scholarly journals The Moral Philosophy of Maria Montessori

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
PATRICK FRIERSON
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Virtue ◽  
Social Solidarity ◽  
Ethical Theories ◽  
Moral Concepts ◽  
Maria Montessori ◽  
Individual Character ◽  
Individual Self ◽  
Shared Agency

Abstract This paper lays out the moral theory of philosopher and educator Maria Montessori (1870–1952). Based on a moral epistemology wherein moral concepts are grounded in a well-cultivated moral sense, Montessori develops a threefold account of moral life. She starts with an account of character as an ideal of individual self-perfection through concentrated attention on effortful work. She shows how respect for others grows from and supplements individual character, and she further develops a notion of social solidarity that goes beyond cooperation toward shared agency. Partly because she attends to children's ethical lives, Montessori highlights how character, respect, and solidarity all appear first as prereflective, embodied orientations of agency. Full moral virtue takes up prereflective orientations reflectively and extends them through moral concepts. Overall, Montessori's ethic improves on features similar to some in Nietzschean, Kantian, Hegelian, or Aristotelian ethical theories while situating these within a developmental and perfectionist ethics.

The Place of Cicero in Locke’s Moral Theology

2019 ◽  
pp. 19-88
Author(s):  
Tim Stuart-Buttle
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Theology ◽  
Christian Theology ◽  
Ethical Theories ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Unpublished Works

Locke’s published and unpublished works disclose a marked contempt for classical moral philosophy, with one signal exception: Cicero. This chapter reconstructs Locke’s interpretation of Cicero, to explain why he was held to be an exception to Locke’s more general disdain for ancient ethical theories. This approach also illuminates our understanding of the relationship between Locke’s moral theory, political philosophy, writings of Christian apologetic, and theory of toleration. It suggests that Locke’s moral philosophy is decidedly more complex, and richer, than is often recognized: pregnant with naturalistic impulses that were nonetheless subordinated to a grounding of morality in the authority, will, and command of a divine legislator. These aspects of Locke’s moral theory proved to be immensely stimulating to later British philosophers such as Hume, even if they sought systematically to decouple moral philosophy from Christian theology.

Intellectual Virtues

2020 ◽  
pp. 93-107
Author(s):  
Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Moral Virtue ◽  
Intellectual Virtue ◽  
Intellectual Virtues ◽  
Long Period

This chapter defends the view that intellectual virtues are deep and enduring acquired intellectual excellences, supported by the underlying idea in Exemplarist Moral Theory that excellences are admirable traits, and admirable traits are those that people admire on reflection and that have features identified in empirical studies. The intellectual virtues require both admirable intellectual motivations and reliable success in reaching the truth, and the defense of this claim is that that is what people admire on reflection. The connection of intellectual virtue with moral virtue also explains admirable states like wisdom that are recently getting attention in philosophy and psychology after a long period of neglect.

Descriptive Moral Theories

2020 ◽  
pp. 45-72
Author(s):  
Anne-Marie Søndergaard Christensen
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Ludwig Wittgenstein ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Problem ◽  
Moral Language ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Moral Problems ◽  
Insight Into ◽  
Moral Philosophers

This chapter develops an alternative, descriptive understanding of moral theory in order to reconcile two apparently conflicting insights; the insight of the critics of moral theory into the problems of the dominant conception of moral theory and the insight into the relevance that we still attribute to the positions traditionally conceived as theories such as Kantianism and utilitarianism. Building on the work of theory-critics, but without giving up the notion of moral theory, the chapter presents a view according to which theories are descriptive rather than prescriptive and serve heuristic and elucidatory purposes. Inspired by the notion of grammar found in the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, it is furthermore claimed that theories are descriptions which provide overviews of various normative structures of concerns—or moral grammars—and which may serve two different purposes, providing either general descriptions of the logic of our moral language or descriptions that elucidate a specific moral problem. According to this view, moral philosophers must accept the co-existence of a plurality of moral theories that describe a plurality of moral grammars, and they must give up the idea that moral theories are mutually exclusive. Moreover, the development of the second purpose reveals that theories cannot be the sole tool of moral philosophy, they need to be supplemented with grammatical investigations of the particularities involved in moral problems. Moral theories can be helpful, but they are never sufficient when addressing a problem in moral philosophy.

