Should We Polish It Up? The Polish Constitutional Tribunal and the Idea of Supremacy of EU Law

2005 ◽  
Vol 6 (10) ◽  
pp. 1355-1366 ◽  
Author(s):  
Krystyna Kowalik-Bańczyk

Just one year after Polish accession to the European Union, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal was provided the opportunity to clarify its position regarding the supremacy of EC and EU law. In its two recent judgments, it joined the long tradition of a rather uneasy relationship between national Constitutional Courts and European Court of Justice (ECJ). The uneasiness of this relationship results from an ever-unsolved dilemma – which of the two judicial fora should have the last word in case of conflict between European norms and national constitution norms? The solution given by European Court of Justice in a series of early judgments seems obvious. It opted for an absolute supremacy of EC norms over national norms. On the other hand, the national Constitutional Courts usually accept the supremacy of EC law - but only as a consequence of transfer of some competences under strict conditions set by national constitutions. They thus accept the concept named by Neil Walker “constitutional pluralism”, meaning that the states are no longer the sole source of constitutional authority. However, national constitutions are still the “primary” source of any such authority.

2017 ◽  
Vol 111 (2) ◽  
pp. 468-475 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ágoston Mohay ◽  
Norbert Tóth

In a case of first impression, the Constitutional Court of Hungary (CCH or Court) ruled on November 30, 2016 that, in exceptional cases, it is competent to consider whether Hungary's obligations to the European Union (EU) violate fundamental individual rights (including human dignity) or Hungarian sovereignty as protected by the Hungarian Constitution. The decision places Hungary squarely within the growing group of EU member states whose constitutional courts have decided that, despite the decisions of the European Court of Justice regarding the primacy of EU law, EU member states are not compelled to violate their domestic constitutional obligations in carrying out their shared EU commitments.


2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (2-2019) ◽  
pp. 419-433
Author(s):  
Stefanie Vedder

National high courts in the European Union (EU) are constantly challenged: the European Court of Justice (ECJ) claims the authority to declare national standing interpretations invalid should it find them incompatible with its views on EU law. This principle noticeably impairs the formerly undisputed sovereignty of national high courts. In addition, preliminary references empower lower courts to question interpretations established by their national ‘superiors’. Assuming that courts want to protect their own interests, the article presumes that national high courts develop strategies to elude the breach of their standing interpretations. Building on principal-agent theory, the article proposes that national high courts can use the level of (im-) precision in the wording of the ECJ’s judgements to continue applying their own interpretations. The article develops theoretical strategies for national high courts in their struggle for authority.


Author(s):  
Nigel Foster

This chapter examines the procedural law of the European Union (EU), focusing on Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). It explains that Article 267 is the reference procedure by which courts in member states can endorse questions concerning EU law to the European Court of Justice (CoJ). Under this Article, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has the jurisdiction to provide preliminary rulings on the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies of the Union and on the interpretation of the Treaties.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1491-1508
Author(s):  
Eva Julia Lohse

So far, the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, henceforth:BVerfG) has only made a single preliminary reference to the (now) Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), despite frequent rulings on matters connected with European Union (EU) Law. Its apparent reluctance seemed odd considering the atmosphere of dialogue and cooperation which prevails between the non-constitutional courts and the EU courts. This situation might, however, have changed with the preliminary reference from January 2014, proving predictions on the perceived “most powerful constitutional court” and its relationship to the EU partly wrong. The legal effects of its preliminary reference on the interpretation of Articles 119, 123, 127 ff. of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the validity of Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) by the European Central Bank (ECB) under EU Law are as yet unclear; although the Opinion of the Advocate General Cruz Villalón was delivered in the beginning of 2015, which did not confirm the doubts expressed by theBVerfGabout the conformity of the OMT programme with EU law. Nonetheless, the interpretative scheme and the normative questions as to the reluctance of theBVerfGremain the same after this single referral and offer explanations as to why theBVerfGhad for nearly sixty years not referred a question to the former European Court of Justice (ECJ).


