scholarly journals Systemic risk measurement: bucketing global systemically important banks

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marina Brogi ◽  
Valentina Lagasio ◽  
Luca Riccetti

AbstractThe general consensus on the need to enhance the resilience of the financial system has led to the imposition of higher capital requirements for certain institutions, supposedly based on their contribution to systemic risk. Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) are divided into buckets based on their required additional capital buffers ranging from 1% to 3.5%. We measure the marginal contribution to systemic risk of 26 G-SIBs using the Distressed Insurance Premium methodology proposed by Huang et al. (J Bank Financ 33:2036–2049, 2009) and examine ranking consistency with that using the SRISK of Acharya et al. (Am Econ Rev 102:59–64, 2012). We then compare the bucketing using the two academic approaches and supervisory buckets. Because it leads to capital surcharges, bucketing should be consistent, irrespective of methodology. Instead, discrepancies in the allocation between buckets emerge and this suggests the complementary use of other methodologies.

2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 94-105
Author(s):  
Alfan Mansur

Inter-connectedness is one important aspect in measuring the degree of systemic risk arising in the banking system. In this paper, this aspect besides the degree of commonality and volatility are measured using Principal Component Analysis (PCA), dynamic Granger causality tests and a Markov regime switching model. These measures can be used as leading indicators to detect pressures in the financial system, in particular the banking system. There is evidence that the inter-connectedness level together with degree of commonality and volatility among banks escalate substantially during the financial distress. It implies that less systemically important banks could become more important in the financial system during the abnormal times. Therefore, the list of systemically important banks as regulated in the Law on Prevention and Mitigation of Financial System Crisis (UU PPKSK) should be updated more frequently during the period of financial distress.


2012 ◽  
pp. 32-47
Author(s):  
S. Andryushin ◽  
V. Kuznetsova

The paper analyzes central banks macroprudencial policy and its instruments. The issues of their classification, option, design and adjustment are connected with financial stability of overall financial system and its specific institutions. The macroprudencial instruments effectiveness is evaluated from the two points: how they mitigate temporal and intersectoral systemic risk development (market, credit, and operational). The future macroprudentional policy studies directions are noted to identify the instruments, which can be used to limit the financial systemdevelopment procyclicality, mitigate the credit and financial cycles volatility.


Risks ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 74 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabiana Gómez ◽  
Jorge Ponce

This paper provides a rationale for the macro-prudential regulation of insurance companies, where capital requirements increase in their contribution to systemic risk. In the absence of systemic risk, the formal model in this paper predicts that optimal regulation may be implemented by capital regulation (similar to that observed in practice, e.g., Solvency II ) and by actuarially fair technical reserve. However, these instruments are not sufficient when insurance companies are exposed to systemic risk: prudential regulation should also add a systemic component to capital requirements that is non-decreasing in the firm’s exposure to systemic risk. Implementing the optimal policy implies separating insurance firms into two categories according to their exposure to systemic risk: those with relatively low exposure should be eligible for bailouts, while those with high exposure should not benefit from public support if a systemic event occurs.


2021 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 74-95
Author(s):  
Yu.S. Evlakhova ◽  
◽  
E.N. Alifanova ◽  
A.A. Tregubova ◽  
◽  
...  

This paper finds out the behavior patterns of the Russian banking sector and systemically important banks in response to changes in the population financial activity under the economic shocks. The results show that the Russian banking sector has a behavior pattern that includes the sequence of actions: the outflow of deposits — vulnerability to non-repayment of loans — deposit bubble — credit bubble. We find no consistent evidence that systemically important banks show the same sequence of actions during the crises. We also find that the banking sector behavior and systemically important banks’ behavior varied in 2008–2009, but became the same in the crisis of 2014–2015. The coincidence of behavior patterns of the banking sector and systemically important banks increases the systemic risk. Research on intragroup differences between systemically important banks will allow finding solutions to reduce the risk.


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