Uranium contamination removal from water by an orchid (Vanda tessellata) based biosorbent

2021 ◽  
Vol 328 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-101
Author(s):  
Pritee Pandey ◽  
Madhurima Pandey ◽  
Piyush Kant Pandey
Author(s):  
E. C. Buck ◽  
N. L. Dietz ◽  
J. K. Bates

Operations at former weapons processing facilities in the U. S. have resulted in a large volume of radionuclidecontaminated soils and residues. In an effort to improve remediation strategies and meet environmental regulations, radionuclide-bearing particles in contaminant soils from Fernald in Ohio and the Rocky Flats Plant (RFP) in Colorado have been characterized by electron microscopy. The object of these studies was to determine the form of the contaminant radionuclide, so that it properties could be established [1]. Physical separation and radiochemical analysis determined that uranium contamination at Fernald was not present exclusively in any one size/density fraction [2]. The uranium-contamination resulted from aqueous and solid product spills, air-borne dust particles, and from the operation of an incinerator on site. At RFP the contamination was from the incineration of Pu-bearing materials. Further analysis by x-ray absorption spectroscopy indicated that the majority of the uranium was in the 6+ oxidation state [3].


Metabolomics ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 9 (6) ◽  
pp. 1168-1180 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stéphane Grison ◽  
Gaëlle Favé ◽  
Matthieu Maillot ◽  
Line Manens ◽  
Olivia Delissen ◽  
...  

1957 ◽  
Author(s):  
J Bailey ◽  
S Kingsbury ◽  
J Knight

2005 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 86-90
Author(s):  
Marko Ninkovic ◽  
Ruzica Glisic

A critical look at UNEP Reports concerning depleted uranium on Yugoslav territory is presented in this paper. The subjects of the analysis are summarized as remarks high-lighting the following three points: (a) those concerning the use of terms significant and insignificant doses (risks), (b) those concerning the use of 1 mSv as a border between these two risk types and (c) those concerning the composition of ex pert UNEP Teams investigating the depleted uranium issue. To start with, the assumption that it should be possible to express the risks (con sequences) caused by the in take of depleted uranium ( by ingestion/ inhalation and/ or external exposure) to b and g rays from depleted uranium as insignificant or significant for comparison purposes is, in our view, in collision with the linear non thresh old hypothesis, still valid in the radiation protection field. Secondly, the limit of 1 mSv per year as a reference dose level between insignificant and significant risks (con sequences) is not accept able in the case of military depleted uranium contamination. This is because the reference level of 1 mSv, according to the ICRP Recommendation, can be used in the optimization of radiation protection as an additional annual dose limit for members of the public solely for useful practices. Military usage of depleted uranium can not be classified as being useful for both sides - the culprit and the victim alike. Our third objection concerns the composition of ex pert UNEP teams for Kosovo (Desk Assessment Group, Scientific Reviewer Group, and UNEP Scientific Mission) as not being representative enough, bearing in mind all UN member-countries. This last objection may be rather difficult to understand for any one viewing it from the perspective other than that of the victims.


2020 ◽  
Vol 69 (9) ◽  
pp. 439-454
Author(s):  
Hiroshi YOSHII ◽  
Yukie IZUMOTO ◽  
Tsugufumi MATSUYAMA ◽  
Kodai TAKAMURA

1992 ◽  
Vol 58-59 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Alejandro Martin Sanchez ◽  
Feliciano Vera Tome ◽  
José Diaz Bejarano ◽  
Angela Garcia Aparicio

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