Foundations II

2021 ◽  
pp. 193-215
Author(s):  
Mogens Lærke
Keyword(s):  
Social Contract ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
Collective Security ◽  
Causal Account ◽  
Natural Right ◽  
The Social ◽  
Theoretical Evolution

This chapter explores Spinoza’s doctrine of the social contract and his understanding of natural law and natural right. Contrasting his views with those of Hobbes, it interprets the social contract not as a logical, historical, or causal account of the state’s foundations, but as a fictive narrative, grounded entirely in the imagination, that citizens in a free republic must embrace in order to prevent mutual persecution and ensure collective security. It also argues how such a reading of the social contract can help resolve fundamental tensions between the Tractatus theologico-politicus and the later Tractatus politicus that until now have been most convincingly explained in terms of a fundamental theoretical evolution between Spinoza’s two political treatises.

Natural Law and Public Reason in Kant's Political Philosophy

1996 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 389-411 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel M. Weinstock
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Social Contract ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
The State ◽  
Legal Philosophy ◽  
The Social ◽  
Human Good ◽  
Natural Law Theory

My intention in this essay will be to explore the role that consent-based arguments perform in Kant's political and legal philosophy. I want to uncover the extent to which Kant considered that the legitimacy of the State and of its laws depends upon the outcome of intersubjective deliberation. Commentators have divided over the following question: Is Kant best viewed as a member of the social contract tradition, according to which the legitimacy of the state and of the laws it promulgates derives from the consent of those people over whom it claims authority, or should he be read as having put forward a secularized version of natural law theory, according to which the state and its laws are legitimate to the extent that they are attained by standards of sound reason and supported by an objective account of the human good?

Hobbes's Confusing “Clarity”—The Case of “Liberty”

1960 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 428-436 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Roland Pennock
Keyword(s):  
Social Contract ◽  
Focal Point ◽  
Psychological Explanation ◽  
Political Obligation ◽  
Focal Points ◽  
Central Concept ◽  
Natural Right ◽  
The Social ◽  
Analytical System ◽  
Acceptable Theory

The Leviathan has been described as “original, persuasive, solid, coherent.” General commentaries on Hobbes usually single out his logic for special praise; more detailed critiques generally unearth a mass of confusions and inconsistencies. Confusions and inconsistencies there certainly are; more, I believe, than one would expect to find in the work of a man of such undeniable logical powers. Speculation upon the psychological explanation of this fact is intriguing, but no part of the purpose of the present article. It is part of my purpose, however, to contend that Hobbes's passion for clarity and certainty may have played a part in leading him to adopt perverse definitions, to which even he did not consistently adhere and which constituted a major source of confusion. Conversely, I disagree with those who say his analytical system is sound and only his empirical assumptions about human nature are open to serious criticism.More specifically, one may profitably inquire whether there is some central concept that serves as a focal point for many of these difficulties. For example, it is often suggested, with merit, that Hobbes's perversion, or inversion, of the traditional meaning of “jus naturale” plays such a role. Without making any exclusive claim or denying the insights that may be gained by concentrating attention upon other focal points, my hypothesis is that understanding of Hobbes may be deepened by an examination of his use of the word “liberty.” I shall deal first with his definitions of the term, and then in turn with his applications of it to natural right and natural law, to sovereignty by acquisition, and finally to the social contract. I shall argue that his method, as illustrated by his definitions, leads him occasionally into confusion or inconsistency, and more frequently tends to confuse the reader and so to enable Hobbes to make an unsound conclusion appear sound, by means of specious reasoning. In particular, I shall contend that Hobbes's treatment of liberty (1) leads him into self-contradiction regarding the extent of natural liberty, (2) enables him to argue persuasively but speciously in support of the obligation to obey a sovereign who has attained his position by violence, and (3) prevents him from developing an acceptable theory of political obligation.

Samuel Clain and the Rumanian Enlightenment in Transylvania

Slavic Review ◽  
1964 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 660-675 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith Hitchins
Keyword(s):  
Eighteenth Century ◽  
Eastern Europe ◽  
Social Contract ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
The West ◽  
Local Conditions ◽  
The Enlightenment ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Relationship

In the second half of the eighteenth century the leavening effects of the Enlightenment began to be felt among the Rumanians of Transylvania. The Enlightenment in Transylvania—and in Eastern Europe generally —was a curious blend of natural law, rationalism, and optimism, drawn from the West, and nationalism, a response to local conditions. It is no coincidence that the first tangible signs of national awakening among the Rumanians manifested themselves at this time. In the thought of the Enlightenment they discovered new justification for their claims to equality with their Magyar, Saxon, and Szekler neighbors. For example, they applied the notion of “natural” civil equality between individuals to the relationship between whole peoples, and they accepted wholeheartedly the myth of the social contract as the foundation of society and as the guarantee of the rights of all those who composed it.

Leviathan Bound; or the Re-education of Thomas Hobbes

2009 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 123-143 ◽  
Author(s):  
Quentin Taylor
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
Social Contract ◽  
Liberal Democracy ◽  
First Principles ◽  
Thomas Hobbes ◽  
Natural Right ◽  
The Social

AbstractThomas Hobbes is often credited as the “founder of modern liberalism” for grounding his political theory in individualism, natural right, and the social contract. The irony, of course, is that upon this foundation he built an imposing edifice of absolutism. What has escaped most observers, however, is the extent to which Hobbes' absolutism is mitigated by his own principles, qualifications, and doctrines. Hence, “saving Hobbes from himself,” is not simply a matter of correcting his errors, but requires drawing out the implications of his first principles and identifying the additional supports he provides for an essentially liberal order. In this way it is possible to “bind” Leviathan through a process of internal domestication, as opposed to looking backward to Aristotle or forward to Locke. The result is a “reformed” Hobbes who can be readily acknowledged as “the true ancestor of constitutional liberal democracy.”

