The enactment of shared agency in teams exploring Mars through rovers

Author(s):  
Dan Chiappe ◽  
John Vervaeke
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Ellen Kristine Solbrekke Hansen

AbstractThis paper aims to give detailed insights of interactional aspects of students’ agency, reasoning, and collaboration, in their attempt to solve a linear function problem together. Four student pairs from a Norwegian upper secondary school suggested and explained ideas, tested it out, and evaluated their solution methods. The student–student interactions were studied by characterizing students’ individual mathematical reasoning, collaborative processes, and exercised agency. In the analysis, two interaction patterns emerged from the roles in how a student engaged or refrained from engaging in the collaborative work. Students’ engagement reveals aspects of how collaborative processes and mathematical reasoning co-exist with their agencies, through two ways of interacting: bi-directional interaction and one-directional interaction. Four student pairs illuminate how different roles in their collaboration are connected to shared agency or individual agency for merging knowledge together in shared understanding. In one-directional interactions, students engaged with different agencies as a primary agent, leading the conversation, making suggestions and explanations sometimes anchored in mathematical properties, or, as a secondary agent, listening and attempting to understand ideas are expressed by a peer. A secondary agent rarely reasoned mathematically. Both students attempted to collaborate, but rarely or never disagreed. The interactional pattern in bi-directional interactions highlights a mutual attempt to collaborate where both students were the driving forces of the problem-solving process. Students acted with similar roles where both were exercising a shared agency, building the final argument together by suggesting, accepting, listening, and negotiating mathematical properties. A critical variable for such a successful interaction was the collaborative process of repairing their shared understanding and reasoning anchored in mathematical properties of linear functions.


Author(s):  
PATRICK FRIERSON

Abstract This paper lays out the moral theory of philosopher and educator Maria Montessori (1870–1952). Based on a moral epistemology wherein moral concepts are grounded in a well-cultivated moral sense, Montessori develops a threefold account of moral life. She starts with an account of character as an ideal of individual self-perfection through concentrated attention on effortful work. She shows how respect for others grows from and supplements individual character, and she further develops a notion of social solidarity that goes beyond cooperation toward shared agency. Partly because she attends to children's ethical lives, Montessori highlights how character, respect, and solidarity all appear first as prereflective, embodied orientations of agency. Full moral virtue takes up prereflective orientations reflectively and extends them through moral concepts. Overall, Montessori's ethic improves on features similar to some in Nietzschean, Kantian, Hegelian, or Aristotelian ethical theories while situating these within a developmental and perfectionist ethics.


2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas H. Smith

AbstractI compare Bratman’s theory with Gilbert’s. I draw attention to their ­similarities, query Bratman’s claim that his theory is the more parsimonious, and point to one theoretical advantage of Gilbert’s theory.


2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael E. Bratman

AbstractThese are replies to the discussions by Kirk Ludwig, Elizabeth Pacherie, Björn Petersson, Abraham Roth, and Thomas Smith of Michael E. Bratman, Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together (Oxford University Press, 2014).


Noûs ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 284-308 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher McMahon
Keyword(s):  

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