scholarly journals Should we Ascribe Capabilities to Species and Ecosystems? A Critical Analysis of Ecocentric Versions of the Capabilities Approach

2021 ◽  
Vol 34 (5) ◽  
Author(s):  
Anders Melin
Keyword(s):  
Critical Analysis ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Capabilities Approach ◽  
Overlapping Consensus ◽  
As Species ◽  
Theories Of Justice ◽  
Comprehensive Doctrines ◽  
Sentient Beings

AbstractMartha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach is today one of the most influential theories of justice. In her earlier works on the capabilities approach, Nussbaum only applies it to humans, but in later works she extends the capabilities approach to include sentient animals. Contrary to Nussbaum’s own view, some scholars, for example, David Schlosberg, Teea Kortetmäki and Daniel L. Crescenzo, want to extend the capabilities approach even further to include collective entities, such as species and ecosystems. Though I think we have strong reasons for preserving ecosystems and species within the capabilities approach, there are several problems with ascribing capabilities to them, especially if we connect it with the view that species and ecosystems are subjects of justice. These problems are partly a consequence of the fact that an ascription of capabilities to species and ecosystems needs to be based on an overlapping consensus between different comprehensive doctrines, in accordance with the framework of political liberalism on which the capabilities approach builds. First, the ascription of capabilities to species and ecosystems presupposes the controversial standpoint that they are objectively existing entities. Second, the ascription of capabilities to ecosystems and species and the view that they are subjects of justice is justified by claiming that they have integrity and agency, but these characteristics have different meanings when applied to collective entities and humans, respectively. Third, the view that species and ecosystems are subjects of justice seems to require the controversial assumption that they have interests of their own, which differ from the interests of the sentient beings that are part of them. However, even if we do not ascribe capabilities to species and ecosystems and regard them as subjects of justice, there are still strong reasons to protect them within the capabilities approach, as the preservation of ecosystems and species is an important precondition for many human and animal capabilities.

scholarly journals How “political” is Quong’s political liberalism?

2014 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-56
Author(s):  
Enrico Zoffoli
Keyword(s):  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Sharp Contrast ◽  
Short Paper ◽  
The Political ◽  
Overlapping Consensus ◽  
Political Conception ◽  
Comprehensive Doctrines

In this short paper I ask to what extent the sharp contrast between the political and the comprehensive, on which political liberals such as Rawls and Quong place primary emphasis, caters to a truly ?political? conception of liberalism. I argue that Quong?s own take on this point is more distinctively ?political? than Rawls?s, in that it assigns far less weight to citizens? comprehensive doctrines. Indeed, I suggest that Quong?s exclusion of comprehensive doctrines (exemplified by his worries about an ?overlapping consensus?) has more radical implications than Quong himself seems to think. In doing so, I offer a streamlined version of Quong?s critique, which encompasses two more or less direct criticisms of Rawls?s doctrine of the overlapping consensus. I will call them the ?sincerity objection? and the ?liberal objection?.

Incoherent but Reasonable

2020 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 573-603
Author(s):  
Alexander Schaefer ◽  
Robert Weston Siscoe ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Common Ground ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Overlapping Consensus ◽  
Political Consensus ◽  
Joseph Raz ◽  
The Common ◽  
Joshua Cohen ◽  
Comprehensive Doctrines ◽  
Concept Of Truth

A strength of liberal political institutions is their ability to accommodate pluralism, both allowing divergent comprehensive doctrines as well as constructing the common ground necessary for diverse people to live together. A pressing question is how far such pluralism extends. Which comprehensive doctrines are simply beyond the pale and need not be accommodated by a political consensus? Rawls attempted to keep the boundaries of reasonable disagreement quite broad by infamously denying that political liberalism need make reference to the concept of truth, a claim that has been criticized by Joseph Raz, Joshua Cohen, and David Estlund. In this paper, we argue that these criticisms fail due to the fact that political liberalism can remain non-committal on the nature of truth, leaving the concept of truth in the domain of comprehensive doctrines while still avoiding the issues raised by Raz, Cohen, and Estlund. Further substantiating this point is the fact that Rawls would, and should, include parties in the overlapping consensus whose views on truth may be incoherent. Once it is seen that political liberalism allows such incoherence to reasonable parties, it is clear that the inclusion of truth and the requirement of coherence urged by Raz, Cohen, and Estlund requires more of reasonable people than is necessary for a political consensus.

Conclusion

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christie Hartley
Keyword(s):  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Constitutional Democracy ◽  
Political Values ◽  
State Action ◽  
Substantive Content ◽  
Comprehensive Doctrines ◽  
Equal Citizenship

The conclusion stresses that the argument for the view that political liberalism is a feminist liberalism depends on claims made about the substantive content of free and equal citizenship and how this conception of citizenship limits and shapes what kinds of state action can be justified to others. Some may charge that the position defended in the book is actually a comprehensive liberalism, not a political liberalism. This objection is addressed in the conclusion as well as the inability of political liberalism to address certain egalitarian commitments that may be part of some feminist comprehensive doctrines. It is argued that our view does not amount to a partially comprehensive liberalism, as the view rests on political values that are part of the idea of constitutional democracy and the demands of citizenship within such societies.