Overton, Richard (d. circa 1665)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Udo Thiel
Keyword(s):  
Social Contract ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Law

Overton was one of the leading figures of the radical Leveller movement in England in the 1640s. He fought for the equality of all men before the law and for complete religious and political toleration, often by appealing to notions such as the social contract and the natural law. In metaphysics he denied that the soul is a separate immaterial and immortal substance, arguing that immortality is not achieved until the resurrection. His views on the soul may have influenced Milton.

Heller's Self-Defense

2010 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 449-484 ◽  
Author(s):  
Boaz Sangero
Keyword(s):  
Social Contract ◽  
District Of Columbia ◽  
Natural Right ◽  
Second Amendment ◽  
Self Defense ◽  
Person Following ◽  
The Social ◽  
Constitutional Right ◽  
The Right

This article reflects on District of Columbia v. Heller and proposes a new footing and limit to the right to bear arms: a person's inalienable right to selfdefense. Self-defense is a natural right embedded in personhood and is antecedent to the social contract that sets up a state. This right consequently remains with the person following the establishment of the state and allows her to use proportional force necessary for resisting aggression. The right to bear arms derives from the constitutional right to self-defense, which merits protection under both the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments. This instrumental nexus calls for a dynamic determination of the scope of the right to bear arms under the Second Amendment, along Heller's lines. The scope of the right to bear arms should be defined by an ordinary citizen's necessity to use arms in defending herself proportionally against criminals. This criterion will allow courts to deliver both predictable and balanced decisions that align with originalism.

Contractarianism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Freeman
Keyword(s):  
Social Contract ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Common Good ◽  
John Locke ◽  
General Will ◽  
Natural Right ◽  
Social Compact ◽  
Political Relations ◽  
The Social ◽  
Principles Of Justice

The idea that political relations originate in contract or agreement has been applied in several ways. In Plato’s Republic Glaucon suggests that justice is but a pact among rational egoists. Thomas Hobbes developed this idea to analyse the nature of political power.Given the predominantly self-centred nature of humankind, government is necessary for society. Government’s role is to stabilize social cooperation. By exercising enforcement powers, government provides each with the assurance that everyone else will abide by cooperative rules, thereby making it rational for all to cooperate. To fulfil this stabilizing role, Hobbes argued that it is rational for each individual to agree to authorize one person to exercise absolute political power. Neo-Hobbesians eschew absolutism and apply the theory of rational choice to argue that rules of justice, perhaps even all morality, can be construed in terms of a rational bargain among self-interested individuals. John Locke, working from different premises than Hobbes, appealed to a social compact to argue for a constitutional government with limited powers. All men are born with a natural right to equal freedom, and a natural duty to God to preserve themselves and the rest of mankind. No government is just unless it could be commonly agreed to form a position of equal freedom, where agreement is subject to the moral constraints of natural law. Absolutism is unjust according to this criterion. Rousseau developed egalitarian features of Locke’s view to contend for a democratic constitution.The Social Contract embodies the General Will of society, not the unconstrained private wills of its members. The General Will wills the common good, the good of society and all of its members. Only by bringing our individual wills into accord with the General Will can we achieve civic and moral freedom. In this century, John Rawls has recast natural rights theories of the social contract to argue for a liberal egalitarian conception of justice. From a position of equality, where each person abstracts from knowledge of their historical situations, it is rational for all to agree on principles of justice that guarantee equal basic freedoms and resources adequate for each person’s independence. T.M. Scanlon, meanwhile, has outlined a right-based contractualist account of morality. An act is right if it accords with principles that could not be reasonably rejected by persons who are motivated by a desire to justify their actions according to principles that no one else can reasonably reject.

scholarly journals Freedom and inequality: On the problem of the history and philosophy of liberalism

2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 283-287
Author(s):  
Vladimir P. Rozhkov ◽  
Keyword(s):  
French Revolution ◽  
Social Contract ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
18Th Century ◽  
Social Solidarity ◽  
Legal Argumentation ◽  
Classical Liberalism ◽  
The Social ◽  
Liberal Attitude ◽  
The French Revolution

The article is devoted to the study of the problem of the doctrinal identification of freedom and inequality by classical liberalism and neoliberalism. Identifying the features of the naturalistic and theological approaches to the manifestation of inequality in human communities, the author notes the philosophical justification of the legal argumentation of inequality in the theories of natural law and the social contract of modern thinkers. The appeal to the value dynamics reflected in the slogans of the French revolution of the 18th century allows the author to reveal the gradual displacement of the priorities of “Equality” and “Brotherhood”, which were put forward by the revolutionary democracy, by the liberal movements. The final statement of Locke’s version of the orientation of classical liberalism on the triad “Freedom. Property. Life”, according to the author, logically determines the identification of freedom with inequality, and equality with slavery by representatives of liberal circles. The development of the concepts of “social solidarity” by the theorists of neoliberalism, according to the author’s proof, does not change the liberal attitude to “freedom in inequality”. The analysis of the categories of freedom and inequality allows the author to formulate the contradictions of this provision. The article concludes that with the aggravation of the derived contradiction to the maximum, the risk of self-denial of liberalism increases.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document