scholarly journals La Ética Aristotélica en Castilla: las bibliotecas universitarias medievales y prerrenacentistas = The Aristotelian Ethics in Castile: The Medieval and Pre-Renaissance University Libraries

2018 ◽  
pp. 221 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Díez Yáñez
Keyword(s):  
Qualitative Analysis ◽  
Iberian Peninsula ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
University Libraries ◽  
Late Medieval ◽  
Aristotle's Ethics ◽  
The University ◽  
Península Ibérica

Todavía en demasiadas ocasiones se ha dejado de lado el panorama hispánico en el contexto europeo. Por eso presento aquí un estudio de los ejemplares aristotélicos conservados en las bibliotecas catedralicias y universitarias del reino de Castilla.  La revisión de los inventarios y catálogos de manuscritos e incunables proporciona un análisis cuantitativo y cualitativo del fondo aristotélico. El objetivo es proporcionar un corpus de los antecedentes necesarios para una mejor comprensión y estudio de la recepción de la moral aristotélica en la Castilla tardomedieval y renacentista.La cultura cortesana se sirve de la moral de Aristóteles para construir y difundir un discurso a favor de la monarquía. Una de las vías de acceso más importantes al texto aristotélico es la universitaria. A partir de ahí, resultarán especialmente interesantes las adaptaciones y transmisiones de la Ética en los contextos aristocráticos.La transmisión del texto de la Ética aristotélica en Castilla responde a factores europeos y a características propias del contexto hispánico. De esta manera, se podrán perfilar las peculiaridades del aristotelismo en la península ibérica, a la vez que completar el recorrido del aristotelismo en Europa. All too often, the Hispanic case in history has been neglected in European-wide studies. For this reason, we will study the works of Aristotle held in cathedral and university libraries in the kingdom of Castile. A quantitative and qualitative analysis of the manuscripts and incunabula of Aristotelian writings by way of the inventories of Castilian universities will be undertaken in order to create a corpus of existing works and determine the reception of Aristotelian moral philosophy in late-medieval and Renaissance Castile.Courtly culture adopted Aristotelian moral theory to construct and transmit a discourse in favour of monarchy. The university is one of the most important centres where one could get access to Aristotelian texts. From this basis, we will study the adaptation and transmission of Aristotle’s Ethics in an aristocratic context.The transmission of the text of Aristotle’s Ethics in Castile responds to European factors as well as to characteristics derived from the particular Hispanic context. This study enhances our understanding of the characteristics of Aristotelianism in the Iberian Peninsula, and allows us to complete the wider picture in Europe.

Needs, Moral Demands and Moral Theory

Utilitas ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 251-266 ◽  
Author(s):  
SORAN READER ◽  
GILLIAN BROCK
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Life ◽  
Moral Practice ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Moral Demandingness ◽  
Moral Demands

In this article we argue that the concept of need is as vital for moral theory as it is for moral life. In II we analyse need and its normativity in public and private moral practice. In III we describe simple cases which exemplify the moral demandingness of needs, and argue that the significance of simple cases for moral theory is obscured by the emphasis in moral philosophy on unusual cases. In IV we argue that moral theories are inadequate if they cannot describe simple needs-meeting cases. We argue that the elimination or reduction of need to other concepts such as value, duty, virtue or care is unsatisfactory, in which case moral theories that make those concepts fundamental will have to be revised. In conclusion, we suggest that if moral theories cannot be revised to accommodate needs, they may have to be replaced with a fully needs-based theory.

