scholarly journals Condorcet's Theory of Voting

1988 ◽  
Vol 82 (4) ◽  
pp. 1231-1244 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. P. Young
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Social Welfare Function ◽  
Optimal Choice ◽  
Simple Majority ◽  
Independence Of Irrelevant Alternatives ◽  
Correct Rule

Condcrcet's criterion states that an alternative that defeats every other by a simple majority is the socially optimal choice. Condorcet argued that if the object of voting is to determine the “best” decision for society but voters sometimes make mistakes in their judgments, then the majority alternative (if it exists) is statistically most likely to be the best choice. Strictly speaking, this claim is not true; in some situations Bordas rule gives a sharper estimate of the best alternative. Nevertheless, Condorcet did propose a novel and statistically correct rule for finding the most likely ranking of the alternatives. This procedure, which is sometimes known as “Kemeny's rule,” is the unique social welfare function that satisfies a variant of independence of irrelevant alternatives together with several other standard properties.

The Theory of Social Choice since 1951 / Die Theorie kollektiver Entscheidungen seit 1951

1998 ◽  
Vol 217 (6) ◽  
Author(s):  
Wulf Gaertner
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Social Welfare Function ◽  
Impossibility Result ◽  
Independence Axiom ◽  
Simple Majority ◽  
Borda Rule ◽  
Choice Context ◽  
Aggregation Functions ◽  
Starting Point

SummaryStarting point for our analysis is Arrow’s famous impossibility result from 1951. Arrow had proved that within an ordinal framework no non-dictatorial social welfare function exists that satisfies the condition of unrestricted domain, the weak Pareto principle and the requirement of independence of irrelevant alternatives. In the first few sections, we discuss what kinds of positive results can be obtained once we relax one or the other of his axioms. The simple majority rule, for example, is an Arrow social welfare function under a domain restriction that is more general than single-peakedness. The Borda rule violates Arrow’s independence axiom but satisfies a weak independence requirement together with some other rather attractive properties. We next look at preference domains that admit the existence of Arrovian social welfare functions, i. e. aggregation rules fulfilling both the Pareto and the independence condition and being nondictatorial. We also characterize domains for non-manipulable voting procedures. The subsequent section analyzes social aggregation functions that allow for an interpersonal comparison of both utility levels and utility gains. Utilitarian rules and the Rawlsian lexicographic maximin principle are discussed in particular. We finally examine the exercise of individual rights within the social choice context, which means that non-utility information is considered as well.

Remittances and the Politics of Austerity

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roy Germano
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Economic Crisis ◽  
Social Welfare Function ◽  
Global Markets ◽  
Welfare Programs ◽  
Social Instability ◽  
Social Welfare Programs ◽  
Poor Families ◽  
International Migrants

Remittances sent by international migrants have become an increasingly important source of social welfare in the developing world. This chapter explores what remittances are, why migrants send them, and how poor families use them. I argue in this chapter that remittances are more than just gifts from one relative to another. They play a larger social welfare role that complements funds that governments spend on social welfare programs. This social welfare function has become particularly important in recent decades as developing countries have prioritized austerity and integrated into volatile global markets. I argue that by filling a welfare gap in an age of austerity, remittances help to reduce the suffering and anger that so often trigger political and social instability during times of economic crisis.

scholarly journals Introducing fairness in Norwegian air ambulance base location planning

2021 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Caroline J. Jagtenberg ◽  
Maaike A. J. Vollebergh ◽  
Oddvar Uleberg ◽  
Jo Røislien
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Social Welfare Function ◽  
Mathematical Optimization ◽  
Population Coverage ◽  
Air Ambulance ◽  
Service Levels ◽  
Remote Areas ◽  
The North ◽  
Time Threshold ◽  
Essential Question

Abstract Background A primary task of the Norwegian helicopter emergency medical services (HEMS) is to provide advanced medical care to the critical ill and injured outside of hospitals. Where HEMS bases are located, directly influences who in the population can be reached within a given response time threshold and who cannot. When studying the locations of bases, the focus is often on efficiency, that is, maximizing the total number of people that can be reached within a given set time. This approach is known to benefit people living in densely populated areas, such as cities, over people living in remote areas. The most efficient solution is thus typically not necessarily a fair one. This study aims to incorporate fairness in finding optimal air ambulance base locations. Methods We solve multiple advanced mathematical optimization models to determine optimal helicopter base locations, with different optimization criteria related to the level of aversion to inequality, including the utilitarian, Bernoulli-Nash and iso-elastic social welfare functions. This is the first study to use the latter social welfare function for HEMS. Results Focusing on efficiency, a utilitarian objective function focuses on covering the larger cities in Norway, leaving parts of Norway largely uncovered. Including fairness by rather using an iso-elastic social welfare function in the optimization avoids leaving whole areas uncovered and in particular increases service levels in the north of Norway. Conclusions Including fairness in determining optimal HEMS base locations has great impact on population coverage, in particular when the number of base locations is not enough to give full coverage of the country. As results differ depending on the mathematical objective, the work shows the importance of not only looking for optimal solutions, but also raising the essential question of ‘optimal with respect to what’.

