Incoherent but Reasonable

2020 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 573-603
Author(s):  
Alexander Schaefer ◽  
Robert Weston Siscoe ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Common Ground ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Overlapping Consensus ◽  
Political Consensus ◽  
Joseph Raz ◽  
The Common ◽  
Joshua Cohen ◽  
Comprehensive Doctrines ◽  
Concept Of Truth

A strength of liberal political institutions is their ability to accommodate pluralism, both allowing divergent comprehensive doctrines as well as constructing the common ground necessary for diverse people to live together. A pressing question is how far such pluralism extends. Which comprehensive doctrines are simply beyond the pale and need not be accommodated by a political consensus? Rawls attempted to keep the boundaries of reasonable disagreement quite broad by infamously denying that political liberalism need make reference to the concept of truth, a claim that has been criticized by Joseph Raz, Joshua Cohen, and David Estlund. In this paper, we argue that these criticisms fail due to the fact that political liberalism can remain non-committal on the nature of truth, leaving the concept of truth in the domain of comprehensive doctrines while still avoiding the issues raised by Raz, Cohen, and Estlund. Further substantiating this point is the fact that Rawls would, and should, include parties in the overlapping consensus whose views on truth may be incoherent. Once it is seen that political liberalism allows such incoherence to reasonable parties, it is clear that the inclusion of truth and the requirement of coherence urged by Raz, Cohen, and Estlund requires more of reasonable people than is necessary for a political consensus.

Political Parties and the Overlapping Consensus

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matteo Bonotti
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Overlapping Consensus ◽  
The Common Good ◽  
Creative Agency ◽  
Public Reasoning ◽  
The Common ◽  
Comprehensive Doctrines ◽  
Political Liberal

This chapter rejects the ‘extrinsic’ view of public reason examined in Chapter 4, and argues that political parties can play an important role in helping citizens to relate their comprehensive doctrines to political liberal values and institutions. Once we understand the distinctive normative demands of partisanship, this chapter claims, we can see that there is no inherent tension between them and the demands of the Rawlsian overlapping consensus. This is because partisanship (unlike factionalism) involves a commitment to the common good rather than the sole advancement of merely partial interests, and this implies a commitment to public reasoning. The chapter further examines three distinctive empirical features of parties that particularly enable them to contribute to an overlapping consensus. These are their linkage function, their advancement of broad multi-issue political platforms, and their creative agency.

scholarly journals Should we Ascribe Capabilities to Species and Ecosystems? A Critical Analysis of Ecocentric Versions of the Capabilities Approach

2021 ◽  
Vol 34 (5) ◽  
Author(s):  
Anders Melin
Keyword(s):  
Critical Analysis ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Capabilities Approach ◽  
Overlapping Consensus ◽  
As Species ◽  
Theories Of Justice ◽  
Comprehensive Doctrines ◽  
Sentient Beings

AbstractMartha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach is today one of the most influential theories of justice. In her earlier works on the capabilities approach, Nussbaum only applies it to humans, but in later works she extends the capabilities approach to include sentient animals. Contrary to Nussbaum’s own view, some scholars, for example, David Schlosberg, Teea Kortetmäki and Daniel L. Crescenzo, want to extend the capabilities approach even further to include collective entities, such as species and ecosystems. Though I think we have strong reasons for preserving ecosystems and species within the capabilities approach, there are several problems with ascribing capabilities to them, especially if we connect it with the view that species and ecosystems are subjects of justice. These problems are partly a consequence of the fact that an ascription of capabilities to species and ecosystems needs to be based on an overlapping consensus between different comprehensive doctrines, in accordance with the framework of political liberalism on which the capabilities approach builds. First, the ascription of capabilities to species and ecosystems presupposes the controversial standpoint that they are objectively existing entities. Second, the ascription of capabilities to ecosystems and species and the view that they are subjects of justice is justified by claiming that they have integrity and agency, but these characteristics have different meanings when applied to collective entities and humans, respectively. Third, the view that species and ecosystems are subjects of justice seems to require the controversial assumption that they have interests of their own, which differ from the interests of the sentient beings that are part of them. However, even if we do not ascribe capabilities to species and ecosystems and regard them as subjects of justice, there are still strong reasons to protect them within the capabilities approach, as the preservation of ecosystems and species is an important precondition for many human and animal capabilities.

scholarly journals How “political” is Quong’s political liberalism?

2014 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-56
Author(s):  
Enrico Zoffoli
Keyword(s):  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Sharp Contrast ◽  
Short Paper ◽  
The Political ◽  
Overlapping Consensus ◽  
Political Conception ◽  
Comprehensive Doctrines

In this short paper I ask to what extent the sharp contrast between the political and the comprehensive, on which political liberals such as Rawls and Quong place primary emphasis, caters to a truly ?political? conception of liberalism. I argue that Quong?s own take on this point is more distinctively ?political? than Rawls?s, in that it assigns far less weight to citizens? comprehensive doctrines. Indeed, I suggest that Quong?s exclusion of comprehensive doctrines (exemplified by his worries about an ?overlapping consensus?) has more radical implications than Quong himself seems to think. In doing so, I offer a streamlined version of Quong?s critique, which encompasses two more or less direct criticisms of Rawls?s doctrine of the overlapping consensus. I will call them the ?sincerity objection? and the ?liberal objection?.

