Commitment Without Consequences. A Carnapian Approach to Fictional Objects and Negative Existence Statements

<p>The overall aim of this thesis is to present a fresh perspective on three closely related areas of enquiry: Descriptivist theories of reference, Direct Reference theories and the Carnapian approach to questions of existence and identity. This perspective is developed and tested by a critical analysis of the work of a leading Carnapian theorist, Amie Thomasson, and by looking at some of the central problems associated with our talk of fictional objects. It concludes in an account of negative existence statements and fictional objects as possibly existing objects. In Chapter one I set out the key elements of Carnap’s approach, as that approach was developed over time and in dialogue with his colleague Quine. In Chapter two I explore the relation between the previously mentioned three areas of enquiry through an examination of Amie Thomasson’s brand of Carnapian meta-ontology. In Chapters four and five I develop the view that fictional objects are objects that meet the criteria of existence and identity of at least one linguistic framework but fail to meet the criteria of another, preferred framework. This provides the basis for a neo-Carnapian account of fictional objects in terms of the relations between linguistic frameworks, a novel approach to the questions surrounding such objects. In chapter five, the concluding chapter of the thesis, I further develop my explanation of how there can be truths about fictional and non-existent objects by giving an ontological version of John MacFarlane’s relativity principle. This paves the way for a neo-Carnapian analysis of true negative existence statements. Here I integrate the story I have told about fictional objects and the relations between linguistic frameworks with theories of reference and meaning. In particular, I incorporate a satisfactory concept of the rigid designation of ordinary proper names (and, potentially, of natural and artefactual kind terms). This then leads on to an explanation of how fictional objects, contra Kripke and many others, may reasonably said to be possible objects that, though they don’t exist, might exist under different circumstances.</p>

Commitment Without Consequences. A Carnapian Approach to Fictional Objects and Negative Existence Statements

<p>The overall aim of this thesis is to present a fresh perspective on three closely related areas of enquiry: Descriptivist theories of reference, Direct Reference theories and the Carnapian approach to questions of existence and identity. This perspective is developed and tested by a critical analysis of the work of a leading Carnapian theorist, Amie Thomasson, and by looking at some of the central problems associated with our talk of fictional objects. It concludes in an account of negative existence statements and fictional objects as possibly existing objects. In Chapter one I set out the key elements of Carnap’s approach, as that approach was developed over time and in dialogue with his colleague Quine. In Chapter two I explore the relation between the previously mentioned three areas of enquiry through an examination of Amie Thomasson’s brand of Carnapian meta-ontology. In Chapters four and five I develop the view that fictional objects are objects that meet the criteria of existence and identity of at least one linguistic framework but fail to meet the criteria of another, preferred framework. This provides the basis for a neo-Carnapian account of fictional objects in terms of the relations between linguistic frameworks, a novel approach to the questions surrounding such objects. In chapter five, the concluding chapter of the thesis, I further develop my explanation of how there can be truths about fictional and non-existent objects by giving an ontological version of John MacFarlane’s relativity principle. This paves the way for a neo-Carnapian analysis of true negative existence statements. Here I integrate the story I have told about fictional objects and the relations between linguistic frameworks with theories of reference and meaning. In particular, I incorporate a satisfactory concept of the rigid designation of ordinary proper names (and, potentially, of natural and artefactual kind terms). This then leads on to an explanation of how fictional objects, contra Kripke and many others, may reasonably said to be possible objects that, though they don’t exist, might exist under different circumstances.</p>

Artefactualism as an Ontology of Art

<p>This thesis argues for artefactualism about works of art, which is the claim that works of art are artefacts. It does this by considering the cases of works of music, and works of fiction, and arguing that each of these are artefacts, or existent, created, individual entities. To do this, it argues against anti-realist, eternalist, and type theories in these domains. The thesis draws on arguments made by philosophers such as Amie Thomasson regarding fictional characters and Guy Rohrbaugh regarding repeatable works of art.</p>

Artefactualism as an Ontology of Art

<p>This thesis argues for artefactualism about works of art, which is the claim that works of art are artefacts. It does this by considering the cases of works of music, and works of fiction, and arguing that each of these are artefacts, or existent, created, individual entities. To do this, it argues against anti-realist, eternalist, and type theories in these domains. The thesis draws on arguments made by philosophers such as Amie Thomasson regarding fictional characters and Guy Rohrbaugh regarding repeatable works of art.</p>

Are Ontological Questions Really Meaningless?

