scholarly journals Porter Hypothesis vs Pollution Haven Hypothesis: Can There Be Environmental Policies Getting Two Eggs in One Basket?

2021 ◽  
Vol 78 (1) ◽  
pp. 177-199
Author(s):  
Claudia Ranocchia ◽  
Luca Lambertini

AbstractThe Porter hypothesis and the pollution haven hypothesis seem to predict opposite reactions by firms facing environmental regulation, as the first invokes the arising of a win–win solution while the second envisages the possibility for firms to flee abroad. We illustrate the possibility of designing policies (taking the form of either emission taxation or environmental standards) able to eliminate firms’ incentives to relocate their plants abroad and create a parallel incentive for them to deliver a win–win solution by investing either in replacement technologies under emission taxation, or in abatement technologies under an environmental standard. This is worked out in a Cournot supergame in which firms may activate the highest level of collusion compatible with their intertemporal preferences.

2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 615-635 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. De Santis ◽  
C. Jona Lasinio

In this paper we test the narrow Porter hypothesis on a sample of European economies in the period 1995–2008. We focus on the channels through which tighter environmental regulation affect productivity and innovation. Our findings suggest that the “narrow” Porter Hypothesis cannot be rejected and that the choice of policy instruments is not neutral. In particular, market based environmental stringency measures seem to be the most suitable to stimulate innovations and productivity growth. Consistently with the strategic reorientation of environmental policies in the European Union since the end of the eighties, our results indicate that the EU might privilege the market based instruments in order to meet more effectively the 2030 targets, especially through the channels of innovation and productivity enhancement.


Author(s):  
Monica Das ◽  
Sandwip K. Das

Abstract According to the Pollution Haven Hypothesis (PHH), weak environmental policies improve a country's comparative advantage in the polluting sector, thus promoting its expansion. In this paper, we develop a neo-classical general equilibrium model with two goods and two factors and show that the relationship between environmental policies and comparative advantage can be ambiguous. We focus entirely on emission caps or command and control (CAC) programs of regulation and treat abatement as equivalent to a technological retardation. We show that when the technological retardation is Hick neutral, the PHH holds and the Heckscher Ohlin Samuelson (HOS) theorem determines trade patterns between a capital-abundant country and a labor-abundant country that follow different environmental policies. If pollution abatement is capital biased in the polluting sector, the standard trade theorems and the PHH may not hold. The paper derives a sufficient condition under which the PHH would hold. However, if this condition is violated, the PHH as well as the HOS theorem may not hold.


2018 ◽  
Vol 202 ◽  
pp. 993-1000 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jing Yang ◽  
Huanxiu Guo ◽  
Beibei Liu ◽  
Rui Shi ◽  
Bing Zhang ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
Beata Smarzynska Javorcik ◽  
Shang-Jin Wei

Abstract The “pollution haven” hypothesis refers to the possibility that multinational firms, particularly those engaged in highly polluting activities, relocate to countries with weaker environmental standards. Despite the plausibility and popularity of this hypothesis, the existing literature has found only limited evidence to support it. To enhance our ability to detect the possible “dirty secret,” this study makes improvements in four areas. First, we focus on investment flows from multiple countries to 25 economies in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Transition countries are a suitable region for studying this question, as they offer a large variation in terms of environmental standards. Second, we take into explicit account the effect of host country corruption. Third, we include information on both the polluting-intensity of the potential investor and the environmental stringency in the potential host country, which allows us to test whether dirty industries are relatively more attracted to locations with weak standards. And fourth, we rely on firm-level rather than industry-level data. Despite these improvements, we find no support for the “pollution haven” hypothesis. If anything, firms in less polluting industries are more likely to invest in the region. We find no systematic evidence that FDI from “dirtier” industries is more likely to go to countries with weak environmental regulations.


2019 ◽  
Vol 64 (02) ◽  
pp. 301-321 ◽  
Author(s):  
DONGMEI TU ◽  
YAO LI ◽  
YONG ZENG

This study investigates the impact of stricter environmental regulation on export exit behavior of Chinese manufacturing firms from 1998 to 2009. After controlling heterogeneous firm, we find that (i) on average, the stricter regulation has not significantly caused more export exit; (ii) under stricter policy, foreign invested pure (or pollution intensive) exporters are not more likely to exit export than domestic pure (or pollution intensive) exporters; (iii) only weak evidence supports the pollution haven hypothesis for domestic pure exporters. All our robustness checks such as difference in difference analysis, different regulation measurement, and matched firm analysis show similar results.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document