The Problem with Disagreement on Social Media

2021 ◽  
pp. 259-279
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Edenberg
Keyword(s):  
Social Media ◽  
Common Ground ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Political Community ◽  
Political Debate ◽  
Epistemic Agency ◽  
Political Cooperation ◽  
Divided Society ◽  
The Common ◽  
Different Sources

Intractable political disagreements threaten to fracture the common ground upon which we can build a political community. The deepening divisions in society are partly fueled by the ways social media has shaped political engagement. Social media allows us to sort ourselves into increasingly likeminded groups, consume information from different sources, and end up in polarized and insular echo chambers. To solve this, many argue for various ways of cultivating more responsible epistemic agency. This chapter argues that this epistemic lens does not reveal the complete picture and therefore misses a form of moral respect required to reestablish cooperation across disagreements in a divided society. The breakdown of discourse online provides renewed reasons to draw out not an epistemic but a moral basis for political cooperation among diverse citizens—one inspired by Rawlsian political liberalism. We need ways to cultivate mutual respect for our fellow citizens in order to reestablish common moral ground for political debate.

Religion’s Political Role in Rawlsian Key

2012 ◽  
Vol 19 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 1-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Johannes A. van der Ven
Keyword(s):  
Liberal Democracy ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Western Europe ◽  
Common Ground ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Language Game ◽  
Building Blocks ◽  
Quadratic Equation ◽  
Political Role ◽  
The Common

AbstractIn Political Liberalism, expanded edition, Rawls repeatedly wants religions to accept liberal democracy for intrinsic reasons from their own religious premises, not as a modus vivendi. This article is to be considered an exploration in that field. In the first part the narrative of the St. Paul’s speech before the Areopagus in Athens by Luke is hermeneutically analyzed, as it tries to find common ground with Hellenistic philosophy and to do so by using deliberative rhetoric. In the second part these two characteristics of the Lukean story are considered the building blocks for the intrinsic acceptance of liberal democracy, albeit not in a substantive, but a formal key. The common ground Luke explored then was religious in nature, whereas in our days, at least in North-Western Europe, religion belongs to a cognitive minority. Moreover philosophy does not provide a common ground either, as there is a pluralism of competing schools nowadays. But intercontextual hermeneutics metaphorically permits to draw the following quadratic equation: as Lukean Paul related the Christian message to his philosophical context in order to find common ground, so we are to relate it to our context, the common ground of which is not philosophical, but political, which refers to the context of public reason. This article argues for accepting Rawls’ concept of using a bilingual language game for religion to present its religious convictions into the public debate and in due course translate them in terms of public reason. Such a translation requires a deliberative argumentation, that corresponds to the rules of logics and epistemology in practical reason.

scholarly journals Is there a need for political liberalism to have an account of pre-overlapping consensus reasoning?

2014 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-74
Author(s):  
Nebojsa Zelic
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Ideal Theory ◽  
Overlapping Consensus ◽  
Political Values ◽  
Liberal Conception ◽  
Public Reasoning ◽  
Further Development

In his Liberalism without Perfection, Jonathan Quong argues for internal conception of political liberalism which goal is to show that a liberal well-ordered society is internally coherent ideal and that citizens who would be raised in such society could endorse and support their own liberal institutions and principles if those institutions and principles are justified in particular way These institutions should be justified by particular conception of public reason which main feature is that overlapping consensus is the first stage of its justificatory structure. So, public reasoning of citizens in well-ordered society should be based solely on values and ideas inherent to liberal conception of justice - freedom, equality, fair system of cooperation and burdens of judgment. Another important feature of Quong?s conception of public reason concerns its scope. Quong argues for a wide scope of public reason which demands that all coercive or binding laws or public policies should be justified (whenever possible) on basis of these values alone. Thus, reasonable citizens in well-ordered society by definition accord deliberative priority to public reasons over their other comprehensive or nonpublic beliefs whenever they exercise their collective political power over one another. The problem I raise in this paper is that it is very likely that in well-ordered society there will be a group of citizens that will not accord full deliberative priority to political values, especially not at all levels of political deliberation. On certain issues they will like to see their particular values being realized through common political institutions. If our political theory excludes this group from justificatory constituency on this particular issue or categorize them as unreasonable it can easily undermine their general adherence to liberal conception of justice and endanger stability of well-ordered society. Thus, my point is that we need a further development of political liberalism to solve such problems not as a part of non-ideal theory but as a part of its ideal of well-ordered society.

Conclusion

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christie Hartley
Keyword(s):  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Constitutional Democracy ◽  
Political Values ◽  
State Action ◽  
Substantive Content ◽  
Comprehensive Doctrines ◽  
Equal Citizenship

The conclusion stresses that the argument for the view that political liberalism is a feminist liberalism depends on claims made about the substantive content of free and equal citizenship and how this conception of citizenship limits and shapes what kinds of state action can be justified to others. Some may charge that the position defended in the book is actually a comprehensive liberalism, not a political liberalism. This objection is addressed in the conclusion as well as the inability of political liberalism to address certain egalitarian commitments that may be part of some feminist comprehensive doctrines. It is argued that our view does not amount to a partially comprehensive liberalism, as the view rests on political values that are part of the idea of constitutional democracy and the demands of citizenship within such societies.

Exclusive Public Reason

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christie Hartley
Keyword(s):  
Public Reason ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Moral Duty ◽  
Public Justification ◽  
Moral Foundation ◽  
Narrow Scope ◽  
Public Reasoning ◽  
Comprehensive Doctrines

This chapter develops the idea of public reason based on the shared reasons account of public justification. It is argued that the moral foundation for political liberalism delimits a narrow scope for the idea of public reason, such that public reasons are required only for matters of constitutional essentials and basic justice. It is also argued that where public reason applies, persons as citizens have a moral duty to never appeal to their comprehensive doctrines when engaging in public reasoning. Hence, an exclusive account of public reason is vindicated. Finally, we respond to various potential objections to our view, such as the claim that the shared reasons view requires identical reasoning and the claim that public reason is interderminate or inconclusive.

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