Decision 22/2016. (XII. 5.) AB on the Interpretation of Article E)(2) of the Fundamental Law

2017 ◽  
Vol 111 (2) ◽  
pp. 468-475 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ágoston Mohay ◽  
Norbert Tóth
Keyword(s):  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Fundamental Law

In a case of first impression, the Constitutional Court of Hungary (CCH or Court) ruled on November 30, 2016 that, in exceptional cases, it is competent to consider whether Hungary's obligations to the European Union (EU) violate fundamental individual rights (including human dignity) or Hungarian sovereignty as protected by the Hungarian Constitution. The decision places Hungary squarely within the growing group of EU member states whose constitutional courts have decided that, despite the decisions of the European Court of Justice regarding the primacy of EU law, EU member states are not compelled to violate their domestic constitutional obligations in carrying out their shared EU commitments.

6. The preliminary ruling (Article 267 TFEU)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nigel Foster
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Preliminary Ruling ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Reference Procedure ◽  
Procedural Law ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court

This chapter examines the procedural law of the European Union (EU), focusing on Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). It explains that Article 267 is the reference procedure by which courts in member states can endorse questions concerning EU law to the European Court of Justice (CoJ). Under this Article, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has the jurisdiction to provide preliminary rulings on the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies of the Union and on the interpretation of the Treaties.

The German Constitutional Court and Preliminary References—Still a Match not Made in Heaven?

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1491-1508
Author(s):  
Eva Julia Lohse
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
German Constitutional Court ◽  
In The Beginning ◽  
The Eu

So far, the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, henceforth:BVerfG) has only made a single preliminary reference to the (now) Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), despite frequent rulings on matters connected with European Union (EU) Law. Its apparent reluctance seemed odd considering the atmosphere of dialogue and cooperation which prevails between the non-constitutional courts and the EU courts. This situation might, however, have changed with the preliminary reference from January 2014, proving predictions on the perceived “most powerful constitutional court” and its relationship to the EU partly wrong. The legal effects of its preliminary reference on the interpretation of Articles 119, 123, 127 ff. of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the validity of Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) by the European Central Bank (ECB) under EU Law are as yet unclear; although the Opinion of the Advocate General Cruz Villalón was delivered in the beginning of 2015, which did not confirm the doubts expressed by theBVerfGabout the conformity of the OMT programme with EU law. Nonetheless, the interpretative scheme and the normative questions as to the reluctance of theBVerfGremain the same after this single referral and offer explanations as to why theBVerfGhad for nearly sixty years not referred a question to the former European Court of Justice (ECJ).

scholarly journals The 346 Clause of TFEU Regulation in Different EU Member States

Teisė ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 113 ◽  
pp. 123-138
Author(s):  
Vilius Kuzminskas
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Case Law ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court

The article discloses the fixed exclusion regulation of Clause 346 in the Treaty of Function of the European Union in different EU member states. A further assessment of different relevant judicial approaches to regulation are disclosed and evaluated in accordance with the European Court of Justice case law and procurement in the defense area doctrine.

scholarly journals ¿Es real el diálogo entre tribunales? Cuestión prejudicial y control de constitucionalidad por vulneración de derechos y libertades fundamentales

2017 ◽  
pp. 529
Author(s):  
Encarnación Roca Trías ◽  
Susana García Couso
Keyword(s):  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights ◽  
National Constitution

Es de sobra conocida la tensión existente entre los Tribunales Constitucionales de los Estados miembros y el Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea a raíz del planteamiento de cuestiones prejudiciales ante el TJUE en supuestos en los que, aunque el asunto se plantee como una cuestión interpretativa del derecho de la Unión, comprende, además, un problema de derechos fundamentales susceptibles de ser controlados, también, constitucionalmente. Ambos procedimientos terminan con una decisión de compatibilidad con los derechos fundamentales. Este artículo pretende hacer una reflexión acerca de los problemas que suscita el hecho de que dos Tribunales —TJUE y TC— competentes en materia de protección de derechos fundamentales, y, al mismo tiempo, interpretadores de un mismo ordenamiento jurídico, puedan emitir juicios paralelos sobre una misma norma que ha sido sometida a su control y con parámetros diferentes de control: la Carta de Derechos Fundamentales de la Unión Europea y la Constitución.This paper purports to reflect on the complex issues that arise from the fact that both the European Court of Justice and the national constitutional court have the power to adjudicate on fundamental rights and that, therefore, on the basis of the application of different rules — the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the national Constitution — they can occasionally arrive at different decisions. National courts are more and more aware of this dual avenue to challenge national regulations, through the preliminary reference to the ECJ and through the reference to the Constitutional Court of constitutional doubts with regard to national legislation. In consequence, national Constitutional Courts must accommodate into this new scenario.