scholarly journals Roberts’ weak welfarism theorem: a minor correction

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter J. Hammond
Keyword(s):  
Euclidean Space ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Utility Function ◽  
Weak Continuity ◽  
Strict Preference ◽  
Counter Example ◽  
Independence Of Irrelevant Alternatives ◽  
Unrestricted Domain ◽  
A Minor ◽  
Minor Correction

AbstractRoberts’ “weak neutrality” or “weak welfarism” theorem concerns Sen social welfare functionals which are defined on an unrestricted domain of utility function profiles and satisfy independence of irrelevant alternatives, the Pareto condition, and a form of weak continuity. Roberts (Rev Econ Stud 47(2):421–439, 1980) claimed that the induced welfare ordering on social states has a one-way representation by a continuous, monotonic real-valued welfare function defined on the Euclidean space of interpersonal utility vectors—that is, an increase in this welfare function is sufficient, but may not be necessary, for social strict preference. A counter-example shows that weak continuity is insufficient; a minor strengthening to pairwise continuity is proposed instead and its sufficiency demonstrated.

scholarly journals Optimal Policy with Heterogeneous Preferences

2008 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Louis Kaplow
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Optimal Policy ◽  
Income Tax ◽  
Social Welfare Function ◽  
Income Taxation ◽  
Heterogeneous Preferences ◽  
Commodity Taxation ◽  
Policy Rules ◽  
The Social

Abstract Optimal policy rules—including those regarding income taxation, commodity taxation, public goods, and externalities—are typically derived in models with homogeneous preferences. This article reconsiders many central results for the case in which preferences for commodities, public goods, and externalities are heterogeneous. When preference differences are observable, standard second-best results in basic settings are unaffected, except those for the optimal income tax. Optimal levels of income taxation may be higher, the same, or lower on types who derive more utility from various goods, depending on the nature of preference differences and the concavity of the social welfare function. When preference differences are unobservable, all policy rules may change. The determinants of even the direction of optimal rule adjustments are many and subtle.

The NIP graph of a social welfare function

2009 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 415-421 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lee R. Gibson ◽  
Robert C. Powers
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Social Welfare Function

scholarly journals Distributive Justice, Public Policies and the Comparison of Legal Rules: Quantify the “Price of Equity”

2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Fabbri ◽  
Diogo GC Britto
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Social Welfare Function ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Public Policies ◽  
Quantitative Approach ◽  
Legal Rules ◽  
Aggregation Methods ◽  
Equity And Efficiency ◽  
Special Circumstances ◽  
Total Wealth

Abstract This paper proposes a quantitative approach to study two methodological problems arising when a costly redistribution of resources is implemented through public policies or legal rules: (a) aggregating individual into social preferences and (b) choosing the object of maximization. We consider a redistribution intervention that reduces inequality but diminishes total wealth and we specify a set of social welfare functions combining different preferences aggregation methods and maximands. For each social welfare function, we calculate its “price of equity”, defined as the maximum fraction of total wealth that a society is willing to sacrifice in order to implement the redistribution. Comparing the prices for equity across different social welfare function specifications, we identify systematic relationships and we rank them according to the efficiency-equity orientation. Results show that social welfare functions characterized by aggregation methods conventionally considered equity-oriented may reject redistribution interventions that are evaluated as welfare-improving by social welfare functions using efficiency-oriented aggregation methods. Similarly, social welfare functions considered equity-oriented because using utility as object of maximization may reject distributive policies that are evaluated as welfare-improving by social welfare functions using wealth as maximand. We argue that the quantitative approach proposed, by expounding the trade-off between equity and efficiency connected to different social welfare functions, may prove useful in areas of public law where policy-makers have to engage in the choice of a normative criterion for the evaluation of social welfare. Additionally, our results may inform rule-makers interested in comparing the distributive effects of alternative legal rules in special circumstances where private remedies can efficiently achieve redistribution goals.

scholarly journals Influence Mechanism on Supplier Emission Reduction Based on a Two-Level Supply Chain

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (23) ◽  
pp. 12439
Author(s):  
Lina Ma ◽  
Xinran Zhang ◽  
Yushen Du
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Environmental Impact ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Ghg Emissions ◽  
Optimal Choice ◽  
Emissions Reduction ◽  
Governmental Intervention ◽  
The Government ◽  
Reduction Effort ◽  
Better Than

The purpose of this paper is to investigate environmental performance of a supply chain which consists of an upstream supplier and a downstream firm. A mathematical model considering both downstream firm’s monitoring and governmental intervention is developed. Afterwards, a numerical example is presented to show the equilibriums of these models and the optimal choices of firms and government. The results show that when customers’ environmental awareness increases, both total environmental impact and social welfare decrease. The downstream firm’s monitoring will certainly reduce the total environmental impact. In most cases, it does not matter whether the downstream firm chooses to monitor the supplier or not, the total environmental impact and social welfare would not be affected when the government chooses subsidy. If a subsidy is present, firms and environment will be better than those without subsidy. Hence, the government is more likely to choose to provide subsidy and the downstream firm will not monitor the supplier’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction effort. In a few cases when environmental impact is too large, taxation may be the optimal choice for the government and the downstream firm will choose to monitor the supplier’s GHG emissions reduction investment.

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