scholarly journals DISAGREEMENT, DRUGS, ETC.: FROM ACCURACY TO AKRASIA

Episteme ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 397-422 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Christensen
Keyword(s):  
Higher Order ◽  
Epistemic Akrasia ◽  
Implicit Biases ◽  
Pros And Cons ◽  
The One ◽  
Higher Order Evidence

ABSTRACTWe often get evidence concerning the reliability of our own thinking about some particular matter. This “higher-order evidence” can come from the disagreement of others, or from information about our being subject to the effects of drugs, fatigue, emotional ties, implicit biases, etc. This paper examines some pros and cons of two fairly general models for accommodating higher-order evidence. The one that currently seems most promising also turns out to have the consequence that epistemic akrasia should occur more frequently than is sometimes supposed. But it also helps us see why this might not be a bad thing.

Higher-Order Evidence

2019 ◽  
pp. 312-344
Author(s):  
Declan Smithies
Keyword(s):  
Higher Order ◽  
Epistemic Rationality ◽  
Total Evidence ◽  
Epistemic Akrasia ◽  
Level Splitting ◽  
Higher Order Evidence

Chapter 10 explores a puzzle about epistemic akrasia: if you can have misleading higher-order evidence about what your evidence supports, then your total evidence can make it rationally permissible to be epistemically akratic. Section 10.1 presents the puzzle and three options for solving it: Level Splitting, Downward Push, and Upward Push. Section 10.2 argues that we should opt for Upward Push: you cannot have misleading higher-order evidence about what your evidence is or what it supports. Sections 10.3 and 10.4 defend Upward Push against David Christensen’s objection that it licenses irrational forms of dogmatism in ideal and nonideal agents alike. Section 10.5 responds to his argument that misleading higher-order evidence generates rational dilemmas in which you’re guaranteed to violate one of the ideals of epistemic rationality. Section 10.6 concludes with some general reflections on the nature of epistemic rationality and the role of epistemic idealization.

scholarly journals Suspension, Higher-Order Evidence, and Defeat

2021 ◽  
pp. 116-145
Author(s):  
Errol Lord ◽  
Kurt Sylvan
Keyword(s):  
Higher Order ◽  
Functional Profile ◽  
Reasons For Belief ◽  
Epistemic Akrasia ◽  
First Order ◽  
Evidential Support ◽  
Support Relations ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Suspension Of Judgment ◽  
Higher Order Evidence

This paper has two main goals. The first and most central goal is to develop a framework for understanding higher-order defeat. The framework rests on the idea that higher-order evidence provides direct reasons for suspending judgment which leave evidential support relations on the first order intact. Equally importantly, we also seek to explain how this sort of defeat is possible by showing how direct reasons for suspension of judgment flow from the functional profile of suspension of judgment. As a result, our framework is embedded within an account of the nature of suspension of judgment that shows how new insights about its nature lead to a different picture of its rational profile. A second and subsidiary goal of the paper is to show how our framework provides a compelling basis for more moderate positions about disagreement and epistemic akrasia. We show that the puzzles about these topics rest on more fundamental mistakes about suspension and the relationship between reasons for suspension, reasons for belief, and evidence.

ON THE EPISTEMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF EVIDENCE YOU SHOULD HAVE HAD

Episteme ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 449-470 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sanford C. Goldberg
Keyword(s):  
Strict Liability ◽  
Full Range ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
The Other ◽  
Total Evidence ◽  
Knowing How ◽  
The One ◽  
Additional Support ◽  
Higher Order Evidence

ABSTRACTElsewhere I and others have argued that evidence one should have had can bear on the justification of one's belief, in the form of defeating one's justification. In this paper, I am interested in knowing how evidence one should have had (on the one hand) and one's higher-order evidence (on the other) interact in determinations of the justification of belief. In doing so I aim to address two types of scenario that previous discussions have left open. In one type of scenario, there is a clash between a subject's higher-order evidence and the evidence she should have had: S's higher-order evidence is misleading as to the existence or likely epistemic bearing of further evidence she should have. In the other, while there is further evidence S should have had, this evidence would only have offered additional support for S's belief that p. The picture I offer derives from two “epistemic ceiling” principles linking evidence to justification: one's justification for the belief that p can be no higher than it is on one's total evidence, nor can it be higher than what it would have been had one had all of the evidence one should have had. Together, these two principles entail what I call the doctrine of Epistemic Strict Liability: insofar as one fails to have evidence one should have had, one is epistemically answerable to that evidence whatever reasons one happened to have regarding the likely epistemic bearing of that evidence. I suggest that such a position can account for the battery of intuitions elicited in the full range of cases I will be considering.