Exclusive Public Reason

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christie Hartley
Keyword(s):  
Public Reason ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
Public Justification ◽  
Moral Foundation ◽  
Narrow Scope ◽  
Public Reasoning ◽  
Comprehensive Doctrines

This chapter develops the idea of public reason based on the shared reasons account of public justification. It is argued that the moral foundation for political liberalism delimits a narrow scope for the idea of public reason, such that public reasons are required only for matters of constitutional essentials and basic justice. It is also argued that where public reason applies, persons as citizens have a moral duty to never appeal to their comprehensive doctrines when engaging in public reasoning. Hence, an exclusive account of public reason is vindicated. Finally, we respond to various potential objections to our view, such as the claim that the shared reasons view requires identical reasoning and the claim that public reason is interderminate or inconclusive.

The Role of Ideal Theory

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christie Hartley
Keyword(s):  
Ideal Theory ◽  
Racial Minorities ◽  
Gender Inequalities ◽  
Liberal Society ◽  
Social Categories ◽  
Ideal Society ◽  
Gender And Race ◽  
Theories Of Justice ◽  
Comprehensive Doctrines

This chapter discusses whether political liberalism’s commitment to ideal theory makes it ill-suited for theorizing about justice for socially subordinated groups such as women and racial minorities. It is shown that political liberalism’s commitment to ideal theory does not entail assuming away race or gender as social categories that give rise to concerns about justice. Even within a politically liberal well-ordered (ideal) society racial or gender inequalities may arise due to the role that beliefs about race or gender play in some persons’ comprehensive doctrines. Furthermore, it is argued that theories of justice developed for a well-ordered politically liberal society provide important guidance for correcting injustices on the basis of gender and race in nonideal societies.

Political Parties and the Overlapping Consensus

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matteo Bonotti
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Overlapping Consensus ◽  
The Common Good ◽  
Creative Agency ◽  
Public Reasoning ◽  
The Common ◽  
Comprehensive Doctrines ◽  
Political Liberal

This chapter rejects the ‘extrinsic’ view of public reason examined in Chapter 4, and argues that political parties can play an important role in helping citizens to relate their comprehensive doctrines to political liberal values and institutions. Once we understand the distinctive normative demands of partisanship, this chapter claims, we can see that there is no inherent tension between them and the demands of the Rawlsian overlapping consensus. This is because partisanship (unlike factionalism) involves a commitment to the common good rather than the sole advancement of merely partial interests, and this implies a commitment to public reasoning. The chapter further examines three distinctive empirical features of parties that particularly enable them to contribute to an overlapping consensus. These are their linkage function, their advancement of broad multi-issue political platforms, and their creative agency.

scholarly journals In the Region of Middle Axioms: Judicial Dialogue as Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Mid-level Principles

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
José Juan Moreso ◽  
Chiara Valentini
Keyword(s):  
Public Reason ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Legal Pluralism ◽  
Wide Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Overlapping Consensus ◽  
Foreign Law ◽  
Comprehensive Doctrines ◽  
Constitutional Adjudication

AbstractThis article addresses the use of foreign law in constitutional adjudication. We draw on the ideas of wide reflective equilibrium and public reason in order to defend an engagement model of comparative adjudication. According to this model, the judicial use of foreign law is justified if it proceeds by testing and mutually adjusting the principles and rulings of our constitutional doctrines against reasonable alternatives, as represented by the principles and rulings of other reasonable doctrines. By this, a court points to a wide reflective equilibrium, justifying its own interpretations with reasonable arguments, i.e. arguments that are acceptable from the perspectives defined by other constitutional doctrines, as endorsed by other courts. The point of a judicial engagement of this sort is to work out an overlap between different, reasonable, doctrines in the judicial forum, as part of a liberal forum of public reason. Here, the exercise of public reason filters out the premises of comprehensive doctrines so as to leave us in the region of an overlapping consensus: a region of mid-level principles that can be shared, notwithstanding the fact of legal pluralism.

Labor Law and the Capabilities Approach

2019 ◽  
pp. 62-81
Author(s):  
Martha C. Nussbaum
Keyword(s):  
Informal Economy ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Labor Law ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Capabilities Approach ◽  
The Political ◽  
Respect For Persons ◽  
Pluralistic Society ◽  
Equal Respect ◽  
Constitutional Right

Labor law scholars often discuss the “Capability Approach” as if it were a single thing with clearly defined content. However, it is best seen as a family of approaches. This paper first clarifies what the different versions of the approach have in common: a commitment to replacing measurement of well-being by gross domestic product (GDP) per capita by a focus on a group of substantial freedoms or opportunities for choice. It then goes on to clarify some deep differences between Amartya Sen’s version of the approach and that used by Nussbaum. Nussbaum’s version is intended to supply a basis for political principles in a pluralistic society, and thus, eschews on grounds of equal respect for persons any commitment to a comprehensive doctrine of freedom or autonomy, given that in a pluralistic society citizens, religious and secular, differ about these values. It also avoids, in consequence, a commitment to maximizing freedom. Even though Sen distinguishes maximizing from optimizing and allows for plural conceptions of the good, he goes further than Nussbaum in prioritizing autonomy and reason-based conceptions. And because he does not endorse a list his maximizing exercise seems fully general; by contrast, Nussbaum’s the political goal is understood to be to secure to all citizens, by constitutional right, an ample threshold amount of (only) ten central opportunities or capabilities as a partial conception. She defends this approach, in terms of Rawlsian “political liberalism,” as more consonant with equal respect for persons. In further clarifying these ideas, the paper also discusses the role of feminist economics in developing the approach, and recommends a focus on the informal economy and the political assignment of financial value to women’s unpaid domestic work.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document