Social welfare functions that satisfy Pareto, anonymity, and neutrality, but not independence of irrelevant alternatives

2006 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald E. Campbell ◽  
Jerry S. Kelly
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Independence Of Irrelevant Alternatives

scholarly journals Roberts’ weak welfarism theorem: a minor correction

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter J. Hammond
Keyword(s):  
Euclidean Space ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Utility Function ◽  
Weak Continuity ◽  
Strict Preference ◽  
Counter Example ◽  
Independence Of Irrelevant Alternatives ◽  
Unrestricted Domain ◽  
A Minor ◽  
Minor Correction

AbstractRoberts’ “weak neutrality” or “weak welfarism” theorem concerns Sen social welfare functionals which are defined on an unrestricted domain of utility function profiles and satisfy independence of irrelevant alternatives, the Pareto condition, and a form of weak continuity. Roberts (Rev Econ Stud 47(2):421–439, 1980) claimed that the induced welfare ordering on social states has a one-way representation by a continuous, monotonic real-valued welfare function defined on the Euclidean space of interpersonal utility vectors—that is, an increase in this welfare function is sufficient, but may not be necessary, for social strict preference. A counter-example shows that weak continuity is insufficient; a minor strengthening to pairwise continuity is proposed instead and its sufficiency demonstrated.

scholarly journals Condorcet's Theory of Voting

1988 ◽  
Vol 82 (4) ◽  
pp. 1231-1244 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. P. Young
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Social Welfare Function ◽  
Optimal Choice ◽  
Simple Majority ◽  
Independence Of Irrelevant Alternatives ◽  
Correct Rule

Condcrcet's criterion states that an alternative that defeats every other by a simple majority is the socially optimal choice. Condorcet argued that if the object of voting is to determine the “best” decision for society but voters sometimes make mistakes in their judgments, then the majority alternative (if it exists) is statistically most likely to be the best choice. Strictly speaking, this claim is not true; in some situations Bordas rule gives a sharper estimate of the best alternative. Nevertheless, Condorcet did propose a novel and statistically correct rule for finding the most likely ranking of the alternatives. This procedure, which is sometimes known as “Kemeny's rule,” is the unique social welfare function that satisfies a variant of independence of irrelevant alternatives together with several other standard properties.

Soziale Disziplinierung im flexiblen Kapitalismus

2004 ◽  
Vol 34 (136) ◽  
pp. 339-356
Author(s):  
Tobias Wölfle ◽  
Oliver Schöller
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Second Step ◽  
Social Rights ◽  
Federal Law ◽  
Capitalist Development ◽  
The Core ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Municipal Level

Under the term “Hilfe zur Arbeit” (aid for work) the federal law of social welfare subsumes all kinds of labour disciplining instruments. First, the paper shows the historical connection of welfare and labour disciplining mechanisms in the context of different periods within capitalist development. In a second step, against the background of historical experiences, we will analyse the trends of “Hilfe zur Arbeit” during the past two decades. It will be shown that by the rise of unemployment, the impact of labour disciplining aspects of “Hilfe zur Arbeit” has increased both on the federal and on the municipal level. For this reason the leverage of the liberal paradigm would take place even in the core of social rights.

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