Epistemic Akrasia, Higher-order Evidence, and Charitable Belief Attribution

2015 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 296-314 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hamid Vahid
Keyword(s):  
Higher Order ◽  
Epistemic Status ◽  
Belief Attribution ◽  
Radical Interpretation ◽  
Standard Argument ◽  
Epistemic Akrasia ◽  
First Order ◽  
Higher Order Evidence

Epistemic akrasia refers to the possibility of forming an attitude that fails to conform to one’s best judgment. In this paper, I will be concerned with the question whether epistemic akrasia is rational and I will argue that it is not. Addressing this question, in turn, raises the question of the epistemic significance of higher-order evidence. After examining some of the views on this subject, I will present an argument to show why higher-order evidence is relevant to the epistemic status of the pertinent first-order beliefs. This helps to show why a standard argument for the rationality of epistemic akrasia does not work. Finally, I shall try to show how considerations involving Davidson’s theory of radical interpretation bear on the question of the rationality of epistemic akrasia.

scholarly journals Higher-Order Uncertainty

2019 ◽  
pp. 35-61 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin Dorst
Keyword(s):  
Higher Order ◽  
Clear Picture ◽  
Central Question ◽  
Epistemology Of Disagreement ◽  
Epistemic Akrasia ◽  
First Order ◽  
Higher Order Evidence

You have higher-order uncertainty iff you are uncertain of what opinions you should have. This chapter defends three claims about it. First, the higher-order evidence debate can be helpfully reframed in terms of higher-order uncertainty. The central question becomes how your first- and higher-order opinions should relate—a precise question that can be embedded within a general, tractable framework. Second, this question is nontrivial. Rational higher-order uncertainty is pervasive, and lies at the foundations of the epistemology of disagreement. Third, the answer is not obvious. The Enkratic Intuition—that your first-order opinions must “line up” with your higher-order opinions—is incorrect; epistemic akrasia can be rational. If all this is right, then it leaves us without answers—but with a clear picture of the question, and a fruitful strategy for pursuing it.

scholarly journals Preserving the Shape of Functions by Applying Multidimensional Schoenberg-Type Operators

Symmetry ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (6) ◽  
pp. 1016
Author(s):  
Camelia Liliana Moldovan ◽  
Radu Păltănea
Keyword(s):  
Applied Sciences ◽  
Degree Of Approximation ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Dimensional Case ◽  
Moduli Of Continuity ◽  
One Dimensional ◽  
Multidimensional Generalization ◽  
The One

The paper presents a multidimensional generalization of the Schoenberg operators of higher order. The new operators are powerful tools that can be used for approximation processes in many fields of applied sciences. The construction of these operators uses a symmetry regarding the domain of definition. The degree of approximation by sequences of such operators is given in terms of the first and the second order moduli of continuity. Extending certain results obtained by Marsden in the one-dimensional case, the property of preservation of monotonicity and convexity is proved.

scholarly journals «Vi vil børste vekk asken, men holde liv i ilden.» En kvalitativ studie av et mentorprogram for unge idrettsledere1

2020 ◽  
pp. 207-230
Author(s):  
Birthe Kåfjord Lange ◽  
Hans Erik Næss
Keyword(s):  
Qualitative Interviews ◽  
Leadership Skills ◽  
Mentoring Programs ◽  
Mentoring Program ◽  
Sports Management ◽  
Leadership Qualities ◽  
Personal Strengths ◽  
Sporting Culture ◽  
Pros And Cons ◽  
The One

Norwegian sports today are characterized on the one hand by a need to innovate organizationally and rethink current practices, and on the other hand to respect national traditions and values of sporting culture. This dual responsibility poses a particular challenge to sports leaders of tomorrow. Whereas other studies have examined sports management education or sports leadership qualities as solutions to this challenge, this chapter examines the potential of a mentoring program to improve leadership skills. It draws upon qualitative interviews with participants, mentors and organizers of the 2019/2020 Mentor Program for Young Sport Leaders offered by the Norwegian Federation of Sports (NIF) and the Norwegian Association of Student Sports (NSI). Our findings reveal that this program enables young sports leaders to become more aware of their personal strengths and weaknesses. At the same time, the transfer value they represent to the organization is conditioned by prior experience, attendance motives and mentee-mentor relations. Consequently, this program reproduces known pros and cons found in earlier research on mentoring programs, yet offers something new in the sense that it allows young leaders to be part of the solution to issues in Norwegian sports by defining the relevant problems.

Research on CNN Coal and Rock Recognition Method Based on Hyperspectral Data

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jianjian Yang ◽  
Boshen Chang ◽  
Yuchen Zhang ◽  
Wenjie Luo ◽  
Miao Wu
Keyword(s):  
Near Infrared ◽  
Dropout Rate ◽  
Hyperspectral Data ◽  
Standard Normal ◽  
Infrared Spectrometer ◽  
Pros And Cons ◽  
Mining Face ◽  
The One ◽  
Near Infrared Spectrometer ◽  
Spectrum Data

Abstract Aiming at the problem of coal gangue identification in the current fully mechanized mining face and coal washing links, this article proposes a CNN coal and rock identification method based on hyperspectral data. First, collect coal and rock spectrum data by a near-infrared spectrometer, and then use four methods such as first-order differential (FD), second-order differential (SD), standard normal variable transformation (SNV), and multi-style smoothing to filter the 120 sets of collected data. The coal and rock reflectance spectrum data is preprocessed to enhance the intensity of spectral reflectance and absorption characteristics, and effectively remove the spectral curve noise generated by instrument performance and environmental factors.Construct a CNN model, judge the pros and cons of the model by comparing the accuracy of the three parameter combinations, select the most appropriate learning rate, the number of feature extraction layers, and the dropout rate, and generate the best CNN classifier for hyperspectral data. Rock recognition. Experiments show that the recognition accuracy of the one-dimensional convolutional neural network model proposed in this paper reaches 94.6%, which is higher than BP (57%), SVM (72%) and DBN (86%). Verify the advantages and effectiveness of the method proposed in this article.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document