Reciprocity in Morality and Law

2013 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 201-227 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronit Donyets Kedar
Keyword(s):  
Social Contract ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Cooperative Scheme ◽  
The Social ◽  
Mutual Advantage ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Modern Moral Philosophy ◽  
Liberal Thought

Abstract Western liberal thought, which is rooted in the social contract tradition, views the relationship between rational contractors as fundamental to the authority of law, politics, and morality. Within this liberal discourse, dominant strands of modern moral philosophy claim that morality too is best understood in contractual terms. Accordingly, others are perceived first and foremost as autonomous, free, and equal parties to a reciprocal cooperative scheme, designed for mutual advantage. This Article aims to challenge the contractual model as an appropriate framework for morality. My claim is that the constituting concepts of contractualist thought, especially the idea of reciprocity, while perhaps fitting to law, are misplaced in morality. I argue that importing the concept of reciprocity and its conceptual habitat from law to morality yields ethical contractualism an unconvincing moral theory.

scholarly journals What Can Philosophers Learn from Psychopathy?

2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heidi L. Maibom
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Current Evidence ◽  
Secondary Psychopathy

Many spectacular claims about psychopaths are circulated. This contribution aims at providing the reader with the more complex reality of the phenomenon (or phenomena), and to point to issues of particular interest to philosophers working in moral psychology and moral theory. I first discuss the current evidence regarding psychopaths’ deficient empathy and decision-making skills. I then explore what difference it makes to our thinking whether we regard their deficit dimensionally (as involving abilities that are on or off) and whether we focus on primary or secondary psychopathy. My conclusion is that most grand claims about psychopathy settling long-standing debates in moral philosophy and psychology are overblown, but there is much to be learnt from this disorder when it comes to formulating modern theories of moral psychology.

Looking for Answers in All the Wrong Places

2004 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 293-313 ◽  
Author(s):  
Earl W. Spurgin
Keyword(s):  
Business Ethics ◽  
Social Contract ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Question ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
The Way

Abstract:In recent years, many business ethicists have raised problems with the “ethics pays” credo. Despite these problems, many continue to hold it. I argue that support for the credo leads business ethicists away from a potentially fruitful approach found in Hume’s moral philosophy. I begin by demonstrating that attempts to support the credo fail because proponents are trying to provide an answer to the “Why be moral?” question that is based on rational self-interest. Then, I show that Hume’s sentiments-based moral theory provides an alternative to the credo that points toward a more fruitful approach to business ethics. Along the way, I examine a recent social contract alternative to the credo that, despite many appealing features, is less effective than is the Humean alternative. Finally, I develop a Humean approach to business ethics and demonstrate why it is a desirable alternative that business ethicists should explore.

Aristotelian Virtue and Its Limitations

Philosophy ◽  
1994 ◽  
Vol 69 (269) ◽  
pp. 291-316 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christipher Cordner
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Human Life ◽  
Moral Virtue ◽  
Ethical Thought ◽  
Living Well ◽  
The World ◽  
Good Will ◽  
The Will

‘Virtue ethics’ is prominent, if not pre-eminent, in contemporary moral philosophy. The philosophical model for most of those urging a ‘virtues approach’ to ethics is of course Aristotle. Some features, at least, of the motivation to this renewed concern with Aristotelian ethical thought are fairly clear. Notoriously, Kant held that the only thing good without qualification is the good will; and he then made it difficult to grasp what made the will good when he denied that it could be its preoccupation with or attention to anything in the world. The idea of the good will then seems to be an idea of something which transcends the world, and therefore to be no easier to make sense of, or to believe in, than Plato′s form of the good is usually thought to be. The first obvious attraction of Aristotle′s ethics, then—at least to those of an empiricist or worldly cast of mind—is that it promises an understanding of the ethical which locates that robustly within the world. Aristotle′s virtues are real this-worldly existences. They are, moreover, qualities whose place in our lives seems to be explained readily, and attractively, in Aristotelian terms. Moral virtue is essentially connected with eudaimonia, a concept variously construed as happiness, as living well, or even as flourishing. Morality is important because of the contribution it makes to the living of a fully human life. And a ‘fully human’ life is characterizable in what modernity calls ‘humanist’, or sometimes ‘naturalistic’, terms: it requires no invocation of transcendence or other-worldliness.

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