scholarly journals Formalizing Kant’s Rules

2019 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 613-680
Author(s):  
R. Evans ◽  
M. Sergot ◽  
A. Stephenson
Keyword(s):  
General Procedure ◽  
Cognitive Architecture ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Input Output ◽  
Truth Values ◽  
First Order ◽  
Natural Way

AbstractThis paper formalizes part of the cognitive architecture that Kant develops in the Critique of Pure Reason. The central Kantian notion that we formalize is the rule. As we interpret Kant, a rule is not a declarative conditional stating what would be true if such and such conditions hold. Rather, a Kantian rule is a general procedure, represented by a conditional imperative or permissive, indicating which acts must or may be performed, given certain acts that are already being performed. These acts are not propositions; they do not have truth-values. Our formalization is related to the input/ output logics, a family of logics designed to capture relations between elements that need not have truth-values. In this paper, we introduce KL3 as a formalization of Kant’s conception of rules as conditional imperatives and permissives. We explain how it differs from standard input/output logics, geometric logic, and first-order logic, as well as how it translates natural language sentences not well captured by first-order logic. Finally, we show how the various distinctions in Kant’s much-maligned Table of Judgements emerge as the most natural way of dividing up the various types and sub-types of rule in KL3. Our analysis sheds new light on the way in which normative notions play a fundamental role in the conception of logic at the heart of Kant’s theoretical philosophy.

scholarly journals A FORMALIZATION OF KANT’S TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC

2011 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 254-289 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. ACHOURIOTI ◽  
M. VAN LAMBALGEN
Keyword(s):  
Formal Proof ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Technical Application ◽  
First Order ◽  
Transcendental Logic ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Argumentative Structure

Although Kant (1998) envisaged a prominent role for logic in the argumentative structure of his Critique of Pure Reason, logicians and philosophers have generally judged Kant’s logic negatively. What Kant called ‘general’ or ‘formal’ logic has been dismissed as a fairly arbitrary subsystem of first-order logic, and what he called ‘transcendental logic’ is considered to be not a logic at all: no syntax, no semantics, no definition of validity. Against this, we argue that Kant’s ‘transcendental logic’ is a logic in the strict formal sense, albeit with a semantics and a definition of validity that are vastly more complex than that of first-order logic. The main technical application of the formalism developed here is a formal proof that Kant’s Table of Judgements in Section 9 of the Critique of Pure Reason, is indeed, as Kant claimed, complete for the kind of semantics he had in mind. This result implies that Kant’s ‘general’ logic is after all a distinguished subsystem of first-order logic, namely what is known as geometric logic.

Natural deduction based set theories: a new resolution of the old paradoxes

1986 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 393-411 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul C. Gilmore
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Classical Logic ◽  
Natural Deduction ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Truth Values ◽  
First Order ◽  
Axiom Scheme ◽  
Universe Of Sets ◽  
Comprehension Axiom

AbstractThe comprehension principle of set theory asserts that a set can be formed from the objects satisfying any given property. The principle leads to immediate contradictions if it is formalized as an axiom scheme within classical first order logic. A resolution of the set paradoxes results if the principle is formalized instead as two rules of deduction in a natural deduction presentation of logic. This presentation of the comprehension principle for sets as semantic rules, instead of as a comprehension axiom scheme, can be viewed as an extension of classical logic, in contrast to the assertion of extra-logical axioms expressing truths about a pre-existing or constructed universe of sets. The paradoxes are disarmed in the extended classical semantics because truth values are only assigned to those sentences that can be grounded in atomic sentences.

scholarly journals The Complexity of Circumscription in DLs

2009 ◽  
Vol 35 ◽  
pp. 717-773 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. A. Bonatti ◽  
C. Lutz ◽  
F. Wolter
Keyword(s):  
Description Logics ◽  
Default Logic ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
First Order ◽  
Alternative Approach ◽  
Default Rules ◽  
Logic Description ◽  
Interesting Alternative ◽  
Natural Way

As fragments of first-order logic, Description logics (DLs) do not provide nonmonotonic features such as defeasible inheritance and default rules. Since many applications would benefit from the availability of such features, several families of nonmonotonic DLs have been developed that are mostly based on default logic and autoepistemic logic. In this paper, we consider circumscription as an interesting alternative approach to nonmonotonic DLs that, in particular, supports defeasible inheritance in a natural way. We study DLs extended with circumscription under different language restrictions and under different constraints on the sets of minimized, fixed, and varying predicates, and pinpoint the exact computational complexity of reasoning for DLs ranging from ALC to ALCIO and ALCQO. When the minimized and fixed predicates include only concept names but no role names, then reasoning is complete for NExpTime^NP. It becomes complete for NP^NExpTime when the number of minimized and fixed predicates is bounded by a constant. If roles can be minimized or fixed, then complexity ranges from NExpTime^NP to undecidability.

scholarly journals Multisequent Gentzen Deduction Systems For B2 2-Valued First-Order Logic

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 53
Author(s):  
Wei Li ◽  
Yuefei Sui
Keyword(s):  
Boolean Algebra ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Deduction System ◽  
Truth Values ◽  
First Order ◽  
Soundness And Completeness ◽  
Completeness Theorems

For the four-element Boolean algebra B22, a multisequent Г|Δ|∑|∏ is a generalization of sequent Г→Δ in traditional B22 valued first-order logic. By defining the truth-values of quantified formulas, a Gentzen deduction system G22 for B22-valued first-order logic will be built and its soundness and completeness theorems will be proved.

First-Order Logic Reasoning Support for the Semantic Web

2009 ◽  
Vol 19 (12) ◽  
pp. 3091-3099 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gui-Hong XU ◽  
Jian ZHANG
Keyword(s):  
Semantic Web ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
First Order ◽  
Logic Reasoning

Boolean-valued structures

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tim Button ◽  
Sean Walsh
Keyword(s):  
Model Theory ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Inference Rules ◽  
Mathematical Concepts ◽  
Semantic Framework ◽  
First Order ◽  
Standard Models ◽  
Boolean Valued Model ◽  
Semantic Values

Chapters 6-12 are driven by questions about the ability to pin down mathematical entities and to articulate mathematical concepts. This chapter is driven by similar questions about the ability to pin down the semantic frameworks of language. It transpires that there are not just non-standard models, but non-standard ways of doing model theory itself. In more detail: whilst we normally outline a two-valued semantics which makes sentences True or False in a model, the inference rules for first-order logic are compatible with a four-valued semantics; or a semantics with countably many values; or what-have-you. The appropriate level of generality here is that of a Boolean-valued model, which we introduce. And the plurality of possible semantic values gives rise to perhaps the ‘deepest’ level of indeterminacy questions: How can humans pin down the semantic framework for their languages? We consider three different ways for inferentialists to respond to this question.

scholarly journals Extensions in graph normal form

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michał Walicki
Keyword(s):  
Normal Form ◽  
Fixed Points ◽  
Propositional Logic ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
First Order ◽  
Special Cases

Abstract Graph normal form, introduced earlier for propositional logic, is shown to be a normal form also for first-order logic. It allows to view syntax of theories as digraphs, while their semantics as kernels of these digraphs. Graphs are particularly well suited for studying circularity, and we provide some general means for verifying that circular or apparently circular extensions are conservative. Traditional syntactic means of ensuring conservativity, like definitional extensions or positive occurrences guaranteeing exsitence of fixed points, emerge as special cases.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document