Is There a “Qua Problem” for a Purely Causal Account of Reference Grounding?

Erkenntnis ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Max Deutsch
Keyword(s):  
Causal Account ◽  
Qua Problem

scholarly journals Hume's Causal Account of the Self

1990 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
pp. 23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nathan Brett
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
Causal Account

Computationalism

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gualtiero Piccinini
Keyword(s):  
Neural Network ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Network Models ◽  
Turing Machines ◽  
Neural Network Models ◽  
Causal Account ◽  
Semantic Account ◽  
Neural Processes ◽  
Processing Information ◽  
Empirical Hypothesis

The introduction of the concept of computation in cognitive science is discussed in this article. Computationalism is usually introduced as an empirical hypothesis that can be disconfirmed. Processing information is surely an important aspect of cognition so if computation is information processing, then cognition involves computation. Computationalism becomes more significant when it has explanatory power. The most relevant and explanatory notion of computation is that associated with digital computers. Turing analyzed computation in terms of what are now called Turing machines that are the kind of simple processor operating on an unbounded tape. Turing stated that any function that can be computed by an algorithm could be computed by a Turing machine. McCulloch and Pitts's account of cognition contains three important aspects that include an analogy between neural processes and digital computations, the use of mathematically defined neural networks as models, and an appeal to neurophysiological evidence to support their neural network models. Computationalism involves three accounts of computation such as causal, semantic, and mechanistic. There are mappings between any physical system and at least some computational descriptions under the causal account. The semantic account may be formulated as a restricted causal account.

Deep South Enclaves on the Eve of the Transition

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Mickey
Keyword(s):  
South Carolina ◽  
Political Geography ◽  
Political Authority ◽  
Deep South ◽  
Causal Account ◽  
Black Protest ◽  
Democratic Parties

This chapter examines four important features of Deep South authoritarian enclaves on the eve of the transition: their political geography, centralization of political authority, party factionalism, and latent strength of their indigenous opponents. A review of these and other characteristics of these polities suggests that modernization cannot fully explain the variation in Deep South democratization experiences. The chapter considers a causal account emphasizing the importance of regime defenders, opponents, and the institutional topography on which they battled one another. It compares the degree to which authority was centralized in South Carolina, Mississippi, and Georgia and highlights the factionalism within Democratic parties. It concludes with a discussion of black protest capacity on the eve of the transition.

Foundations II

2021 ◽  
pp. 193-215
Author(s):  
Mogens Lærke
Keyword(s):  
Social Contract ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
Collective Security ◽  
Causal Account ◽  
Natural Right ◽  
The Social ◽  
Theoretical Evolution

This chapter explores Spinoza’s doctrine of the social contract and his understanding of natural law and natural right. Contrasting his views with those of Hobbes, it interprets the social contract not as a logical, historical, or causal account of the state’s foundations, but as a fictive narrative, grounded entirely in the imagination, that citizens in a free republic must embrace in order to prevent mutual persecution and ensure collective security. It also argues how such a reading of the social contract can help resolve fundamental tensions between the Tractatus theologico-politicus and the later Tractatus politicus that until now have been most convincingly explained in terms of a fundamental theoretical evolution between Spinoza’s two political treatises.

Indeterminism and Obligation

2019 ◽  
pp. 73-118
Author(s):  
Ishtiyaque Haji
Keyword(s):  
Moral Character ◽  
States Of Mind ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Causal Account ◽  
Luck Objection

The obligation dilemma’s indeterministic horn, whose primary constituent is the luck objection, is introduced in this chapter. This is the objection that indeterministically caused actions are too luck-infected to be obligations. Two versions of this objection are discussed. On the No Explanation Version, if an agent indeterministically decides to do one thing rather than another, then there is no detailed causal account of her decision. Since the control free decision requires is causal, her deciding to do what she does is not free. On the Pure Luck Version, if an agent does something, which she refrains from doing in another possible world with the same past and laws, and there is nothing about her powers, capacities, states of mind, moral character, and the like that explains this cross-world difference, then this difference is just a matter of freedom-undermining luck.

scholarly journals Ockham on Memory and Double Intentionality

Topoi ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dominik Perler
Keyword(s):  
Causal Chain ◽  
Causal Account ◽  
Cognitive Mechanism ◽  
The Core

Abstract Ockham developed two theories to explain the intentionality of memory: one theory that takes previously perceived things to be the objects of memory, and another that takes one’s own earlier acts of perceiving to be the objects of memory. This paper examines both theories, paying particular attention to the reasons that motivated Ockham to give up the first theory in favor of the second. It argues that the second theory is to be understood as a theory of double intentionality. At the core of this theory is the thesis that one directly remembers one’s own acts, and indirectly also the objects of these acts. The paper analyzes the cognitive mechanism that makes this double intentionality possible and examines the causal account that Ockham gave for explaining the emergence of acts of remembering. It emphasizes that he accepted nothing more than a causal chain of acts and habits, thereby offering an ontologically parsimonious theory of memory.

scholarly journals The qua-Problem, Meaning Scepticism, and the Life-World

2020 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 159-168
Author(s):  
Anar Jafarov
Keyword(s):  
Life World ◽  
Qua Problem

Who's in Control Here?

Philosophy ◽  
1976 ◽  
Vol 51 (198) ◽  
pp. 421-430
Author(s):  
Robert V. Hannaford
Keyword(s):  
Causal Explanation ◽  
Conceptual Scheme ◽  
Causal Account ◽  
Human Control ◽  
Voluntary Agency ◽  
Control Actions ◽  
The World ◽  
And Control

The question arises from recent arguments, including one by G. E. M. Anscombe, which hold that a belief in one's ability to choose one's actions is incompatible with a causal account of the world. For, if one's arguments deny either choice or causal sequences, how can one account for human control of actions? If to control one's actions means to work to cause some chosen end, and if either point of the argument were correct, how could anyone ever control one's actions at all? Yet we must be able to control actions if we are to seek out and select from evidence or develop any kind of conceptual scheme. I want to develop this necessity-of-control notion to show that arguments such as those advanced by Miss Anscombe are incoherent and to show that we must retain our notion of choice while giving a causal account of the world. I will argue that deterministic sequences and the notions of choice and control go together: in order for us to have a tenable explanation of the world we must be able to talk about choice and control and we must identify and use predictable deterministic sequences in our acting and choosing. I shall argue that we can retain both causal explanation and choice only by employing two different conceptions of causal agency: merely physical agency and the voluntary agency of embodied actors.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document