Epistemic akrasia and higher-order beliefs

2019 ◽  
Vol 177 (9) ◽  
pp. 2501-2515
Author(s):  
Timothy Kearl
Keyword(s):  
Higher Order ◽  
Epistemic Akrasia

Higher-Order Evidence

2019 ◽  
pp. 312-344
Author(s):  
Declan Smithies
Keyword(s):  
Higher Order ◽  
Epistemic Rationality ◽  
Total Evidence ◽  
Epistemic Akrasia ◽  
Level Splitting ◽  
Higher Order Evidence

Chapter 10 explores a puzzle about epistemic akrasia: if you can have misleading higher-order evidence about what your evidence supports, then your total evidence can make it rationally permissible to be epistemically akratic. Section 10.1 presents the puzzle and three options for solving it: Level Splitting, Downward Push, and Upward Push. Section 10.2 argues that we should opt for Upward Push: you cannot have misleading higher-order evidence about what your evidence is or what it supports. Sections 10.3 and 10.4 defend Upward Push against David Christensen’s objection that it licenses irrational forms of dogmatism in ideal and nonideal agents alike. Section 10.5 responds to his argument that misleading higher-order evidence generates rational dilemmas in which you’re guaranteed to violate one of the ideals of epistemic rationality. Section 10.6 concludes with some general reflections on the nature of epistemic rationality and the role of epistemic idealization.

Epistemic Akrasia

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Owens
Keyword(s):  
Higher Order ◽  
Epistemic Akrasia ◽  
First Order

In a case of practical akrasia, we freely do something even though we judge that we ought not to do it. This chapter discusses the possibility of epistemic akrasia. Epistemic akrasia is possible only if (a) a person’s (first-order) beliefs can diverge from their higher-order judgements about what it would be reasonable for them to believe, and (b) these divergent (first-order) beliefs are freely and deliberately formed. Several recent authors deny the possibility of epistemic akrasia because they doubt that (a) can be true. I argue that though (a) can indeed be true, (b) cannot. On this point, believing is contrasted with guessing.

scholarly journals Suspension, Higher-Order Evidence, and Defeat

2021 ◽  
pp. 116-145
Author(s):  
Errol Lord ◽  
Kurt Sylvan
Keyword(s):  
Higher Order ◽  
Functional Profile ◽  
Reasons For Belief ◽  
Epistemic Akrasia ◽  
First Order ◽  
Evidential Support ◽  
Support Relations ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Suspension Of Judgment ◽  
Higher Order Evidence

This paper has two main goals. The first and most central goal is to develop a framework for understanding higher-order defeat. The framework rests on the idea that higher-order evidence provides direct reasons for suspending judgment which leave evidential support relations on the first order intact. Equally importantly, we also seek to explain how this sort of defeat is possible by showing how direct reasons for suspension of judgment flow from the functional profile of suspension of judgment. As a result, our framework is embedded within an account of the nature of suspension of judgment that shows how new insights about its nature lead to a different picture of its rational profile. A second and subsidiary goal of the paper is to show how our framework provides a compelling basis for more moderate positions about disagreement and epistemic akrasia. We show that the puzzles about these topics rest on more fundamental mistakes about suspension and the relationship between reasons for suspension, reasons for belief, and evidence.

scholarly journals EPISTEMIC AKRASIA AND EPISTEMIC REASONS

Episteme ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 282-302 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc-Kevin Daoust
Keyword(s):  
Partial Solution ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Epistemic Rationality ◽  
Epistemic Reasons ◽  
Rational Agents ◽  
Epistemic Akrasia ◽  
First Order ◽  
Theoretical Assumptions ◽  
Square Well

ABSTRACTIt seems that epistemically rational agents should avoid incoherent combinations of beliefs and should respond correctly to their epistemic reasons. However, some situations seem to indicate that such requirements cannot be simultaneously satisfied. In such contexts, assuming that there is no unsolvable dilemma of epistemic rationality, either (i) it could be rational that one's higher-order attitudes do not align with one's first-order attitudes or (ii) requirements such as responding correctly to epistemic reasons that agents have are not genuine rationality requirements. This result doesn't square well with plausible theoretical assumptions concerning epistemic rationality. So, how do we solve this puzzle? In this paper, I will suggest that an agent can always reason from infallible higher-order reasons. This provides a partial solution to the above puzzle.

scholarly journals DISAGREEMENT, DRUGS, ETC.: FROM ACCURACY TO AKRASIA

Episteme ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 397-422 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Christensen
Keyword(s):  
Higher Order ◽  
Epistemic Akrasia ◽  
Implicit Biases ◽  
Pros And Cons ◽  
The One ◽  
Higher Order Evidence

ABSTRACTWe often get evidence concerning the reliability of our own thinking about some particular matter. This “higher-order evidence” can come from the disagreement of others, or from information about our being subject to the effects of drugs, fatigue, emotional ties, implicit biases, etc. This paper examines some pros and cons of two fairly general models for accommodating higher-order evidence. The one that currently seems most promising also turns out to have the consequence that epistemic akrasia should occur more frequently than is sometimes supposed. But it also helps us see why this might not be a bad thing.

