Constitutional courts as promoters of political centralization: lessons for the European Court of Justice

2009 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 203-222 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roland Vaubel
Keyword(s):  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Political Centralization

Constitutional Courts, Preliminary Rulings and the “New Form of Law”: The Adjudication of the European Stability Mechanism

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1771-1790 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samo Bardutzky
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
The Other ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
High Courts ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
European Stability Mechanism ◽  
New Form

In 2012 and 2013, we observed how the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) was adjudicated by “EU courts, plural”: a number of high courts of the Member States (among them “Kelsenian” constitutional courts as well as representatives of a more hybrid model of judicial review of constitutionality) and the European Court of Justice (CJEU) were seized by challenges to the mechanism. What attracted attention was the fact that only one court, the Supreme Court of Ireland, decided to submit a preliminary reference to the CJEU, while the other courts, as would appear from their judgments, did not even consider the option. This was a suboptimal example of judicial dialogue in the case of ESM adjudication.

scholarly journals The European Court of Justice: Of Institutions and Democracy

1998 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Shapiro
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Statutory Interpretation ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Limited Government ◽  
Administrative Action ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Court Interpreting ◽  
Law Making

The problem of democracy and judicial review is a problem engendered by successful constitutional courts. For where courts are not successful in establishing veto powers over legislation, no problem or only a very limited problem occurs. Of course any court interpreting statutes in the process of applying them does some law making. How much this law making interferes with democracy depends on how easy it is for the legislature to legislate. Where legislatures can amend statutes easily, they can easily correct “errors” of judicial statutory interpretation. Judicial review of the lawfulness of administrative action essentially involves the same power of statutory interpretation with the same potential for legislative correction.Most of the nations of the world that do not have successful constitutional courts are not democracies. Indeed, no state without considerable claims to democracy has successful judicial review. These facts are clues to the obvious. Constitutional government is limited government. In the real world we do not encounter nondemocratic limited governments although we encounter many shades of more or less democratic, more or less constitutional governments. So there is some affinity between democracy and constitutionalism.

Decision 22/2016. (XII. 5.) AB on the Interpretation of Article E)(2) of the Fundamental Law

2017 ◽  
Vol 111 (2) ◽  
pp. 468-475 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ágoston Mohay ◽  
Norbert Tóth
Keyword(s):  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Fundamental Law

In a case of first impression, the Constitutional Court of Hungary (CCH or Court) ruled on November 30, 2016 that, in exceptional cases, it is competent to consider whether Hungary's obligations to the European Union (EU) violate fundamental individual rights (including human dignity) or Hungarian sovereignty as protected by the Hungarian Constitution. The decision places Hungary squarely within the growing group of EU member states whose constitutional courts have decided that, despite the decisions of the European Court of Justice regarding the primacy of EU law, EU member states are not compelled to violate their domestic constitutional obligations in carrying out their shared EU commitments.

Protocol No 16 to the ECHR: Managing Backlog through Complex Judicial Dialogue?

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 691-713
Author(s):  
Koen Lemmens
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Advisory Opinions

European Court of Human Rights – Protocol No. 16 – Advisory Opinions – Managing backlog – Unpredictable effects – Complex judicial dialogue – Interplay with preliminary rulings of European Court of Justice and national constitutional courts – Bosphorus presumption – National courts in charge of judicial diplomacy – Increased burden for national courts

scholarly journals ¿Es real el diálogo entre tribunales? Cuestión prejudicial y control de constitucionalidad por vulneración de derechos y libertades fundamentales

2017 ◽  
pp. 529
Author(s):  
Encarnación Roca Trías ◽  
Susana García Couso
Keyword(s):  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights ◽  
National Constitution

Es de sobra conocida la tensión existente entre los Tribunales Constitucionales de los Estados miembros y el Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea a raíz del planteamiento de cuestiones prejudiciales ante el TJUE en supuestos en los que, aunque el asunto se plantee como una cuestión interpretativa del derecho de la Unión, comprende, además, un problema de derechos fundamentales susceptibles de ser controlados, también, constitucionalmente. Ambos procedimientos terminan con una decisión de compatibilidad con los derechos fundamentales. Este artículo pretende hacer una reflexión acerca de los problemas que suscita el hecho de que dos Tribunales —TJUE y TC— competentes en materia de protección de derechos fundamentales, y, al mismo tiempo, interpretadores de un mismo ordenamiento jurídico, puedan emitir juicios paralelos sobre una misma norma que ha sido sometida a su control y con parámetros diferentes de control: la Carta de Derechos Fundamentales de la Unión Europea y la Constitución.This paper purports to reflect on the complex issues that arise from the fact that both the European Court of Justice and the national constitutional court have the power to adjudicate on fundamental rights and that, therefore, on the basis of the application of different rules — the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the national Constitution — they can occasionally arrive at different decisions. National courts are more and more aware of this dual avenue to challenge national regulations, through the preliminary reference to the ECJ and through the reference to the Constitutional Court of constitutional doubts with regard to national legislation. In consequence, national Constitutional Courts must accommodate into this new scenario.

Should We Polish It Up? The Polish Constitutional Tribunal and the Idea of Supremacy of EU Law

2005 ◽  
Vol 6 (10) ◽  
pp. 1355-1366 ◽  
Author(s):  
Krystyna Kowalik-Bańczyk
Keyword(s):  
Primary Source ◽  
Sole Source ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Constitutional Tribunal ◽  
One Year

Just one year after Polish accession to the European Union, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal was provided the opportunity to clarify its position regarding the supremacy of EC and EU law. In its two recent judgments, it joined the long tradition of a rather uneasy relationship between national Constitutional Courts and European Court of Justice (ECJ). The uneasiness of this relationship results from an ever-unsolved dilemma – which of the two judicial fora should have the last word in case of conflict between European norms and national constitution norms? The solution given by European Court of Justice in a series of early judgments seems obvious. It opted for an absolute supremacy of EC norms over national norms. On the other hand, the national Constitutional Courts usually accept the supremacy of EC law - but only as a consequence of transfer of some competences under strict conditions set by national constitutions. They thus accept the concept named by Neil Walker “constitutional pluralism”, meaning that the states are no longer the sole source of constitutional authority. However, national constitutions are still the “primary” source of any such authority.

scholarly journals Europe and Rights: Taking Dialogue Seriously

2009 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marta Cartabia
Keyword(s):  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Judicial Activism ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Reference Procedure ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights

Judicial dialogue – protection of fundamental rights – common constitutional principles – judicial activism – Charter of Fundamental Rights – pluralistic nature of Europe – national particularism – preliminary reference procedure – duty of constitutional courts to participate in dialogue – protection of national constitutional values and traditions – judicial style of European Court of Justice

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