Does managerial reluctance of dividend cuts signal future earnings?

Author(s):  
James Juichia Lin ◽  
Cheng-Few Lee
2011 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 511-536 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter M. Johnson ◽  
Thomas J. Lopez ◽  
Juan Manuel Sanchez

SYNOPSIS We provide a comprehensive analysis of special items and the characteristics of the firms that recognize them. Our analysis reveals that the temporal frequency, magnitude, and persistence of special items has increased significantly in the last 30 years, and that such increases are primarily driven by negative special items. More recently, however, our evidence is consistent with both a decline in frequency and magnitude of negative special items. On the other hand, we find that the frequency of reporting of positive special items, which remained relatively constant through 2002, has increased in more recent years. We also find strong evidence that subsequent special item reporting is an increasing function of the frequency of “prior” special item reporting. Using a random subsample of firms reporting special items, we document that 22 percent of the amounts reported in Compustat do not reconcile with the amounts reported on the firms' actual financial statements. Our comprehensive analysis should be of interest to regulators, academics, and managers interested in the implications of special items on firm-related consequences such as future earnings and firm value. Our examination can also serve as a catalyst for researchers interested in extending this important area of inquiry.


2005 ◽  
Vol 80 (2) ◽  
pp. 441-476 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qiang Cheng ◽  
Terry D. Warfield

This paper examines the link between managers' equity incentives—arising from stock-based compensation and stock ownership—and earnings management. We hypothesize that managers with high equity incentives are more likely to sell shares in the future and this motivates these managers to engage in earnings management to increase the value of the shares to be sold. Using stock-based compensation and stock ownership data over the 1993–2000 time period, we document that managers with high equity incentives sell more shares in subsequent periods. As expected, we find that managers with high equity incentives are more likely to report earnings that meet or just beat analysts' forecasts. We also find that managers with consistently high equity incentives are less likely to report large positive earnings surprises. This finding is consistent with the wealth of these managers being more sensitive to future stock performance, which leads to increased reserving of current earnings to avoid future earnings disappointments. Collectively, our results indicate that equity incentives lead to incentives for earnings management.


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