Projections of pension benefits in supplementary pension saving scheme in Slovakia

Author(s):  
Michal Mešťan ◽  
Ivan Králik ◽  
Matej Žofaj ◽  
Nikola Karkošiaková ◽  
Audrius Kabašinskas
Author(s):  
Antoine Genest-Grégoire ◽  
Luc Godbout ◽  
René Beaudry ◽  
Bernard Morency

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah Lynne Salvador Daway-Ducanes

Abstract This paper analyses the macroeconomic and welfare effects of a higher retirement age within a dynamic overlapping generations framework, wherein exponential discounting and sophisticated quasi-hyperbolic discounting agents coexist in ‘mixed economies’. The transitional dynamics of economic aggregates depend on the proportion of QHD agents, and the extent to which reducing the social security tax rate mitigates crowding-out effects on savings and enables both lower pension contributions and higher pension benefits. Welfare impacts across agent types and cohorts differ accordingly: QHD agents employ the higher retirement age as a commitment mechanism to mitigate the adverse welfare implications of present-biasedness.


2011 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-70 ◽  
Author(s):  
GILLES LE GARREC

AbstractIn most industrial countries, public pension systems redistribute from workers to retired people, not from high-income to low-income earners. They are close actuarial fairness. However, they are not all equivalent. In particular, some pension benefits are linked to full lifetime average earnings, while others are only linked to partial earnings history. In the latter case, we then show in this article that an actuarially fair pay-as-you-go pension system can both reduce lifetime income inequality and enhance economic growth. We also shed light on the dilemma between inequality and economic growth in retirement systems: greater progressivity results in less lifetime inequlity but also less growth.


2006 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Annelies Debels ◽  
Hans Peeters ◽  
Gert Verschraegen ◽  
Jos Berghman

Old age protection of flexible workers in Belgium Old age protection of flexible workers in Belgium This article investigates to what extent the Belgian pension system is adapted to the proliferation of a-typical forms of employment. Are there any differences between the old age protection of flexible and non-flexible workers? What are the effects of flexible employment on participation in the three pension pillars and on the level of pension benefits? To answer these questions, the article pursues a double research strategy: an analysis of Belgian legislation and relevant collective labour agreements is complemented with a statistical analysis on the Panel Study of Belgian Households (PSBH). The analyses show that part-time employment results in a lower pension, while other forms of temporal flexibility such as temporary leave arrangements and temporary unemployment do not. In the second pillar we find that contractual and transitional flexible workers are discriminated. Finally, the results indicate that flexible workers do not compensate for lower pension protection through increased participation in the third pension pillar. Our findings suggest that a re-assessment of the system of ‘assimilated’ periods is required, as well as the development of a system of coordinated regulation for the three pension pillars.


2007 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 127-145 ◽  
Author(s):  
PETER J. BRADY

Among the requirements a pension plan must meet to qualify for tax benefits are the nondiscrimination rules. Nondiscrimination rules are designed to ensure that pension benefits do not disproportionately accrue to highly compensated employees. But the rules are also complex and increase administrative and compliance costs associated with offering a pension plan. Recent pension reform proposals would simplify nondiscrimination rules, reducing administrative and compliance costs and potentially leading to more employers offering pension benefits. However, there are concerns that any loosening of the rules could lead to a drop in participation by low-wage workers. This paper examines the economic incentive that nondiscrimination rules provide to employers to cross subsidize employees; that is, the incentive to increase pension benefits (and total compensation) paid to low-paid workers for the express purpose of enabling high-paid workers to receive a higher proportion of compensation in the form of pension benefits. The study calculates the incentives faced by a hypothetical firm, and then illustrates how those incentives change when assumptions about employee contribution behavior, employee compensation, and employer-matching formulas are allowed to vary. Results show that only firms with a relatively low ratio of low-paid workers to high-paid workers would have an economic incentive under a standard 401(k) plan to cross subsidize employees. Although this incentive may exist in a large number of firms, these firms likely employ only a small portion of the workforce. This is ultimately an empirical question, however, and examining data on the distribution of earnings within pension plans, as well as determining if firms find nondiscrimination rules binding, would be a useful extension of this research.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (2) ◽  
pp. 114-130
Author(s):  
Anastasiia SVIRIDOVSKA ◽  

According to the current legislation, the modern Ukrainian pension system is not yet fully formed. In Ukraine, PFC contributions currently form a source of pension benefits for citizens. The solidarity pension system is crumbling . That is, as in the rest of the world, the nation is aging, the share of retirees is growing, and there is less able-bodied population. The search for new ways to save for old age is in the direction of creating a mandatory accumulation under the supervision of the state. Thus, today, a second level of the pension system, mandatory accumulative component, and a rather underdeveloped and unpopular non-state pension system, which forms the third level of the national pension system, do not function. However, in 2020, the work on the concept and bill on the mandatory savings system was intensified. Its introduction is seen as a tool that can increase both the level of pensions and their differentiation. But the world experience of such reforms shows that the real effect on payments from the savings system will have to wait at least 15-20 or even 25 years. The article examines the issue of introducing a funded pension level at the legislative level. According to the results of an expanded analysis of 19 draft laws on reforming the current pension legislation and proposals for new laws on these issues in the period from 2018 to 2021, we can conclude that there is no single concept of amending legislation, so most bills are either withdrawn or sent for further refinement. Currently, various aspects of the pension system of Ukraine are regulated by a large number of legislative acts, so there are signs of dispersion in these draft legislative changes. Most of the bills are developed to enhance the welfare of certain categories of citizens, including servicemen, single mothers, victims of the Chernobyl accident, war veterans and more. The issues of the accumulative pension system are mainly raised in the bills of 2020–2021.


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