An influential critique of ontology, traditionally linked to Rudolf Carnap, logical empiricism, and verificationism, has it that ontological questions and statements are meaningless. In recent years, Amie Thomasson has revived this Carnapian critique, albeit in a non-verificationist version. This chapter argues that the meaningfulness of ontological statements can be vindicated by appealing to considerations compatible with Thomasson’s Carnapian approach. Two possible avenues are explored. The first is that of specifying the assertibility conditions of ontological statements like ‘There are Fs’, by providing an adequate rule of use. The second is that of spelling out the truth-conditions of the same ontological statements by means of a T-schema where the right-hand side is a sentence formulated in a language specifically introduced for doing ontology—what several authors call ‘Ontologese’. It is proposed that Ontologese be introduced as a bona-fide Carnapian framework, and this option is defended against a number of objections.

What does it take for an author to create a fictional object?

Neste artigo eu respondo à objeção principal de Stuart Brock (2010, 2016) ao artefactualismo. De acordo com Brock, artefactualistas como Amie Thomasson (1999) não conseguem explicar como e quando os objetos ficcionais são criados, sendo o artefactualismo, portanto, um tipo de criacionismo teológico. Contrariamente a Brock, e adaptando a teoria dos atos de fala de John Austin (1962) ao presente caso, eu argumento que objetos ficcionais são criados através de um proferimento performativo que, para ser feliz, deve (i) ser realizado pelo indivíduo adequado (um autor ou autora), (ii) com as intenções apropriadas (o ato de realização de ficção), no contexto adequado (associado às nossas práticas pré-estabelecidas de ficção) onde o autor ou autora (iv) nomeia, fornece ao menos uma descrição ou oferece uma imagem para instituir o objeto individual através dos seus atos intencionais.

Easy Ontology, Two-Dimensionalism, and Truthmaking

Amie Thomasson argues that ontology is easy. That there are tables (e.g.) is settled by a mixture of conceptual analysis—to discover under what conditions the concept ‘table’ is appropriately deployed—and straightforward empirical observation—looking in my kitchen to see that those conditions are met. There is, then, no distinctively metaphysical work to be done in settling whether there are tables, according to Thomasson. This paper agrees with Thomasson that it is easy to establish that tables exist and gives a two-dimensionalist defense of this claim. However, it argues that a distinctively metaphysical question remains: what must the world be like to make it the case that tables exist? It defends this view against objections from Thomasson, and draws out some morals concerning the project of ontology.

Some Issues Regarding Artifacts

"When it comes to artifacts, the functional accounts define them as objects that have an intended function. This function is considered essential for them and is used to classify artifacts and differentiate them. However, functional accounts of artifacts face some serious criticism. It seems that a function is neither essential, nor sufficient for an artifact. Thomasson offers a new perspective on artifacts. The author defines artifacts based on their intended feature. A feature may, of course, be a function but does not have to be just that. Generally speaking, intended features are norms of how to treat that specific artifact. Such an account is able to escape the criticism raised against functional accounts. In this article is presented Baker’s functional account of artifacts and some criticism that can be raised for such an account. The second part of the article critically introduces Thomasson’s account for artifacts. The aim of this article is to support Thomasson’s account against a functional perspective. Keywords: artifacts, mind-dependent objects, intended function, natural kinds, intended feature, Amie Thomasson, L. R. Baker"

Fictional Entities

This chapter addresses the existence and nature of fictional entities. It identifies two distinct conditions sufficient for the existence of fictional entities, each of which is grounded by a reference-fixing rule of fiction institutions. One of these rules describes conditions sufficient for the existence of fictional entities that are not constituted by anything, while the other describes conditions sufficient for the existence of fictional entities that are constituted by other things. It identifies the metaphysical dependence base for the existence of fictional entities and argues that this does not include anything metaphysically mysterious. It then describes the nature of fictional entities and their identity and individuation conditions. Finally, it compares the account fictional entities provided with that of Amie Thomasson and argues that, despite obvious similarities, there are fundamental differences between the accounts.