When the universal is particular: a re-examination of the common morality using the work of Charles Taylor

Author(s):  
Michelle C. Bach
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jane McCamant

Abstract The history of American public education has generally been considered as a steady transition from religious and sectarian to secular and pluralist, with the role of science in education increasing as the role of religion decreased. This article examines a conception of the role of religion in education that does not fit this narrative, the “social religion” of theorists of moral and character education in the 1920s. Relying on ideas of religious naturalism and with an orientation toward the practical effects of religious belief, this community of scholars asserted a concept of religion that would allow it to be at the heart of the common school project, uniting all under the common morality of the social good. Influenced both by liberal Protestant humanism and the scientific worldview pervasive in education reform at the time, these character educationists’ ideas remind us of the historical contingency of categories like “religious” and of the antiquity of ideas we might classify under the heading of spirituality in American culture.


2020 ◽  
pp. 9-43
Author(s):  
Rosamond Rhodes

The Trusted Doctor: Medical Ethics and Professionalism rejects the well-entrenched views of medical ethics as everyday ethics or common morality applied to medicine. This chapter lays the foundation for the original account of medical ethics that follows in the book’s succeeding chapters. By presenting vivid examples and general arguments the author demonstrates ways in which the ethics of medicine is distinct and different from common morality. The chapter discusses the most popular common morality views, namely, the four principles approach expounded by Tom Beauchamp and James Childress in Principles of Biomedical Ethics and the ten rules approach presented by Bernard Gert, Charles Culver, and K. Danner Clouser in Bioethics: A Systematic Approach by presenting arguments that challenge their applicability to medical practice. A chart identifies some stark differences between the common morality approach and good medical practice and shows how everyday ethics is incompatible with medical professionalism.


Author(s):  
Griffin Trotter

Abstract In the third and subsequent editions of Principles of Biomedical Ethics, Tom Beauchamp and James Childress articulate a series of ethical norms that they regard as “derived” from, and hence carrying, the “authority” of the common morality. Although Beauchamp and Childress do not claim that biomedical norms they derive from the common morality automatically become constituents of the common morality, or that every detail of their account carries the authority of the common morality, they regard these derived norms as provisionally binding in a way that does not apply to the norms of mere “particular” moralities. Whereas particular moralities “do not bind other persons or communities,” Beauchamp and Childress have designed the norms of Principles of Biomedical Ethics to be “extensions” of the common morality that universally binds other persons and communities. Beauchamp and Childress seem to hold that (1) the norms they articulate in Principles of Biomedical Ethics are derived in an objective way from the common morality, and also that by virtue of being so derived (2) they carry a moral authority that objectively exceeds the authority of norms constituting particular moralities. My thesis in this essay is that both of these claims are false.


1970 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 204-219
Author(s):  
Basil Mitchell

It is a pity that the question about the proper purpose of law has so often been formulated in terms of ‘the enforcement of morals’. Not only is that issue highly charged with emotion, but the sense of the expression is unclear and, taken in any ordinary sense, its importance is marginal. What Lord Devlin seems chiefly to be arguing, when he supports the enforcement of morals, is that there are in any society certain central institutions which receive and deserve protection by law and that without such protection the society in question would disintegrate. His examples in our own society are monogamy and private property. It is true that these institutions are closely bound up with parts of our morality in two different ways: (a) certain moral prohibitions are defined in terms of them, e.g. adultery and theft; (b) a host of obligations is associated with them upon whose general acceptance and discharge their continuance depends. But it is only in an extended sense that one could describe the institutions themselves as parts of the common morality. It is possible, therefore, to hold that the law may properly be used to protect such institutions without necessarily taking the further step of maintaining that their protection requires and justifies legal prohibition of acts which offend against the associated morality. Professor Hart states this position clearly (a position which he does not himself accept): ‘What is essential and to be preserved is the essential core. On this footing it would be an open and empirical question whether any particular moral rule or veto, e.g. on homosexuality, adultery or fornication, is so organically connected with the central core that its maintenance and preservation is required as a vital outwork or bastion.’


2020 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 404-420 ◽  
Author(s):  
ROSAMOND RHODES

AbstractThis paper challenges the long-standing and widely accepted view that medical ethics is nothing more than common morality applied to clinical matters. It argues against Tom Beauchamp and James Childress’s four principles; Bernard Gert, K. Danner Clouser and Charles Culver’s ten rules; and Albert Jonsen, Mark Siegler, and William Winslade’s four topics approaches to medical ethics. First, a negative argument shows that common morality does not provide an account of medical ethics and then a positive argument demonstrates why the medical profession requires its own distinctive ethics. The paper also provides a way to distinguish roles and professions and an account of the distinctive duties of medical ethics. It concludes by emphasizing ways in which the uncommon morality approach to medical ethics is markedly different from the common morality approach.


2016 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-45
Author(s):  
Benjamin Bautz
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Jeffrey Kovac

In ordinary language, the words ethics and morals are used interchangeably to refer to standards of conduct or social norms that guide proper behavior. The English ethics derives from the Greek ethika, meaning character or custom, and is related to the Latin mores, also meaning custom, which gave us the word moral. Some philosophers, however, distinguish between the two. Morals is often taken to refer to universal norms of human behavior—the distinction between good and evil—whereas ethics is used as a generic term for all the different ways scholars use to understand and examine our moral lives (Beauchamp and Childress 2001). Some approaches to ethics are normative while others are nonnormative. Normative approaches seek to discover and justify the general standards of be­havior we should accept, and to apply them to specific situations. Nonnormative approaches can be descriptive—that is, factual investigations of moral con­duct and belief—or what is called meta-ethics, the analysis of ethical language, concepts, and methods of reasoning. Morality generally refers to norms for right and wrong human conduct that are so widely shared they form a stable social consensus. Here it is important to distinguish between what many philosophers call the common morality, the norms that all serious persons share, and communal norms that are shared only by a specific community. Common morality, although it cannot be specified precisely, is universal. Communal norms are similar to the common morality but are specific to a particular group, like a religious or cultural community. Common morality also includes moral ideals and extraordinary virtues, which call us to exhibit morally exemplary behavior. Common morality seems to spring from human nature as shaped by living together in community. Successful communal life requires that people adhere to certain standards of behavior. For example, a principle of promise keeping seems essential to any society, whatever its specific organization. Similarly, the arbitrary harming or killing of other people cannot be tolerated in a civilized society. A principle of truth telling seems essential to all human relationships.


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