clause for the definition of death that would permit people to pick from a reasonable range of definitional options. This autonomy-based option, we believe, is more likely to be practicable than the two options advocated by Singer. Furthermore, we present data from a study with Lithuanian participants that suggest that there is quite pronounced variation of preferences concerning death determination.


2020 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 391-398
Author(s):  
Igor’ B. Boyko

Aim. Analysis of some controversial provisions of Article (Art.) 66 Determination of the Moment of Death of a Person and of Termination of Resuscitation Activities of Federal law On Fundamental Healthcare Principles in the Russian Federation of November 21, 2011 №323-FL (FL 323) directly concerning the issue of death of a person, and justification of making amendments to the title and text of the above mentioned norm. Due to the absence of definition of the concept of death in FL 323, the author presents his own definition of death of a person. The used term the moment of death of a person as a determinant/indicator of the occurrence of death seems to be erroneous. This term cannot be extended to the fact of biological death. Under FL 323, death of the brain is considered to be equivalent to death of a person and today is inextricably linked with organ transplantation. However, in reality it is not so, and in this sense it is a typical juridical fiction that justifies legal removal of organs from living patients. Amendments to the title and wording of Article 66 FL 323 are proposed.


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