Reasoning Rules of Linguistic Truth Values Lattice-Valued First Order Logic with Generalized Quantifiers Based on L-LIA

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
JIAJUN LAI ◽  
YANG XU ◽  
XIAODONG PAN ◽  
ZHIYAN CHANG ◽  
KAIJUN XU ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Generalized Quantifiers ◽  
Truth Values ◽  
First Order

Barwise: Abstract Model Theory and Generalized Quantifiers

2004 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-53 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jouko Väänänen
Keyword(s):  
Model Theory ◽  
Interpolation Property ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Generalized Quantifiers ◽  
Abstract Model ◽  
Famous Theorem ◽  
Abstract Model Theory ◽  
First Order ◽  
Skolem Theorem

§1. Introduction. After the pioneering work of Mostowski [29] and Lindström [23] it was Jon Barwise's papers [2] and [3] that brought abstract model theory and generalized quantifiers to the attention of logicians in the early seventies. These papers were greeted with enthusiasm at the prospect that model theory could be developed by introducing a multitude of extensions of first order logic, and by proving abstract results about relationships holding between properties of these logics. Examples of such properties areκ-compactness. Any set of sentences of cardinality ≤ κ, every finite subset of which has a model, has itself a model. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem down to κ. If a sentence of the logic has a model, it has a model of cardinality at most κ. Interpolation Property. If ϕ and ψ are sentences such that ⊨ ϕ → Ψ, then there is θ such that ⊨ ϕ → θ, ⊨ θ → Ψ and the vocabulary of θ is the intersection of the vocabularies of ϕ and Ψ.Lindstrom's famous theorem characterized first order logic as the maximal ℵ0-compact logic with Downward Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem down to ℵ0. With his new concept of absolute logics Barwise was able to get similar characterizations of infinitary languages Lκω. But hopes were quickly frustrated by difficulties arising left and right, and other areas of model theory came into focus, mainly stability theory. No new characterizations of logics comparable to the early characterization of first order logic given by Lindström and of infinitary logic by Barwise emerged. What was first called soft model theory turned out to be as hard as hard model theory.

On generalized quantifiers in arithmetic

1982 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 187-190 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carl Morgenstern
Keyword(s):  
Axiom System ◽  
Peano Arithmetic ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Generalized Quantifiers ◽  
First Order ◽  
Order Language ◽  
Truth Definition ◽  
Order Arithmetic ◽  
Infinite Set

In this note we investigate an extension of Peano arithmetic which arises from adjoining generalized quantifiers to first-order logic. Markwald [2] first studied the definability properties of L1, the language of first-order arithmetic, L, with the additional quantifer Ux which denotes “there are infinitely many x such that…. Note that Ux is the same thing as the Keisler quantifier Qx in the ℵ0 interpretation.We consider L2, which is L together with the ℵ0 interpretation of the Magidor-Malitz quantifier Q2xy which denotes “there is an infinite set X such that for distinct x, y ∈ X …”. In [1] Magidor and Malitz presented an axiom system for languages which arise from adding Q2 to a first-order language. They proved that the axioms are valid in every regular interpretation, and, assuming ◊ω1, that the axioms are complete in the ℵ1 interpretation.If we let denote Peano arithmetic in L2 with induction for L2 formulas and the Magidor-Malitz axioms as logical axioms, we show that in we can give a truth definition for first-order Peano arithmetic, . Consequently we can prove in that is Πn sound for every n, thus in we can prove the Paris-Harrington combinatorial principle and the higher-order analogues due to Schlipf.

Natural deduction based set theories: a new resolution of the old paradoxes

1986 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 393-411 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul C. Gilmore
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Classical Logic ◽  
Natural Deduction ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Truth Values ◽  
First Order ◽  
Axiom Scheme ◽  
Universe Of Sets ◽  
Comprehension Axiom

AbstractThe comprehension principle of set theory asserts that a set can be formed from the objects satisfying any given property. The principle leads to immediate contradictions if it is formalized as an axiom scheme within classical first order logic. A resolution of the set paradoxes results if the principle is formalized instead as two rules of deduction in a natural deduction presentation of logic. This presentation of the comprehension principle for sets as semantic rules, instead of as a comprehension axiom scheme, can be viewed as an extension of classical logic, in contrast to the assertion of extra-logical axioms expressing truths about a pre-existing or constructed universe of sets. The paradoxes are disarmed in the extended classical semantics because truth values are only assigned to those sentences that can be grounded in atomic sentences.

