Philadelphia reconsidered: participant curation, the Gerry Committee, and US constitutional design

Public Choice ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen C. Phillips ◽  
Alex P. Smith ◽  
Peter R. Licari
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Design

Constituting Scotland

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. Elliot Bulmer
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Constitutional Theory ◽  
Constitutional Design ◽  
Global Trends ◽  
National Movement ◽  
Comparative Constitutional Law ◽  
Constitutional Thought ◽  
Scottish Government ◽  
Historical Trajectory ◽  
Constitutional Tradition

The rise of the Scottish national movement has been accompanied by the emergence of distinct constitutional ideas, claims and arguments, which may affect constitutional design in any future independent Scotland. Drawing on the fields of constitutional theory, comparative constitutional law, and Scottish studies, this book examines the historical trajectory of the constitutional question in Scotland and analyses the influences and constraints on the constitutional imagination of the Scottish national movement, in terms of both the national and international contexts. It identifies an emerging Scottish nationalist constitutional tradition that is distinct from British constitutional orthodoxies but nevertheless corresponds to broad global trends in constitutional thought and design. Much of the book is devoted to the detailed exposition and comparative analysis of the draft constitution for an independent Scotland published by the SNP in 2002. The 2014 draft interim Constitution presented by the Scottish Government is also examined, and the two texts are contrasted to show the changing nature of the SNP’s constitutional policy: from liberal-procedural constitutionalism in pursuit of a more inclusive polity, to a more populist and majoritarian constitutionalism.

Coalition Governments and Comparative Constitutional Design

2001 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Diermeier ◽  
Hulya Eraslan ◽  
Antonio M. Merlo
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Design ◽  
Coalition Governments

Executive Veto Power and Constitutional Design

2019 ◽  
pp. 93-113
Author(s):  
Nicholas R. Miller
Keyword(s):  
Spatial Model ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Strategic Interaction ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
Constitutional Design ◽  
One Dimensional ◽  
Executive Veto

A “separation of powers” system provides for an executive and legislature with independent powers. While only the legislature can pass bills, executive approval is commonly required for them to become law. The executive exercises veto power by withholding approval. Executive veto power is simple if the executive can only approve a bill or reject it in its entirety; it is constructive if he can amend a bill in certain ways. It is qualified if the legislature can override a veto; it is unqualified otherwise. Any such system creates a gamelike strategic interaction between the legislature and executive. The chapter provides an expository sketch of a variety of such veto games. The analysis is based on a one-dimensional spatial model given three different behavioral assumptions: sincere behavior by both the legislature and executive, strategic behavior by both, and strategic behavior coupled with the possibility of a credible veto threat by the executive. Several extensions and qualifications are briefly noted.

scholarly journals Economic elites and the constitutional design of sharing political power

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Victoria Paniagua ◽  
Jan P. Vogler
Keyword(s):  
Political Power ◽  
Public Institutions ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Scholarly Work ◽  
Economic Interests ◽  
Constitutional Design ◽  
Economic Elite ◽  
State Apparatus ◽  
Economic Elites ◽  
Resource Diversity

AbstractWhat explains the emergence and persistence of institutions aimed at preventing any ruling group from using the state apparatus to advance particularistic interests? To answer this recurring question, a burgeoning literature examines the establishment of power-sharing institutions in societies divided by ethnic or religious cleavages. Going beyond existing scholarly work focused on these specific settings, we argue that political power-sharing institutions can also be the result of common disputes within the economic elite. We propose that these institutions are likely to emerge and persist when competition between elite factions with dissimilar economic interests is balanced. To address the possibility of endogeneity between elite configurations and public institutions, we leverage natural resource diversity as an instrument for elite configurations. We show that, where geological resources are more diverse, competition between similarly powerful economic groups is more likely to emerge, leading ultimately to the establishment of power-sharing mechanisms that allow elite groups to protect their diverging economic interests.

Constitution-making and institutional design. The transformations of presidentialism in Argentina

1999 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 193-232 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gabriel L. Negretto
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Design ◽  
Political Competition ◽  
Analytical Framework ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Collective Decision Making ◽  
Constitutional Design ◽  
Constituent Assembly ◽  
Political Resources ◽  
Micro Level ◽  
Constitution Making

This paper presents an analytical framework for the study of constitutional design from the point of view of the structure of interaction and mechanisms of institutional selection that affect the behavior and choices of the actors involved in a constitution-making process. This framework is used to explain the various limitations introduced to the powers of the President in the Argentine constitution of 1994. I argue that two levels of causation determined this reform. At the macro level, the limitation of presidential powers was the outcome of a distribution of political resources and a configuration of preferences among the actors that made possible the resolution of conflicts by means of compromise. At the micro level, the new set of institutions derived from the limited influence of the incumbent executive over constitutional design, the pluralism of the constituent assembly that approved the constitution, and the prevalence of bargaining as a mechanism of collective decision-making. Both levels of action facilitated a consensual constitution-making process from which emerged a powersharing structure that has the potential to lower the stakes of political competition for presidential office and create new rules of mutual trust between government and opposition.

Aspirational Principles in African Federalism: South Africa, Ethiopia and Nigeria Compared

2021 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 362-382
Author(s):  
Erika Arban ◽  
Adriano Dirri
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Social Cohesion ◽  
Constitutional Design ◽  
Divided Societies ◽  
Common Concern

Finding a balance between diversity and social cohesion is a common concern in constitutional design: in divided societies, such a balance has often been sought through federalism. But the need to reconcile diversity and social cohesion can also be addressed through aspirational values embedded in a constitution. In fact, constitutions may entrench fundamental principles directing policies to foster equality, eliminate obstacles or require the different tiers of government to collaborate harmoniously in the performance of their functions. In exploring solidarity between different communities and cooperative government in South Africa, ethnicity as foundational value in Ethiopia, and the federal character in Nigeria, this article offers a comparative account of the three most important federations in Africa to assess how their constitutions reconcile diversity and social cohesion through aspirational principles related to federalism.

Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment

1994 ◽  
Vol 88 (2) ◽  
pp. 355-370 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald S. Lutz
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Study ◽  
Political Science ◽  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Constitutional Amendment ◽  
Constitutional Design ◽  
Empirical Verification ◽  
American States ◽  
Key Variables ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Cross National

Constitutional design proceeds under the assumption that institutions have predictable consequences, but modern political science has not pursued the empirical verification of these predicted consequences with much vigor. I shall attempt to link the theoretical premises underlying one important aspect of constitutional design, the amendment process, with the empirical patterns revealed by a systematic, comparative study of constitutions. An examination of all amendments in the 50 American states since 1776 reveals patterns that are then confirmed using data from 32 national constitutions. The interaction of the two key variables affecting amendment rate can be described by an equation that generates predicted amendment rates close to those found in the cross-national empirical analysis. A constitution's length measured in number of words, the difficulty of an amendment process, and the rate of amendment turn out to have interlocking consequences that illuminate principles of constitutional design.

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