Foundations II

This chapter explores Spinoza’s doctrine of the social contract and his understanding of natural law and natural right. Contrasting his views with those of Hobbes, it interprets the social contract not as a logical, historical, or causal account of the state’s foundations, but as a fictive narrative, grounded entirely in the imagination, that citizens in a free republic must embrace in order to prevent mutual persecution and ensure collective security. It also argues how such a reading of the social contract can help resolve fundamental tensions between the Tractatus theologico-politicus and the later Tractatus politicus that until now have been most convincingly explained in terms of a fundamental theoretical evolution between Spinoza’s two political treatises.

Counsel, Collegiality, and Democracy

This chapter studies the first of two remedies that Spinoza proposes against prejudice, deceit, and flattery. This first remedy consists in reform of the institutions of political counsel. Denouncing the traditional courtly systems of privy counselors, he envisages a broader public sphere of free philosophizing as a source of political advice for the sovereign powers. This conception forms the background for a discussion of absolutism, political resistance, and democratic deliberation and collegiality. Finally, in conclusion, the chapter addresses Spinoza’s conception of the “best citizens” in a free republic, comparing the figure with Caspar Barlaeus’s “wise merchants.”

Prejudice, Deception, Flattery

This chapter studies submissive and abusive ways of using our natural authority to teach and advise, all averse to the freedom of philosophizing. In submissive uses, we reinforce our own lack of control over our own free judgment. They are associated with what Spinoza describes as “preoccupied” or “prejudiced” minds. Such preoccupation and prejudice are contrasted with the integrity and self-contentment of minds in control of their own free judgment. In abusive uses, we prevent others from exercising their freedom of judgment. Spinoza discusses them as “deception with evil intent” and “flattery.” The chapter resituates these notions in a complex context of classical sources and contemporary accounts of similar vices, most importantly humanist discussions of fraudulent political counsel. The chapter finally offers an account of how submissive and abusive uses of the natural authority to teach and advise relate to violent rule and the political instrumentalization of the mob.

Introduction

The first part of Chapter 1 presents the polemical aim of the book, namely to do away with the understanding of Spinoza’s freedom of philosophizing as a legal permission to express whatever opinion one has—a right to “free speech” in the contemporary meaning—and show how it enshrines a vision of how to better regulate public speech in view of increased collective self-determination. The second part contains methodological reflections on the status of texts, contexts, and historical circumstances in the study of the history of philosophy, and explains two assumptions made about the structure and systematic character of the Tractatus theologico-politicus. This part also includes discussion of so-called esoteric readings of Spinoza. The third and final part is a general outline of the entire book, intended to provide the reader with some guidance to the global argument.

Foundations I

The chapter studies the so-called doctrines of universal faith, developed in chapter XIV of the Tractatus theologico-politicus. The theoretical truth or falsity of such doctrines is irrelevant to their purpose. They only serve to structure the collective religious imagination of common people according to a certain practical standard which consists in the exercise of justice and charity alone. It is, however, still necessary that those who profess doctrines of faith should believe them to be true in order for them to fulfill their practical purpose. This insight prompts Spinoza to break with the model of doctrinal minimalism otherwise favored by tolerationist thinkers in his intellectual context. Contrary to them, he maintains that the so-called adiaphora play a significant role in ensuring that people embrace true religion. The argument is at the heart of Spinoza’s cautious and in some respects conflicted defense of religious pluralism.

Authority

Who has the authority to give brotherly advice and what kind of authority does such advice come with? In order to answer these questions, one must reconstruct Spinoza’s understanding of authoritas which takes many forms, including prophetic, Scriptural, private, public, divine, and priestly authority. The specific authority associated with free philosophizing is, however, an “authority to teach and advise.” This authority belongs to all human beings as an inalienable natural right. It is, moreover, a private authority which is exercised in relation to others and therefore also has a public dimension. It is shown how the association of free philosophizing with such natural authority to teach and advise sets it apart from a mere legal permission to speak one’s mind. Finally, the chapter discusses Spinoza’s conception of “violent rule,” defined as any political attempt to deprive citizens of their inalienable natural right to teach and advise.

The Apostolic Styles

This chapter focuses on chapter XI of the Tractatus theologico-politicus where Spinoza offers an analysis of the Apostles’ Letters in the New Testament. On his analysis, the Apostles use a “style” or “mode of speech” in their Letters which is argumentative, candid, non-apodictic, and egalitarian. Contrasting it with the style of prophetic command used by the Apostles in the Gospels, he also defines the epistolary style in terms of giving mutual “brotherly advice.” This style, I argue, forms a veritable paradigm of how to engage in free philosophizing. The chapter also shows how, by conceiving the collective exercise of the freedom of philosophizing in terms of mutual teaching and open sharing of knowledge among noble minds, Spinoza draws on common, classical ideals of intellectual friendship.

The Right Concerning Sacred Matters

This chapter studies how Spinoza’s theory of doctrines comes together in an integrated theological-political model of church–state relations. Chapter XIX of the Tractatus Theologico-politicus proposes a theory of ius circa sacra along broadly Erastian lines. In the Tractatus politicus, Spinoza prolongs this theory with an argument in favor of establishing a national religion. These texts raise questions regarding the coherence of Spinoza’s overall model, especially about how to reconcile his defense of religious freedom with the establishment of a state-controlled national religion. Comparing Spinoza’s position with those of Hobbes and Antistius Constans, the chapter attempts to resolve these tensions by showing how the national religion is conceived as a general framework for safeguarding the definition of true religion, while still allowing for a plurality of forms of worship to exist within that framework. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the religious uniformity imposed by Moses in the Hebrew Republic.

Circles and Spheres of Free Philosophizing

This chapter is mostly dedicated to the historical circumstances and the intellectual context of Spinoza’s conception of the freedom of philosophizing. In the Dutch universities during the middle decades of the seventeenth century, the expression “freedom of philosophizing” was inseparable from disputes between Cartesian philosophers and Calvinist theologians about academic freedom and the separation of philosophy from theology. Spinoza, however, widened the scope of the expression and brought it into contact with another broad controversy regarding freedom of religious conscience going back to the early years of the Dutch Republic in the later sixteenth century and the controversy between Lipsius and Coornhert. The chapter argues that it was Spinoza who first managed to bring these two conceptions of academic freedom and freedom of religious conscience together under a single, systematic conception of libertas philosophandi.

Philosophizing

This chapter offers a text- and term-oriented analysis of the term “philosophizing” and of the meaning it acquires within the argumentative economy of the Tractatus theologico-politicus. It argues that by “philosophizing,” Spinoza understands forms of argumentation based on the natural light common to all and tied to the use of right or sound reason. It includes not just adequate deductions from certain premises and legitimate inferences from true definitions, but also reasoning from experience and certain principles of interpretation; not just rational analysis of truth, but also historical inquiry into meaning and sound judgment regarding authority. When recommending that the state should grant permission to engage in free philosophizing, what Spinoza had in mind was thus something considerably broader than just allowing natural philosophers to pursue their studies without interference from the theologians.