2012 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 4-14
Author(s):  
Jasmina Alihodžić ◽  

The rules of jurisdiction in matters of parental responsibility contained in the Brussels II bis Regulation are based on the concept of habitual residence, while the legislation in B&H in this area gave priority to the principle of nationality. Analyzing these concepts, the author of the paper points to the importance of interpreting the concept of habitual residence by the European Court of Justice, and gives possible directions for reform of the relevant provisions of the PIL Act in terms of their compliance with EU law.


2020 ◽  
pp. 287-318
Author(s):  
Nigel Foster

This chapter examines European Union (EU) law concerning non-tariff barriers to free movement of goods. It describes member states’ attempts to influence imports and the way the European Commission and the European Court of Justice (CoJ) handled these issues. This chapter explains the provisions of the relevant legislation for non-tariff barriers, which include Articles 34, 36, and 35 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). It also analyses example cases including ‘Dassonville’, ‘Cassis de Dijon’, and post ‘Keck’ case law. It concludes with a consideration of the latest trend of cases concerning product use and residual rules.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catharina Voß

This book examines allowing the legal force of national judgements to be overturned in favour of the priority law of the European Union, which has been relevant for both procedural practice and academic discourse since the ‘Klausner-Holz’ ruling by the European Court of Justice in 2015. In addition to an overview of the state of the current jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, the book also offers solutions to the effective enforcement of European priority law through an autonomous concept of the matter in dispute which is in line with EU law, the creation of an additional reason for restitution or a larger submission in practice by national courts. Judges, lawyers, academics and politicians who have to deal with the application or further development of national procedural law in connection with legal fields relevant to EU law, such as the EU’s state aid and public procurement law, antitrust law or competition law, will benefit enormously from reading this book.


Author(s):  
Anna Tarasiuk ◽  
Bartosz Wojno

AbstractThe issue of the interpretation of the concept of an “employee of insurance undertaking”, which was used in the Directive on insurance distribution may cause issues from the point of view of the definition of the “employee” in terms of the type of legal relationship and the scope of activities that are allowed to be performed only by such employees. The authors demonstrate that, in accordance with the previous case law of the European Court of Justice/Court of Justice of the European Union, the concepts contained in EU directives should be interpreted in accordance with EU law, taking into account its autonomy and its aim (harmonization of legal systems of Member States). This should be applied even if a simple translation of a particular term used in an EU directive into the language of a Member State may give rise to an incentive for that term to be interpreted in the context of a local legal system.


Author(s):  
George A Bermann

Abstract To the surprise of many, questions have recently arisen over the scope of inquiry, if any, that a national court may, consistent with Article 54 of the ICSID Convention, make in connection with the enforcement of an ICSID award. It has long been assumed in many, if not most, quarters that a national court is privileged to condition enforcement of an ICSID Convention award on a single simple requirement, viz. that the award be certified by the Secretary-General of ICSID. Until recently, doubts over whether that is so have been raised in a very small number of jurisdictions. But the Commission of the European Union has taken the view that an ICSID Convention award may be denied enforcement if it is contrary to a principle of “autonomy” of EU law and, based on its judgment in Achmea case in connection with non-ICSID awards, the European Court of Justice most likely takes the same view. This suggests that the European Union regards violation of EU public policy, more generally, as a defense to enforcement of an ICSID award. Based on text, object and purpose, legislative history, and predominant state practice, this position appears to run seriously afoul of the ICSID Convention. At the same time, some meaning must be given to the language in Article 54 according to which an ICSID award must be enforced by a national court “as if it were a final judgment of a court” of the enforcing State. The author finds that the understanding of Article 54 that best reflects all pertinent considerations is that it imposes on courts the modest requirement that they subject the enforcement of ICSID awards to no more restrictive or onerous procedures than they impose on the enforecement of national judgments.


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