The hierarchy theorem for generalized quantifiers

1996 ◽  
Vol 61 (3) ◽  
pp. 802-817 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lauri Hella ◽  
Kerkko Luosto ◽  
Jouko Väänänen
Keyword(s):  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Generalized Quantifiers ◽  
Similarity Type ◽  
First Order ◽  
Generalized Quantifier ◽  
Finite Structures

AbstractThe concept of a generalized quantifier of a given similarity type was defined in [12]. Our main result says that on finite structures different similarity types give rise to different classes of generalized quantifiers. More exactly, for every similarity type t there is a generalized quantifier of type t which is not definable in the extension of first order logic by all generalized quantifiers of type smaller than t. This was proved for unary similarity types by Per Lindström [17] with a counting argument. We extend his method to arbitrary similarity types.

scholarly journals Multisequent Gentzen Deduction Systems For B2 2-Valued First-Order Logic

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 53
Author(s):  
Wei Li ◽  
Yuefei Sui
Keyword(s):  
Boolean Algebra ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Deduction System ◽  
Truth Values ◽  
First Order ◽  
Soundness And Completeness ◽  
Completeness Theorems

For the four-element Boolean algebra B22, a multisequent Г|Δ|∑|∏ is a generalization of sequent Г→Δ in traditional B22 valued first-order logic. By defining the truth-values of quantified formulas, a Gentzen deduction system G22 for B22-valued first-order logic will be built and its soundness and completeness theorems will be proved.

scholarly journals Formalizing Kant’s Rules

2019 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 613-680
Author(s):  
R. Evans ◽  
M. Sergot ◽  
A. Stephenson
Keyword(s):  
General Procedure ◽  
Cognitive Architecture ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Input Output ◽  
Truth Values ◽  
First Order ◽  
Natural Way

AbstractThis paper formalizes part of the cognitive architecture that Kant develops in the Critique of Pure Reason. The central Kantian notion that we formalize is the rule. As we interpret Kant, a rule is not a declarative conditional stating what would be true if such and such conditions hold. Rather, a Kantian rule is a general procedure, represented by a conditional imperative or permissive, indicating which acts must or may be performed, given certain acts that are already being performed. These acts are not propositions; they do not have truth-values. Our formalization is related to the input/ output logics, a family of logics designed to capture relations between elements that need not have truth-values. In this paper, we introduce KL3 as a formalization of Kant’s conception of rules as conditional imperatives and permissives. We explain how it differs from standard input/output logics, geometric logic, and first-order logic, as well as how it translates natural language sentences not well captured by first-order logic. Finally, we show how the various distinctions in Kant’s much-maligned Table of Judgements emerge as the most natural way of dividing up the various types and sub-types of rule in KL3. Our analysis sheds new light on the way in which normative notions play a fundamental role in the conception of logic at the heart of Kant’s theoretical philosophy.

Relativized logspace and generalized quantifiers over finite ordered structures

1997 ◽  
Vol 62 (2) ◽  
pp. 545-574 ◽  
Author(s):  
Georg Gottlob
Keyword(s):  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Expressive Power ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
General Point ◽  
Complexity Classes ◽  
Generalized Quantifiers ◽  
Ordered Structures ◽  
First Order ◽  
Henkin Quantifiers

AbstractWe here examine the expressive power of first order logic with generalized quantifiers over finite ordered structures. In particular, we address the following problem: Given a family Q of generalized quantifiers expressing a complexity class C, what is the expressive power of first order logic FO(Q) extended by the quantifiers in Q? From previously studied examples, one would expect that FO(Q) captures LC, i.e., logarithmic space relativized to an oracle in C. We show that this is not always true. However, after studying the problem from a general point of view, we derive sufficient conditions on C such that FO(Q) captures LC. These conditions are fulfilled by a large number of relevant complexity classes, in particular, for example, by NP. As an application of this result, it follows that first order logic extended by Henkin quantifiers captures LNP. This answers a question raised by Blass and Gurevich [Ann. Pure Appl. Logic, vol. 32, 1986]. Furthermore we show that for many families Q of generalized quantifiers (including the family of Henkin quantifiers), each FO(Q)-formula can be replaced by an equivalent FO(Q)-formula with only two occurrences of generalized quantifiers. This generalizes and extends an earlier normal-form result by I. A. Stewart [Fundamenta Inform, vol. 18, 1993].

First-Order Logic Reasoning Support for the Semantic Web

2009 ◽  
Vol 19 (12) ◽  
pp. 3091-3099 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gui-Hong XU ◽  
Jian ZHANG
Keyword(s):  
Semantic Web ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
First Order ◽  
Logic Reasoning

Boolean-valued structures

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tim Button ◽  
Sean Walsh
Keyword(s):  
Model Theory ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Inference Rules ◽  
Mathematical Concepts ◽  
Semantic Framework ◽  
First Order ◽  
Standard Models ◽  
Boolean Valued Model ◽  
Semantic Values

Chapters 6-12 are driven by questions about the ability to pin down mathematical entities and to articulate mathematical concepts. This chapter is driven by similar questions about the ability to pin down the semantic frameworks of language. It transpires that there are not just non-standard models, but non-standard ways of doing model theory itself. In more detail: whilst we normally outline a two-valued semantics which makes sentences True or False in a model, the inference rules for first-order logic are compatible with a four-valued semantics; or a semantics with countably many values; or what-have-you. The appropriate level of generality here is that of a Boolean-valued model, which we introduce. And the plurality of possible semantic values gives rise to perhaps the ‘deepest’ level of indeterminacy questions: How can humans pin down the semantic framework for their languages? We consider three different ways for inferentialists to respond to this question.

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