Should We Polish It Up? The Polish Constitutional Tribunal and the Idea of Supremacy of EU Law

2005 ◽  
Vol 6 (10) ◽  
pp. 1355-1366 ◽  
Author(s):  
Krystyna Kowalik-Bańczyk
Keyword(s):  
Primary Source ◽  
Sole Source ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Constitutional Tribunal ◽  
One Year

Just one year after Polish accession to the European Union, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal was provided the opportunity to clarify its position regarding the supremacy of EC and EU law. In its two recent judgments, it joined the long tradition of a rather uneasy relationship between national Constitutional Courts and European Court of Justice (ECJ). The uneasiness of this relationship results from an ever-unsolved dilemma – which of the two judicial fora should have the last word in case of conflict between European norms and national constitution norms? The solution given by European Court of Justice in a series of early judgments seems obvious. It opted for an absolute supremacy of EC norms over national norms. On the other hand, the national Constitutional Courts usually accept the supremacy of EC law - but only as a consequence of transfer of some competences under strict conditions set by national constitutions. They thus accept the concept named by Neil Walker “constitutional pluralism”, meaning that the states are no longer the sole source of constitutional authority. However, national constitutions are still the “primary” source of any such authority.

11. Free movement of goods II: non-tariff barriers

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nigel Foster
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
European Commission ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Free Movement ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Free Movement Of Goods

This chapter examines European Union (EU) law concerning non-tariff barriers to free movement of goods. It describes member states’ attempts to influence imports and the way the European Commission and the European Court of Justice (CoJ) handled these issues. This chapter explains the provisions of the relevant legislation for non-tariff barriers, which include Articles 34, 36, and 35 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). It also analyses example cases including ‘Dassonville’, ‘Cassis de Dijon’, and ‘Keck’.

After the OMT Case: The Supremacy of EU Law as the Guarantee of the Equality of the Member States

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 1003-1023 ◽  
Author(s):  
Federico Fabbrini
Keyword(s):  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Member States ◽  
European Central ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Cherry Picking ◽  
German Constitutional Court ◽  
The Eu

This article analyzes the recent judgment of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) inGauweiler, answering the first preliminary reference ever by the German Constitutional Court (BVerfG), on the legality of the Outright Monetary Transaction (OMT) program of the European Central Bank (ECB). As the article explains, the ECJ rejected any possible claim of illegality of a key program devised by the ECB at the height of the Euro-crisis. However, because the BVerfG had defined the OMT program as ultra vires, and had threatened to strike it down if the ECJ did not reach the same result, the article defends the principle of the supremacy of European Union (EU) law, indicating that a possible nullification of the OMT program by the BVerfG would be clearly unlawful. To re-affirm the supremacy of EU law, the article argues that this principle is functional to ensure the equality of the member states before the law, preventing each country of the EU from cherry-picking which provisions of EU it likes or not. As the article suggests, respect of the principle of the supremacy of EU law – including by the BVerfG – is ultimately in the interest of every EU member state, including of Germany.

Constitutional Jurisdictions Between the Supremacy of the Constitution and the Primacy of European Union Law

De Jure ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Viktoriya Mingova ◽  
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Main Task ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
European Union Law ◽  
Member States ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Unique Nature

The interaction between the national constitutional jurisdictions of the Member States and the Court of Justice of the European Union raises questions that often cannot be answered unequivocally. The focus of this debate is, of course, on the fundamental question of whether European Union law takes primacy over national constitutions. This study presents the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice on the establishment of the principle of autonomy of EU law in relation to the internal law of the Member States in its development, since it is precisely the positions it adopts that allow the Court of Justice to derive the principle of primacy over ‘any provision of internal law’ as a logical and natural consequence of the unique nature of EU law. On the other hand, since this integration activity of the Court of Justice is not the result of a conscious activity of the Member States, legitimated by their constitutions, the inevitable question arises of whether the results of the activity in question do not clash with the main task of the constitutional courts ‒ to ensure a coherent and uniform application of the law within the national legal order and above all in accordance with the constitution. The case law of the constitutional courts of the Member States presented in this study leads to the conclusion that they regard autonomy as a relative characteristic, which is why they reject the principle of absolute primacy of European Union law over constitutional rules. It seems that no constitutional court could abdicate its role as a court of ‘last word’ in this respect.

The unexpectedly talkative ‘dumb son’: the Italian Constitutional Court’s dialogue with the European Court of Justice in protecting temporary workers’ rights in the public education sector

2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 493-524
Author(s):  
Barbara Guastaferro
Keyword(s):  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Added Value ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Constitutional Review ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Italian Legislation

Judicial cooperation – Italian Constitutional Court – National Constitutional Courts’ attitude towards preliminary reference to the European Court of Justice – First and second preliminary reference of the Italian Constitutional Court inindirectproceedings – Constitutional review of national legislation inconsistent with EU law – Relationship between EU law and constitutional concerns – Added value of Constitutional Courts in protecting constitutional identity – Multilevel protection of fundamental rights – EU Framework agreement on fixed-term work and European Court of Justice case law – Italian legislation on fixed-term work – Italian legislation on recruitment in State schools – Abuse arising from the use of successive fixed-term employment contracts – Judicial defence of workers’ rights – Cooperation between judges and legislators – Balancing between social rights and budgetary constraints –Mascolocase –Tariccocase

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