Epistemic Akrasia, Higher-order Evidence, and Charitable Belief Attribution

2015 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 296-314 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hamid Vahid
Keyword(s):  
Higher Order ◽  
Epistemic Status ◽  
Belief Attribution ◽  
Radical Interpretation ◽  
Standard Argument ◽  
Epistemic Akrasia ◽  
First Order ◽  
Higher Order Evidence

Epistemic akrasia refers to the possibility of forming an attitude that fails to conform to one’s best judgment. In this paper, I will be concerned with the question whether epistemic akrasia is rational and I will argue that it is not. Addressing this question, in turn, raises the question of the epistemic significance of higher-order evidence. After examining some of the views on this subject, I will present an argument to show why higher-order evidence is relevant to the epistemic status of the pertinent first-order beliefs. This helps to show why a standard argument for the rationality of epistemic akrasia does not work. Finally, I shall try to show how considerations involving Davidson’s theory of radical interpretation bear on the question of the rationality of epistemic akrasia.

scholarly journals Higher-Order Uncertainty

2019 ◽  
pp. 35-61 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin Dorst
Keyword(s):  
Higher Order ◽  
Clear Picture ◽  
Central Question ◽  
Epistemology Of Disagreement ◽  
Epistemic Akrasia ◽  
First Order ◽  
Higher Order Evidence

You have higher-order uncertainty iff you are uncertain of what opinions you should have. This chapter defends three claims about it. First, the higher-order evidence debate can be helpfully reframed in terms of higher-order uncertainty. The central question becomes how your first- and higher-order opinions should relate—a precise question that can be embedded within a general, tractable framework. Second, this question is nontrivial. Rational higher-order uncertainty is pervasive, and lies at the foundations of the epistemology of disagreement. Third, the answer is not obvious. The Enkratic Intuition—that your first-order opinions must “line up” with your higher-order opinions—is incorrect; epistemic akrasia can be rational. If all this is right, then it leaves us without answers—but with a clear picture of the question, and a fruitful strategy for pursuing it.

Dual systems for all: Higher-order, role-based relational reasoning as a uniquely derived feature of human cognition

2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel J. Povinelli ◽  
Gabrielle C. Glorioso ◽  
Shannon L. Kuznar ◽  
Mateja Pavlic
Keyword(s):  
Temporal Reasoning ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Important Case ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Relational Reasoning ◽  
Dual Systems ◽  
First Order ◽  
Reasoning System ◽  
Role Based

Abstract Hoerl and McCormack demonstrate that although animals possess a sophisticated temporal updating system, there is no evidence that they also possess a temporal reasoning system. This important case study is directly related to the broader claim that although animals are manifestly capable of first-order (perceptually-based) relational reasoning, they lack the capacity for higher-order, role-based relational reasoning. We argue this distinction applies to all domains of cognition.

Quantitative EPMA of nitrogen : A tricky element in the electron-probe microanalyzer

1992 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 1622-1623
Author(s):  
G.F. Bastin ◽  
H.J.M. Heijligers
Keyword(s):  
Background Subtraction ◽  
Electron Probe ◽  
Detection System ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Light Elements ◽  
Strong Suppression ◽  
Electron Probe Microanalyzer ◽  
Quantitative Epma ◽  
Peak Count ◽  
Lead Stearate

Among the ultra-light elements B, C, N, and O nitrogen is the most difficult element to deal with in the electron probe microanalyzer. This is mainly caused by the severe absorption that N-Kα radiation suffers in carbon which is abundantly present in the detection system (lead-stearate crystal, carbonaceous counter window). As a result the peak-to-background ratios for N-Kα measured with a conventional lead-stearate crystal can attain values well below unity in many binary nitrides . An additional complication can be caused by the presence of interfering higher-order reflections from the metal partner in the nitride specimen; notorious examples are elements such as Zr and Nb. In nitrides containing these elements is is virtually impossible to carry out an accurate background subtraction which becomes increasingly important with lower and lower peak-to-background ratios. The use of a synthetic multilayer crystal such as W/Si (2d-spacing 59.8 Å) can bring significant improvements in terms of both higher peak count rates as well as a strong suppression of higher-order reflections.

Effects of Higher-Order Laue Zone reflections on structure images

1993 ◽  
Vol 51 ◽  
pp. 450-451
Author(s):  
H. S. Kim ◽  
S. S. Sheinin
Keyword(s):  
Wave Vector ◽  
Theoretical Calculations ◽  
Reciprocal Lattice ◽  
Image Plane ◽  
Bloch Wave ◽  
Dynamical Theory ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Lattice Image ◽  
Lattice Vector ◽  
Image Position

The importance of image simulation in interpreting experimental lattice images is well established. Normally, in carrying out the required theoretical calculations, only zero order Laue zone reflections are taken into account. In this paper we assess the conditions for which this procedure is valid and indicate circumstances in which higher order Laue zone reflections may be important. Our work is based on an analysis of the requirements for obtaining structure images i.e. images directly related to the projected potential. In the considerations to follow, the Bloch wave formulation of the dynamical theory has been used.The intensity in a lattice image can be obtained from the total wave function at the image plane is given by: where ϕg(z) is the diffracted beam amplitide given by In these equations,the z direction is perpendicular to the entrance surface, g is a reciprocal lattice vector, the Cg(i) are Fourier coefficients in the expression for a Bloch wave, b(i), X(i) is the Bloch wave excitation coefficient, ϒ(i)=k(i)-K, k(i) is a Bloch wave vector, K is the electron wave vector after correction for the mean inner potential of the crystal, T(q) and D(q) are the transfer function and damping function respectively, q is a scattering vector and the summation is over i=l,N where N is the number of beams taken into account.

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